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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the role of central banks in the context of financial
crises. In particular, the thesis examines (i) the potential monetary policy’s role in
causing a financial crisis and (ii) the central bank’s management in times of crises.
After a brief introduction in chapter 1, chapter 2 examines if US monetary policy
implicitly responds to asset price booms. Using real-time data and a GMM frame-
work, a Taylor-type rule with an asset variable that captures phases of booms and
busts in the real estate market is estimated and yields two main findings. Firstly, the
Fed does implicitly respond to asset price booms in the real estate market. Secondly,
these responses are typically pro-cyclic. This finding indicates that the interest rate
setting behavior of the US monetary policy implicitly contributes to increase the risk
of financial crises.
Chapter 3 analyzes the economic costs associated with the central banks’ decisions
to intervene or not to intervene in case of speculative attacks. The central bank
can either abstain from intervening or start an intervention, which in turn can be
successful or unsuccessful. Therefore, the analysis takes into account three different
types of currency crises: (i) an immediate depreciation, (ii) a successful defense,
and (iii) an unsuccessful attempt to defend the exchange rate. The empirical study
reveals that the decision of the central bank to intervene is risky. If the central bank
intervenes and succeeds she can on average achieve the best growth performance.
However, if the interventions are not maintained and the currency depreciates the
subsequent output loss is particularly severe. Abstaining from an intervention yields
a scenario with a relatively small drop in output.
Chapter 4 extends the previous analysis and takes a closer look at the economic
dynamics after a speculative attack. The results indicate that the macroeconomic
developments differ considerably with respect to the three different types of crises.
Monetary authorities therefore play a central role in determining the economic course
and costs of currency crises.
Chapter 5 analyzes the role of the TARGET2 system against the background of the
European debt and banking crisis. In particular, the real gains and losses of holding
TARGET2 claims in the case of Germany are assessed. The analysis finds that by
the end of 2013 Germany has incurred accumulated losses of around 13 billion euros
in real terms (’99 const. prices). Calculating the losses and gains of every member
country in the euro area suggests that the TARGET2 system can be considered an
implicit redistribution mechanism with a volume of about 30 billion euros (current
prices). The TARGET2 system cannot replace necessary reforms, but can provide
time and money to reduce intra-EMU imbalances.
Finally, chapter 6 outlines the most important results and concludes with a sum-
mary.
VIII
Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Dissertation analysiert den Zusammenhang zwischen Geldpolitik und
Finanzkrisen. So wird einerseits die Rolle der Goldpolitik als mögliche Ursache von
Finanzmarktverwerfungen und andererseits das Notenbankverhalten während einer
Finanzkrise diskutiert.
Nach einer kurzen Einführung in Kapitel 1 wird anschließend in Kapitel 2 un-
tersucht, inwiefern Vermögenspreise implizit als Ziel der US-amerikanischen Geldpo-
litik dienen. Als Analyseinstrument wird eine modifizierte Taylor-Regel verwendet.
Diese wird auf Basis von Echt-Zeit-Daten mittels Generalisierter Momentenmethode
(GMM) geschätzt. Zusätzlich wird die Schätzgleichung um eine Vermögenspreisva-
riable erweitert, um Vermögenspreisentwicklungen entsprechend berücksichtigen zu
können. Die Schätzergebnisse zeigen, dass die US-amerikanische Geldpolitik impli-
zit auf Vermögenspreisentwicklungen reagiert. Zudem deuten die Resultate auf eine
prozyklische Reaktion seitens der Notenbank hin. Dieses Vorgehen jedoch dürfte die
Geldpolitik vor eine Herausforderung stellen, da hierdurch ein Umfeld geschaffen wird,
in dem Vermögenspreisblasen leichter entstehen können.
Kapitel 3 analysiert die volkswirtschaftlichen Kosten von Zentralbankmaßnahmen
bei einer spekulativen Attacke gegen eine Währung. In einer solchen Situation muss
sich die Notenbank entscheiden, entweder auf dem Devisenmarkt zu intervenieren
oder die Währung unmittelbar abwerten zu lassen. Entscheidet sich die Notenbank
für Interventionen, können diese wiederum erfolgreich oder erfolglos sein. Vor die-
sem Hintergrund ergeben sich drei verschiedene Währungskrisentypen: (i) sofortige
Abwertung, (ii) erfolgreiche Verteidigung und (iii) erfolglose Verteidigung. Die empi-
rische Analyse der mit diesen drei Währungskrisen verbundenen ökonomischen Kos-
ten zeigt, dass es sich um eine riskante Interventionsentscheidung der Notenbank
handelt. Während erfolgreiche Interventionsmaßnahmen keine volkswirtschaftlichen
Kosten nach sich ziehen, sind jedoch erfolglose Interventionen mit entsprechend hohen
Kosten verbunden. Bei einer Entscheidung für eine sofortige Abwertung ist hingegen
nur mit äußerst geringfügigen Wachstumseinbußen zu rechnen.
Kapitel 4 erweitert die vorherige Analyse dahingehend, dass insbesondere die
volkswirtschaftlichen Anpassungsmechanismen näher betrachtet werden. So wird auf
Grundlage eines Panel-VAR-Modells untersucht, wie verschiedene makroökonomische
Indikatoren hinsichtlich des Auftretens der drei Währungskrisen reagieren. Zusätzlich
ermöglicht dieses Vorgehen, das Krisenmanagement von Notenbanken im Zusammen-
hang mit den drei Krisentypen zu analysieren und zu bewerten. Die Schätzergebnisse
zeigen, dass Zentralbankmaßnahmen während einer Währungskrise fundamental die
makroökonomischen Anpassungen und die damit verbundenen volkswirtschaftlichen
Kosten bestimmen.
Kapitel 5 untersucht die Bedeutung der so genannten TARGET2-Salden vor dem
Hintergrund der Europäischen Banken- und Schuldenkrise. So werden im Rahmen
dieser Analyse die realwirtschaftlichen Kosten für Deutschland berechnet, die auf
Grund von TARGET2-Ungleichgewichten entstehen können. Die Berechnungen zei-
gen, dass Deutschland zum Ende des Jahres 2013 realwirtschaftliche Kosten in Höhe
von 13 Mrd. Euro (in Preisen von 1999) entstanden sind. Werden die realwirtschaft-
lichen Kosten für alle Mitgliedsländer des Euroraumes berechnet, so implizieren die
Ergebnisse, dass aktuell das TARGET2-System einem Umverteilungsmechanismus
mit einem Volumen von etwa 30 Mrd. Euro gleichkommt. Das TARGET2-System er-
möglicht daher in der aktuellen Krisensituation die Bereitstellung von Geld und Zeit,
um realwirtschaftliche Ungleichgewichte innerhalb des Euroraumes abzubauen.
Abschließend werden die wichtigsten Ergebnisse in Kapitel 6 zusammengefasst.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007 the role of monetary policy has gained
increasing attention in academic literature. It became evident that monetary policy
in the context of financial crises needed to be deeply analyzed. Among the most
important research questions are for example: What is the monetary policy’s role in
causing a financial crisis? How should a central bank respond to financial stress sce-
narios? How should monetary policy be conducted to provide (implicit) stabilization
mechanisms in times of crises?
A common practice to analyze the central bank’s role in causing a financial crisis
is to use the so-called Taylor (1993) rule. If, for instance, the central bank deviates
from the Taylor rule, i. e. from the policy path that would be associated with the
achievement of the monetary policy’s objectives, the monetary authority can sow the
seeds for financial distortions.1 Primarily, the Taylor rule was intended to be a guide-
line for central bankers. However, by a positive analysis, Taylor (1993) has shown
that the Taylor rule is in principle able to reconstruct the implemented monetary
policy of a central bank, and thus it is a useful tool in order to analyze the central
bank policy of a period in question by comparing the actual interest rate with the
Taylor rule interest rate. For instance, Taylor (1998) has analyzed the US monetary
policy within different time frames. The results indicate that since the mid-1980s the
US monetary policy has generally been in line with the interest rate based on the
Taylor rule and has therefore contributed to lower inflation rates as well as to lower
volatility of real GDP – a time period that is often referred to as the Great Mod-
eration (Taylor, 1998). Although low consumer price inflation corresponds with one
of the US monetary policy goals, namely price stability, there have been substantial
1Typically, price stability is considered to be the most important objective of monetary policy.
Further goals are full employment, balanced economic growth, moderate long-term interest rates,
exchange rate stability and financial market stability (see, e. g., Mishkin, 2013, pp. 434).
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increases in asset prices since the mid-1980s until the onset of the financial crisis in
2007. This development seems to be a challenge for monetary policy. The question
arises whether a “wrong” monetary policy, i. e. an interest rate setting behavior of
the central bank without considering asset prices appropriately, might have played a
crucial role with respect to increasing asset prices, and thereby contributing to the
occurrence of the finical crisis in 2007.
When faced with financial stress a central bank has to decide how to react. In
particular, the dynamics of currency crises strikingly highlight the role a central bank
can play in case of a crisis event. Currency crises can be very heterogeneous events.
The outcome of currency crisis ranges from sharp declines in output to even increases
in output (see, e. g., Gupta et al., 2007). One possible explanation for these different
crisis outcomes can be due to means of monetary policy, e. g. by the implementation
of different crisis strategies of the central bank. The central bank can basically decide
whether to defend the domestic currency or to abstain from an intervention policy.
This gives rise to three different types of currency crises, namely, (i) immediate de-
preciation, (ii) successful defense, and (iii) unsuccessful defense. In this context,
empirical studies indicate that a central bank’s crisis management in case of a spec-
ulative attack indeed seems to play an important role. Eichengreen and Rose (2003),
for instance, point out that the failure to defend the domestic currency is accompa-
nied by severe economic costs. However, the authors do not adequately examine the
central bank’s crisis policy, as different types of crises are intermingled. Since the
authors combine an immediate depreciation and an unsuccessful defense to the suc-
cessful attack scenario within the analysis, their results do not provide information
concerning the decision whether a central bank should try to defend the domestic
currency or not. Therefore it is of particular interest to asses the economic costs
associated with respective central banks’ decisions in case of speculative attacks.
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Besides an explicit crisis management, it might be also helpful if the monetary
authority implements implicit stabilization mechanisms. They are especially useful if
immediate crisis responses are necessary as they avoid a complex decision making pro-
cess. In this context, the TARGET2 system of the euro area plays an important role
since the 2009 ongoing debt and banking crisis in Europe. The TARGET2 system is
an interbank payment system that was established to process efficiently cross-boarder
transfers of the Eurosystem. However, it can be currently considered to be part of an
implicit stabilization mechanism. As capital accounts of EMU member countries –
and thus capital flows – no longer reflect current account balances, the member coun-
tries of the currency union face respective balance-of-payment imbalances. Without
a mechanism that substitutes for missing capital flows (or even capital flight), the
recent development might have resulted in a balance-of-payments crisis with a col-
lapsing euro area. The academic literature on TARGET2 balances has become quite
extensive over the last three years (see, e. g., Cecchetti et al., 2012; Fahrholz and
Freytag, 2012; Sinn and Wollmershäuser, 2012a,b). The studies primarily focus on
potential risks and costs, which are associated with a breakdown of the euro area,
and thus the TARGET2 system. CESifo (2014), for instance, calculates the potential
losses for Germany in case of a euro area collapse and the subsequent insolvencies
of the respective crisis economies. The calculation suggests that holding TARGET2
claims might lead to potential losses of about 470 bn. euros. These studies, how-
ever, seem to neglect the aspect that the TARGET2 system might be associated with
current economic costs. To better understand how these current economic costs and
benefits of such implicit stabilization mechanisms could arise, an adequate analysis
seems essential.
4
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1.2 Structure of the thesis
To cope with these research questions the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2
examines if US monetary policy (implicitly) responds to asset price booms. Using
real-time data and a GMM framework, a Taylor-type rule augmented by an asset vari-
able that captures phases of booms and busts in the real estate market is estimated.
The analysis identifies quasi real-time booms and busts using an asset cycle dating
procedure and yields two main findings. Firstly, the Fed does implicitly respond to
asset price booms in the real estate market. Secondly, these responses are typically
pro-cyclic and their intensity changes over time. These findings indicate that the
interest rate setting behavior of the US monetary policy implicitly contributes to the
formation of asset price bubbles, thereby increasing the risk of financial crises.
Chapter 3 analyzes the economic costs associated with the central banks’ deci-
sions to intervene or not to intervene in case of speculative attacks. The central bank
can either abstain from intervening or start an intervention, which in turn can be
successful or unsuccessful. Therefore, an adequate analysis of the costs of currency
crises has to take into account three different types of currency crises: (i) an imme-
diate depreciation without any central bank interventions, (ii) a successful defense,
and (iii) an unsuccessful attempt to defend the exchange rate. The empirical study
reveals that the decision of the central bank to intervene or to remain passive is
risky. If the central bank intervenes and succeeds she can on average achieve the
best growth performance. However, if the interventions are not maintained and the
currency depreciates the subsequent output loss is particularly severe. Abstaining
from an intervention yields a scenario with a relatively small drop in output. Giving
in to a speculative attack rather than trying to fight it can thus be a suitable option
for a risk-averse central bank.
5
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Chapter 4 extends the previous analysis and takes a closer look at the economic
dynamics after a speculative attack by explicitly taking into account the interdepen-
dencies between macroeconomic fundamentals within a panel VAR framework. This
approach enables to gain further insights in the adjustment processes following the
three types of currency crises and the potential role of central banks in reducing the
costs of currency crises. Moreover this chapter takes a deeper look at various com-
ponents of aggregate demand (e. g. private consumption, investment, exports and
imports) as well as further important macroeconomic indicators (e. g. debt-to-GDP
ratio and unemployment rate). The results indicate that the macroeconomic develop-
ments differ considerably with respect to the three different types of crises. Monetary
authorities therefore play a central role in determining the economic course and costs
of currency crises. Specifically, a central bank has two options to mitigate the costs
of speculative attacks, namely an immediate depreciation and a successful defense.
If a central bank intervenes she might be able to stabilize the exchange rate only
temporarily and risks to ultimately fail facing the worst of the three scenarios with
the highest economic costs.
To adequately analyze the role of the TARGET2 system against the background
of the European debt and banking crisis, chapter 5 evaluates the current economic
costs and benefits of the TARGET2 system. In particular, this chapter assesses the
real gains and losses of holding TARGET2 claims in the case of Germany. While
Germany’s nominal gains depend on the development of the nominal interest rate,
the real gains are determined by the real interest rate as well as the real exchange rate.
The analysis finds that by the end of 2013 Germany has incurred accumulated losses
of around 13 billion euros in real terms. Additionally, the calculation of the losses and
gains of every member country in the euro area suggests that the TARGET2 system
can be considered an implicit redistribution mechanism with a volume of about 30
billion euros. On the one hand, this implicit redistribution mechanism might help to
finance necessary (real) economic adjustments. On the other hand, as the real gains
6
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and losses only mirror the real economic differences in the EMU, the TARGET2
system cannot replace necessary reforms, but can provide time and money to reduce
intra-EMU imbalances.
Finally, chapter 6 concludes with a brief summary and outlines the most important
and significant results.
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Chapter 2 The Fed’s TRAP
2.1 Motivation
During the Great Moderation the US, like most developed economies, has been sub-
ject to modest consumer price inflation. While this development conforms with one
of the Fed’s goals, as these focus on consumer price inflation, there have also been
considerable increases in asset prices until the set in of financial crisis in 2007. From
1985q1 to 2007q1 consumer prices rose quarterly on average 0.76%, while corporate
equity and real estate prices increased 2.74% and 1.29%, respectively.1 Among the
often discussed reasons for the spreads between growth rates of consumer and asset
prices are different price elasticities (see Belke et al., 2008) and the “paradox of cred-
ibility”2 (see Borio et al., 2003). Since asset prices are claims on future goods and
services, it should come as no surprise that former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan already asked in 1996:
“But where do we draw the line on what prices matter? Certainly prices
of goods and services now being produced – our basic measure of inflation
– matter. But what about futures prices or more importantly prices of
claims on future goods and services, like equities, real estate, or other
earning assets?”
Economic literature on these questions is still twofold. The traditional view claims
that asset prices should only be taken into account to the extent that these influence
consumer price inflation (“benign neglect” strategy), whereas the new view claims
that asset price booms should be dampened to prevent high-cost busts (“lean against
the wind” strategy). Since there is no common sense about the optimal response to
1Consumer price inflation is approximated by changes in the Consumer Price Index for all urban
consumers including all items. Changes in corporate equity prices are generated from the S&P 500
Index and those of real estate prices stem from the FHFA Index.
2The “paradox of credibility” states that a credible monetary policy can induce boom and bust
cycles in asset markets. It implies that the anchoring of inflation expectations for consumer markets
at reasonable levels will head excess liquidity to asset markets.
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asset price booms, we should first take a closer look at the main problems regarding
this question.
1. Problem of identification: Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) argue that it is
not possible to identify asset price booms in real-time with sufficient certainty.
Roubini (2006) claims that even if their identification come with some degree
of uncertainty, these information should in general not be ignored.
2. Problem of information: Kohn (2008) argues that responses to asset price booms
require central banks to have an information advantage against other market
participants. Cecchetti (2005) holds against that central banks have different
incentives and different measures to act in case of a similar assessment of the
underlying asset price.
3. Problem of destabilization: Posen (2006) claims that pricking asset price booms
can trigger market panics, whereas Borio (2005) points out that ‘leaning against
the wind’ should take place in the early stage of asset price booms to avoid
unpredictable market behavior.
4. Problem of focus: Bernanke and Gertler (1999) argue that the mere focus on
price stability reduces the likelihood of financial crises. But Borio and Lowe
(2002) state that the sole focus of monetary policy on consumer price stability
does not necessarily lead to a stable financial system since asset price booms
indicate excess liquidity even though other indicators neglect any indications.
5. Problem of transmission: Interest rate increases do not necessarily dampen the
formation of asset price booms (see Kohn, 2008), but it has to be considered
that changes in interest rates have a stronger effect on investors as expected
due to the ‘risk-taking’-channel of monetary transmissions, which affects the
willingness to take risk (see Gambacorta, 2009).
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6. Problem of economic costs: While the traditional view points out that pricking
an asset price boom causes collateral damage for the real economy and other not
directly affected asset markets, the new view annotates that a mild collateral
damage of an early intervention should be seen as an insurance premium against
an even worse damage in the wake of a later asset price bust (see Bordo and
Jeanne, 2002).
The debate whether to respond to asset price booms (or not) is not conclusively
discussed in literature yet and is still open to further discourse.
To date the Fed officially follows the traditional view not to respond to asset price
booms. We examine if US monetary policy at least implicitly responds to asset price
booms. Using real-time data and a GMM framework we estimate a Taylor-type
rule as shown in Clarida et al. (1998) and Orphanides (2001). In our article we use a
modified Taylor rule to investigate the monetary policy of the Fed.3 Empirical studies
show, that the interest rate setting behavior of the Fed – except from the period
prior to financial crisis – can certainly be explained by the Taylor rule (see Taylor,
2007; Poole, 2007). Despite all this however, the rule is unable to provide accurate
and satisfying explanations for this period of controversy. The aim of this article is
therefore to search for potential alternatives to adequately interpret the behavior of
the Fed. To take account of asset price movements we extend a Taylor-type rule by
a dummy variable that captures asset price booms.4 This dummy variable refers to
real estate prices which take up an important share in households’ asset portfolio.
Moreover, real estate prices seem to have a close connection to monetary conditions
(see Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007, pp. 19). By using deflated asset prices we attempt
to extract shifts in relative prices with respect to consumer prices.5
3On principle Taylor-type rules can either be applied in a prescriptive way, that sets recommen-
dations on how central banks should act, or in a descriptive way, in order to examine the interest
rate setting behavior of central banks.
4It is crucial to note, that we do not refer to asset price bubbles.
5Deflated asset prices indicate the development of relative prices between the asset in question
and the underlying consumer basket. The applied consumer price index (all items) is used as a
proxy for economy-wide price developments.
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The article is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the asset cycle dating pro-
cedure that we use to identify phases of asset price booms. The empirical framework
which consists of a Taylor-type Rule with Asset Prices (TRAP) is given in section
2.3. The results of our estimations are discussed in section 2.4. Our main findings
are summarized in section 2.5.
2.2 Asset cycle dating procedure
To analyze the Fed’s reaction function on real estate prices we need an approach that
captures asset price movements. The Fed mainly focuses on medium-term develop-
ments to ensure consumer price stability due to significant time lags in the conduct
and effect of monetary policy. In this vein, we suppose that its responses to asset
price booms would most likely also focus on medium-term developments of asset
prices. For that reason we employ an asset cycle dating procedure that is able to
filter medium-term developments by identifying asset price cycles.
The results of recent empirical studies show that asset price cycles seem to be
more volatile and frequent than real business cycles (see Avouyi-Dovi and Matheron,
2005; Claessens et al., 2010). Possible reasons are rigidities and frictions6 as well as
different price elasticities7. Since the characteristics of asset price cycles are different
from those of real business cycles some modifications are necessary. Following Pagan
and Sossounov (2003) and IMF (2003) asset price cycles are identified using a modified
6In general, asset price cycles are subject to less rigidities and frictions than real business cycles
are. For instance, real markets are often characterized by sticky prices, whereas asset prices usually
respond more quickly.
7In the short-term, most asset markets, such as the real estate market, have a relative inelastic
supply since the asset supply can often not be adjusted without some lag of time. For instance, the
supply of houses can increase only gradually since the building of an house requires time. In the
long-term, the supply curve is more elastic.
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Bry-Boschan cycle dating procedure (Bry and Boschan, 1971).8 Similar to Pagan and
Sossounov (2003, pp. 24) we do not use smoothed data and do not remove outliers
to consider unusual movements in time series (e. g., stock market crash in 1987).
Furthermore, we include several censoring criteria in order to avoid spurious phases.
The main characteristics of our procedure can be summarized in two steps. Firstly,
we identify the initial local extrema by searching the input data for peaks and troughs
in a rolling five quarter window. Secondly, pairs of peaks and troughs are chosen to
meet the constraints for minimal duration of cycles (four quarters) and phases (two
quarters). Since we use quarterly data our minimal duration of cycles and phases
are the shortest possible duration constraints. A cycle denotes the period from one
peak to another peak and a phase describes the period between a peak and a trough.
Phases from troughs to peaks refer to booms, whereas phases from peaks to troughs
refer to busts.
After determining peaks and troughs we summarize our results in an asset variable.
We choose a dummy variable to map developments in asset prices since we focus on the
question if the Fed responds to asset price booms in a systematic way, independently
of the depth and length of booms as these information come with great uncertainty.
The dummy variable takes on the value one if the asset market is in a boom phase
at time t and zero otherwise.
Using this procedure we identify five complete booms and five complete busts in
the ex post time series of deflated US real estate prices (see figure 2.1). A summary
statistic on the identification of ex post cycles in the US real estate market is given
in table 2.1.
8The Bry-Boschan cycle dating procedure is a non-parametric technique for dating real business
cycles, but is for example also used to identify asset price cycles in corporate equity markets (see,
e.g., Edwards et al., 2003; Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2003; Pagan and Sossounov, 2003; Biscarri and
Gracia, 2004; Gonzalez et al., 2005).
14
2.2 Asset cycle dating procedure
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
4.9
5.0
5.1
1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
Notes: Boom phases are shaded gray.
Figure 2.1: Ex post booms of deflated US real estate prices
Table 2.1: Statistics on boom and bust phases in US real estate prices
Ex post Real-time
Booms Busts Booms Busts
Number 5 5 8 8
Average duration 14 6 9 4
Average amplitude 12.5 –4.7 7.1 –1.9
Note: Statistics are based on complete cycles between 1980q1–2009q1 only.
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Figure 2.2: Real-time booms of deflated US real estate prices
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The average duration of boom phases is more than two times longer than the
duration of bust phases. Boom phases also have a more than two times higher
amplitude.
To assess whether the Fed responds to asset price booms in the real estate market,
it is important to rely only on data that were available to the Fed at the time of
decision making (see Orphanides, 2001). Hence, we make an additional modification
to our cycle dating procedure. While the algorithm bases on the ex post time series,
the peaks and troughs are obtained recursively, i. e. by using only data up to the
corresponding real-time data point. The resulting dummy variable indicates quasi
real-time boom and bust phases of deflated US real estate prices (see figure 2.2). A
summary statistic on the identification of quasi real-time cycles in the US real estate
market is also given in table 2.1.
By comparing asset price cycles of real estate prices for the ex post and quasi
real-time time series the aspect of uncertainty in decision making of monetary policy
becomes obvious. The quasi real-time approach identifies more and smaller cycles
compared to the ex post approach.
2.3 Empirical framework
To estimate the monetary policy reaction function of the Fed we use a Taylor-type
rule.9 The original Taylor rule is modified by a smoothing term to capture monetary
policy’s gradual interest rate adjustments (see Goodfriend, 1987). Since it is our
purpose to estimate whether the Fed responds to real estate prices – as it does on
inflation gap and output gap – we additionally implement the previously derived asset
variable. Following Orphanides (2001) we use real-time data for our estimations.
9The original Taylor rule is given by r = p+ 0.5y + 0.5(p− 2) + 2, where r is the federal funds
rate, p is a proxy for the expected inflation rate and y is the output gap. The inflation target and
long-term real interest rate are assumed to be constant and appraised to be 2 (Taylor, 1993).
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Our Taylor-type rule is given by:
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ)[γ∆y∗t + pi∗t + δ(Etpit+4 − pi∗t ) + β(yt − y∗t ) + φavt] + t,
where it is the effective federal funds rate and ρ is its monetary policy smoothing
parameter. The equilibrium real interest rate is approximated by the product of
the first-order difference of real-time output potential ∆y∗ and its estimated rela-
tion parameter γ.10 The inflation target pi∗t is designed to be time-varying and is
approximated by real-time 10 year ahead inflation forecasts (FRBP, 2007).11 The
output gap is based on the difference between the real-time real output y and its
long-term potential y∗. The long-term real output potential is estimated by means
of the HP-filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) and is based on the real-time series of
real output.12 The real output is extended by 12 quarter forecasts obtained from an
autoregression.13 We add these to the real output to cope with the end-of-sample
problem of the HP-filter (see Baxter and King, 1995, pp. 18). The inflation gap is
given by the difference between the real-time 4 quarter ahead inflation forecast Etpit+4
and the time-varying inflation target pi∗t . Our asset variable introduced in section 2.2
is denoted by avt. The error term t is i. i. d. The indices t+x represent the period in
question and Et is the expectation operator. The sources of our data are the Bureau
of Economic Analysis, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the
Federal Housing Finance Agency and the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
10Since the equilibrium real interest rate is an unobserved variable it needs to be estimated. Our
estimations build on the economic postulate that in a market equilibrium real interest rates should
be conform with the economy’s marginal productivity of capital.
11Reasons and consequences of a time-varying inflation target are given by Ireland (2007).
12As it is common with data that come with a quarterly frequency the smoothing parameter is
chosen to be λ = 1, 600 (see, e. g., Baxter and King, 1995).
13The first five forecasts are taken from the Philadelphia Fed’s real-time data set. The optimal lag
length of the autoregression is determined by step-wise least squares estimations with a maximum
lag length of 8 and approved p-values up to 10%.
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In general, the estimation of monetary policy reaction functions is subject to
the methodical challenge of endogeneity since the left-hand and right-hand variables
are interdependent and simultaneously determined in the same period. The reverse
causality from the federal funds rate to the explanatory variables violates the essential
assumption for least squares regressions of contemporaneously uncorrelated explana-
tory variables and error terms since the explanatory variables are not exogenous.14
As a result the estimated parameters would be endogeneity biased and inconsistent.
For instance, the asset variable should be affected by changes in the federal funds
rate – given validity of the present value theory – since its underlying asset price is
subject to changes in the discount factor of its expected income stream. To account
for this problem the explanatory variables are instrumentalized and estimated by the
generalized method of moments (GMM). As instruments we use the own lagged real-
izations since these should be uncorrelated with the error term and highly correlated
with their future realizations.15 The optimal weighting matrix is used to obtain the
iterated GMM estimator (see Hall, 2005).
2.4 Estimation results
Using this empirical framework we estimate parameters for the full sample and for
rolling subsamples since we are interested in the Fed’s general reaction as well as
its changes over time. The full sample covers the period from 1985q1–2007q1. The
starting point of the sample is chosen with respect to the constrained availability of
real-time data and the beginning of the Great Moderation (see Stock and Watson,
2002). The end of sample accounts for regime shifts in the conduct of the Fed’s mon-
14By definition, explanatory variables xt are said to be endogenous if they are correlated with
the equation’s error term t.
15The high correlation between the own realizations reduce the standard errors compared with
other less correlated variables (see Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 101). The GMM provides the additional
benefit that it also accounts for measurement uncertainties to which our estimation could be subject
to.
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etary policy due to the installation of unconventional measures during the financial
crisis.16
The upper part of table 2.2 illustrates the parameters of the Taylor-type rule for the
full sample estimation. The full sample estimates of the baseline policy rule indicate
that the Fed responds strongly to expected inflation gap (δ = 6.73) and output gap
(β = 0.85). The estimate of the interest rate smoothing parameter (ρ = 0.80) suggests
that only one fifth of the federal funds rate is influenced by current inflation gap and
output gap. The remaining part of the explained variation is determined by its
previous realizations. The parameter of potential output growth (γ = 0.91) indicates
the Fed’s perception of the equilibrium real interest rate, which should be equivalent
to the long-term potential output growth. All parameters are highly statistically
significant. Indeed, the parameters for the inflation and output gap differ from those
proposed by Taylor (1993), but these parameters are still reasonable and mirror the
Taylor-principle after all. Particularly, the parameter δ > 1 ensures that the federal
funds rate moves more than one-for-one with inflation. Otherwise, inflation could
become highly volatile (see Taylor, 1998).
The estimation results in the lower part of table 2.2 describe the Fed’s reaction
function including the dummy variable for asset price booms in the real estate market.
All estimated parameters are close to the baseline results and the dummy variable is
statistically significant. The negative sign of its parameter suggests that the Fed has
set a lower federal funds rate in the presence of a boom phase in the real estate market.
If the real estate market experiences a boom phase, then the federal funds rate is set
100 basis points lower in the long run than our baseline rule without taking asset
prices into account implies. Additionally, by considering the interest rate smoothing
parameter the current level of the federal funds rate is set about 20 basis points below
16The installation of unconventional measures makes it hard to estimate reasonable parameters
for Taylor-type rules.
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Table 2.2: Parameters of the Taylor-type rule for the full sample estimation
ρ γ δ β φ
Baseline:
Coefficient 0.80 0.91 6.73 0.85 –
Standard Error 0.02 0.06 0.65 0.19 –
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 –
Observations 89
Standard Error of Estimate 0.35
J-Statistic 11.43
Baseline with asset prices:
Coefficient 0.80 1.19 6.04 1.16 −1.00
Standard Error 0.02 0.11 0.69 0.21 0.39
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Observations 89
Standard Error of Estimate 0.33
J-Statistic 11.97
Notes: As instruments we use a constant and the first four lags of federal funds rate,
inflation, expected inflation, potential growth and output gap, respectively. Further-
more, when estimating the Taylor-type rule with the asset variable we add the first
four lags of its own realizations to the set of instruments. The J-Statistic for both
estimations takes the value of 11.42 and 11.08, respectively. In each case the null
hypothesis of valid instruments is not rejected.
the estimated baseline rate. Our results of the full sample estimation indicate that
the Fed responds pro-cyclic to asset price booms. These estimation results are not
sensitive to stronger restrictions on minimum duration of cycles up to 8 quarters.
Moreover, to ensure the robustness of our estimation results we substitute our
dummy variable avt using two alternative approaches to capture asset price move-
ments. Table 2.3 lists the estimation results.
(1) We capture asset price movements using a HP-filter generated cycle variable.
Asset price movements are forecasted using an AR(8) process of asset price growth
rates to cope with end-of-sample problems of the HP filter. The resulting asset
price time series is recursively distinguished into a trend and cyclic component. The
results for the HP-filter generated variable are similar to our estimation results with
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Table 2.3: Parameters of the Taylor-type rule for the full sample estimation using two
alternative approaches to capture asset price movements
ρ γ δ β φ
(1) HP-filter gap
Coefficient 0.79 0.91 5.84 1.11 −0.23
Standard Error 0.02 0.05 0.40 0.20 0.11
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
(2) Growth rate
Coefficient 0.81 0.98 6.56 1.01 −0.04
Standard Error 0.02 0.05 0.54 0.18 0.04
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37
Notes: The J-statistic of each estimation indicates that overidentifying
restrictions are valid with 14.32 for the HP-filter gap and 15.18 for the
growth rate, respectively.
respect to the sign and significance level.17 The HP-filter generated cyclic component
confirms that the Fed responds to boom phases in the real estate market in a pro-
cyclic manner.
(2) We capture asset price movements using annualized quarterly growth rates of
real estate prices. The approach asks if the Fed responds to short-term developments
in asset prices. This contrasts with our initial assumption on the Fed’s time horizon
but is justifiable if one assumes that policy time lags are sufficient small for asset
markets. The asset variable depicts a negative but insignificant coefficient. This
result is in line with those of Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and supports our initial
assumption that the Fed does most likely not focus on short-term developments of
asset prices.
So far, we have examined how monetary policy responds to asset price booms in
general by considering the full sample. In the next step the focus of our analysis shifts
from full sample to rolling subsamples. The estimations of rolling subsamples should
give an indication when and to what extent changes in the monetary reaction function
17Variations in the smoothing parameter of the HP filter do not substantially change our main
results with respect to the sign and significance level.
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics of bull market coefficients for rolling subsample estimations
Total Positive Negative
Number of significant 38 2 36
Number of insignificant 12 1 11
Maximum of significant 5.20 5.20 -1.39
Mean of significant -0.59 4.80 -0.89
Minimum of significant -1.39 4.39 -0.52
Effective maximum of significant 1.61 1.61 -0.29
Effective mean of significant -0.13 1.49 -0.22
Effective minimum of significant -0.29 1.38 -0.12
have taken place. The subsamples cover the period from 1985q1–2007q1. Each
subsample has a window of 10 years and moves on one period after every accomplished
estimation.18 Table 2.4 reports summary statistics on the 50 realizations of the asset
variable.
Out of the 50 estimated parameters 38 are significant at the 10%-level, whereof
2 have a positive and 36 a negative sign. Considering their effective means19 the
estimation results indicate that during boom phases in case of a negative (positive)
sign the Fed has set the federal funds rate on average 22 (149) basis points below
(above) the level that would have been set in the absence of a boom phase. These
figures point out that on average the Fed has responded stronger to asset price booms
in case of an anti-cyclic monetary policy (parameter with a positive sign) than in case
of a pro-cyclic monetary policy (parameter with a negative sign).
Given these results the question arises whether periods exist in which the Fed
has responded in a pro-cyclic or anti-cyclic manner to asset price booms. To obtain
an impression of these periods figure 2.3 shows all estimated t-values of the dummy
variable for each subsample. At first glance, the parameters of subsequent subsamples
appear to be clustered since positive and negative parameters are grouped together.
18Due to small samples either the two step GMM procedure is applied or if possible the optimal
weighting matrix is used to obtain the iterated GMM estimator.
19‘Effective’ refers to the product of the asset cycle coefficient φ and (1− ρ), whereas ρ describes
the interest rate smoothing parameter.
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Figure 2.3: T-values of the Taylor-type rule for the rolling subsample estimations
Considering the signs and significance levels along the timeline it is remarkable that
both point to specific patterns. A few quarters previous to the peak of the recent real
estate market bubble the parameter of our dummy variable switches from insignificant
negative to significant positive. The observable clusters and patterns previous to this
peak in the real estate market give reason to assume that – until a certain point
in time – the Fed responded pro-cyclic to boom phases in the real estate market.
After this certain point in time the Fed took anti-cyclic measures. By asking what
determines this certain point in time one could – for instance – think of an event,
such as a suddenly prevailing perception of the FOMC-members that the real estate
market has exceeded its sound fundamental level so far that it might evoke a negative
feedback to the economy in a way that the achievement of the Fed’s goals would be
undermined.
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2.5 Conclusions
While consumer price inflation is modest, increases in asset prices seem to be a
challenge for monetary policy. This article focuses on the following question: Does
US monetary policy implicitly respond to asset price booms? We extend a GMM
Taylor-type monetary reaction function with a dummy variable which captures asset
price booms in the US real estate market. This dummy variable is created by means
of an asset cycle dating procedure. This procedure identifies initial local extrema
by searching the input data for peaks and troughs in a rolling five quarter window.
Moreover, the pairs of peaks and troughs are chosen to meet the constraints for
minimal duration of cycles and phases. Our full sample estimation results give reason
to suppose that in general US monetary policy responds pro-cyclic to boom phases
in the real estate market.
However, our results raise a remarkable question: Did the Fed promote the real
estate market by means of loose monetary policy in order to extend boom phases?
This question cannot be answered fully yet. Nevertheless, we hint at some interesting
aspects. Facing political pressure, the Fed could have had the incentive to extend
boom phases in the real estate market. At the same time, many government actions
have taken place to encourage home ownership, e. g. the Community Reinvestment
Act in 1977, the American Dream Downpayment Act in 2003 and the establishment
of (more or less) government sponsored enterprises such as Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae,
and Ginnie Mae. Indeed, there is no clear empirical evidence that these government
actions directly contribute to the subprime boom (see, e.g., Ellis, 2008; Kroszner,
2008). But this tells nothing about the impact of government pressure on the Fed’s
monetary policy so that these actions could have nevertheless indirectly contributed.
Indeed, Alan Greenspan warned the Congress in 2004 that Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae have reached too much market power – ’too-big-too-fail’ – and therefore are
in need of more monitoring and regulation. But according to our analysis the Fed
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did not increase interest rates in response to increasing real estate prices. Without
the installation of explicit countermeasures these statements could create by itself an
expansionary monetary impulse. In this vein, the absence of a tighter monetary policy
could be a driving force for further increases in asset prices (see Meltzer, 2002).
The estimation results of rolling subsamples support our general finding that the
Fed does implicitly respond procyclic to asset price booms. Moreover, these results
of rolling subsamples do also point to changing responses to asset price booms over
time. The responses seem to follow specific patterns, as the Fed changed its intensity
and direction of responses previous to the peak of the latest real estate bubble.
These changes could be interpreted as part of an implicit “leaning against the wind”
strategy.
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Chapter 3 To Intervene, or Not to Intervene: Monetary Policy & Currency Crises
3.1 Introduction
Contrary to the typical public perception, currency crises can have very different
economic outcomes, ranging from bust to boom. Turkey, for example, was subject to
six currency crises between 1994 and 2006, which had quite different real effects (see
figure 3.1). While output declined severely after the currency crises of 1994 and 2000,
it hardly changed after the crisis of 1998. Output even increased in the aftermath of
the currency crises of 2003, 2004 and 2006.
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Figure 3.1: Turkey: Real GDP and currency crises (1993 – 2007)
One possible determinant of these different crisis outcomes could be the monetary
authority’s crisis management. The central bank has in principle two options to
respond to a speculative attack. She can either remain passive or intervene in the
foreign exchange market in order to avoid a depreciation (see figure 3.2). If she
decides to intervene, she can then either succeed or fail depending on the extent
of her own actions and the strength of the speculative attack. These interactions
between monetary authority and speculative traders give rise to the following four
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trader‘s decision
no attack/crisisattack
immediate depreciation defense
central bank‘s
decision
unsuccessful defense/
delayed depreciation
stable initial environment
successful defense
Figure 3.2: Basic structure of a speculative attack (see Bauer and Herz, 2010)
outcomes: no attack and three different types of currency crises, namely, immediate
depreciation, successful defense and unsuccessful defense.1
So far neither the theoretical nor the empirical literature has adequately accounted
for the role of monetary authorities in speculative attacks and thus the differences
between the three types of currency crises.2 First-generation models by Krugman
(1979) and Flood and Garber (1984) explain a speculative attack in terms of under-
lying fundamentals, in particular a too expansionary fiscal policy with a central bank
unsuccessfully attempting to defend the peg. In terms of our decision tree (see figure
3.2), the analysis is focused on the dichotomy no attack vs. unsuccessful defense.
Second-generation models as proposed by Obstfeld (1994), Eichengreen et al. (1996)
1To simplify terminology we uniformly apply the term depreciation to devaluation as well as
depreciation events, since currency crises – as we define them (see section 3.2) – are not limited to
de jure or de facto fixed exchange rate regimes.
2See, e. g., Bauer and Herz (2010) and Daniëls et al. (2011), who explicitly model the simulta-
neous interactions between policy makers and speculative traders.
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and Jeanne (2000) introduce the costs and benefits of exchange market interventions
for a central bank and emphasize the role of self-fulfilling expectations and multiple
equilibria. Implicitly these models focus on situations of no attack vs. immediate
depreciation. The so-called third generation of currency crisis models encompasses
very heterogeneous approaches and focuses on quite different issues, e. g. the fragility
in the banking and financial system (see, e. g., Krugman, 1999; Chang and Velasco,
2001; Burnside et al., 2004), or the role of private information (see, e. g., Morris and
Shin, 1998; Heinemann, 2000). Again, a common feature of these studies is their
dichotomic approach, i. e. they compare general crisis with no crisis scenarios and
neglect the heterogeneity of currency crises.
Empirical studies of currency crises also use binary crisis variables (crisis vs. no
crisis), albeit in a somewhat different way.3 In order to identify crisis events two basic
approaches are typically used. A first approach identifies currency crises as substan-
tial depreciations. The significant depreciation measure, as used by Frankel and Rose
(1996), Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) and Bussière et al. (2010), covers two types
of crisis events: a speculative attack during which the central bank (i) does not under-
take any defensive measures and lets the domestic currency depreciate immediately
and (ii) an unsuccessful attempt of the central bank to defend the exchange rate. In
terms of our approach (see figure 3.2) this crisis definition combines two types of crisis
events, namely immediate depreciation and unsuccessful defense. A second popular
way of proceeding is based on the so-called exchange market pressure index (EMPI)
which takes into account any substantial action of central banks and/or speculative
traders and is typically constructed as the weighted sum of depreciation rate, loss in
reserves and interest rate increase (see, e. g., Eichengreen et al., 1995; Bussière and
3While the theoretical literature has typically focused on the pre-crisis period to analyze the
causes of currency crises, the vast empirical literature on currency crises can be differentiated into
two major approaches: (i) studies that focus on crisis prediction (see, e. g., Bussière and Fratzscher,
2006; Gerdesmeier et al., 2009; Melvin and Taylor, 2009), and (ii) studies that analyze the aftermath
of currency crises in particular output effects (see, e. g., Gupta et al., 2007; Cerra and Saxena, 2008).
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Fratzscher, 2006; Cerra and Saxena, 2008; Klaassen and Jager, 2011). Thus, it does
not account for the heterogeneity of currency crises but rather combines all three
types of events, namely immediate depreciation, unsuccessful defense, and successful
defense.
Our investigation into the role of monetary policy by differentiating between the
three types of currency crises particularly relates to Eichengreen and Rose (2003).
By analyzing the economic costs of successful attacks and successful defenses, the
authors find that a successful attack is on average followed by a 3% loss of GDP
in the following year. However, as the authors combine an immediate depreciation
and an unsuccessful defense to the successful attack scenario, their results do not
provide information regarding the important decision whether a central bank should
intervene or not. Another noteworthy study is the work by Gupta et al. (2007), as the
output effects of currency crises are analyzed in a more general approach. The authors
adopt the crisis classification of other studies. In particular, they only treat those
periods as crisis years that were already tagged by a majority of other studies, thereby
intermingling different types of crisis definitions. Their empirical results indicate
that crises can have very different economic outcomes and are typically more severe
in the case of large capital inflows during pre-crisis periods, fewer capital market
restrictions, lower trade openness and higher external long-term debt. Again, due to
the encompassing crisis definition it remains unclear what role central bank policies
could have in explaining the diversity of crisis outcomes. Cerra and Saxena (2008)
and Bussière et al. (2010) point out a new way to examine the persistence of output
effects in the aftermath of currency crises. Their findings suggest that currency crises
are accompanied by a persistent output loss of 2–6% of GDP relative to the no-crisis
trend. Nevertheless, as both studies are based on aggregated crisis definitions, namely
the EMPI in the study of Cerra and Saxena (2008) and the significant depreciation
measure in the case of Bussière et al. (2010) they do not differentiate between the
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three types of crises. For this reason, the role of the central bank’s crisis management
cannot be assessed adequately.
The main contribution of this paper is to evaluate the role of central bank in-
terventions for output effects of speculative attacks. We adequately distinguish the
various types of currency crises and identify the three cases of (i) an immediate depre-
ciation without any central bank interventions following a speculative attack, (ii) a
successful defense, and (iii) an unsuccessful attempt to defend the exchange rate, i. e.
interventions followed by a depreciation. We find that intervention policies do make
a difference for the economic development after a currency crisis. The decision of the
central bank to intervene or to remain passive is risky. If the central bank intervenes
and succeeds she can achieve the best growth performance on average. However, if
the interventions are not maintained and the currency depreciates the subsequent
output loss is particularly severe. Abstaining from an intervention, i. e. allowing an
immediate depreciation, yields an “intermediate” scenario with a relatively small drop
in output. Giving in to a speculative attack rather than trying to fight it can thus
be an interesting option for a risk-averse central bank.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly discusses our approach to
differentiate the three types of crises. Section 3.3 presents some stylized facts. The
empirical framework which evaluates the economic consequences of the different types
of crises is outlined in section 3.4. The analysis is based on two complementary
approaches. Firstly, a static panel analysis explicitly examines the impact of the
three types of currency crises for output growth given several macroeconomic control
variables. Secondly, a dynamic panel analysis complements the static analysis and
evaluates the dynamic responses of various macroeconomic variables in the aftermath
of a crisis. Section 3.4 also discusses several robustness issues that are crucial for the
interpretation of the results. The main findings are summarized in section 3.5.
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In the following we use a stylized version of the monetary model of the exchange rate
to define the different types of currency crises (see, e. g., Eichengreen et al., 1994;
Klaassen and Jager, 2011). Money supply equals the sum of domestic credit, Dt, and
international reserves measured in domestic currency, Rt:
Mt = Dt +Rt. (3.1)
Equation (3.1) can be approximated by
∆mt ≈ ∆Mt
Mt−1
= ∆dt + ∆rt, (3.2)
with ∆dt = ∆Dt/Mt−1 and ∆rt = ∆Rt/Mt−1 where low letter variables denote logs.
We assume standard money demand functions for two countries – home and for-
eign, with asterisks denoting foreign country variables
mt − pt = βyt − αit, (3.3)
m∗t − p∗t = βy∗t − αi∗t , (3.4)
where mt denotes the money supply, pt the price level, yt the real income, it the
nominal interest rate, α the interest rate semi-elasticity and β the income elasticity
of money demand. Further assuming purchasing power parity,
st = pt − p∗t , (3.5)
with st as the nominal exchange rate yields
st = mt −m∗t − β(yt − y∗t ) + α(it − i∗t ). (3.6)
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Taking first differences, and using equation (3.2) leads to
∆st + ∆it −∆rt = ∆dt −∆m∗t + ∆i∗t − β(∆yt −∆y∗t ) + (1 + α)(∆it −∆i∗t ). (3.7)
The left-hand side of equation (3.7) comprises the central elements of the crisis
definitions in a straightforward way. In case of a speculative attack the central bank
can either adjust interest rates (∆it) and/or intervene in the foreign exchange market
(∆rt) and/or let the currency depreciate (∆st).4 We characterize the three types
of crises, namely immediate depreciations, successful interventions, and unsuccessful
interventions, along two dimensions. On the one hand we use changes of the exchange
rate (∆st) and on the other hand we use an intervention index (INTX) in order to
describe the central bank behavior (see Bauer and Herz, 2010). The intervention
index is defined as the standard deviations weighted sum of interest rate changes and
percentage changes in reserves (INTX = ∆it/σ∆it − ∆rt/σ∆rt). To identify specific
crisis events we apply the subsequent set of rules which follows the stylized time
structure of a speculative attack (see figure 3.2):
1.a A depreciation is significant if it is larger than the average of the exchange rate
changes during the previous 12 months plus two times the standard deviation
of these changes. Additionally, the exchange rate change has to be greater than
5%.5 All means and standard deviations in this study are calculated time and
country specific.
4In practice, a central bank clearly has more policy tools than equation (3.7) suggests. For sim-
plicity, we do not discuss in detail, for example, realignments and changes in exchange rate bands as
monetary tools, since they could be subsumed under changes of the exchange rate. Analogously, ex-
change rate orientated open market operations should be accounted for by interest rate adjustments
(see Klaassen and Jager, 2011, p. 77).
5Increases of the exchange rate of less than 5% are not classified as significant depreciations even
if they exceed the standard deviation threshold, e. g. in a strictly managed exchange rate regime
(see Bauer and Herz, 2010). In fact, a managed exchange rate regime is typically announced with
a respective exchange rate band (see, for example, Ilzetzki et al., 2008).
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1.b Analogously, an intervention is considered to be significant if the INTX exceeds
the average value during the previous 12 months plus three standard devia-
tions.6
2.a A successful defense in year T is defined as a significant intervention in month s
of year T without a significant depreciation during the subsequent 12 months.
2.b An unsuccessful defense in year T is defined as a significant intervention in
month s of year T followed by a significant depreciation during the subsequent
12 months.
2.c An immediate depreciation in year T is defined as a significant depreciation
without a significant intervention during the preceding 12 months.
Given our definition an unsuccessful defense might also be characterized as a de-
layed depreciation. Once a central bank has started to intervene in the foreign ex-
change market she could end the intervention and let the currency depreciate for
basically two reasons: either she is no longer able to intervene, e. g. the reserves
are depleted, or she is not willing to further intervene, e. g. the expected benefits of
the intervention policy no longer exceed the expected costs. As we cannot differenti-
ate between these two situations we use the terms unsuccessful defense and delayed
depreciation interchangeably.
Our empirical analysis is in principle based on annual data due to data limitations.
However, as the data relevant for the timing of currency crises, namely interest rates,
exchange rates and reserves, are typically available at higher frequencies, we deter-
mine the crisis events on the basis of monthly data and assign them to the respective
years (see, e. g., Bussière et al., 2010). A major problem in identifying crisis events is
to appropriately differentiate whether subsequent crises are individual events or part
6We apply a more restrictive threshold than in the case of depreciations to account for central
banks’ adjustments of reserve holdings that are due to portfolio alignment only and are not due to
intentional intervention in the foreign exchange market.
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of an ongoing currency crisis. After determining currency crisis events we apply a
one-year window and drop all crises with overlapping time windows, i. e. crises have
to be at least two years apart to be considered as distinct currency crises.7 By doing
so we ensure that the effects of a specific crisis type in year T are not biased by other
nearby currency crises. If, for instance, a successful defense occurs in year T and
an unsuccessful defense in year T + 1, the post-crisis effects of the successful defense
could be influenced by the effects of the unsuccessful defense. Therefore, to avoid
possible interferences in such a situation, these two crisis events are dropped from
our analysis.
3.3 Some stylized facts
In our sample of 32 emerging market economies, covering the years from 1960–2011,
we identify 163 crisis events with 42 immediate depreciations, 87 successful interven-
tions and 34 unsuccessful interventions.8 To better understand the role of macro-
economic fundamentals and central bank policies in the course of currency crises we
examine several macroeconomic indicators in the pre- and post-crisis periods.9
To appropriately analyze the central bank’s role during currency crises, one first
has to answer the question whether the post-crisis economic development is a conse-
quence of the corresponding crisis type or it rather mirrors the underlying causes of
the crisis. Put differently, our crisis classification could be subject to an endogeneity
problem. Either the central bank determines the way through the crisis and thus
7See Bussière et al. (2010) for a similar approach. Moreover, in section 3.4.3 we apply an
alternative time window to check the robustness of these crisis definitions.
8See appendix for a detailed description of the data. The used data set was checked and corrected
for outliers.
9The post-crisis period is defined as the crisis year and the first post-crisis year, as our crisis
definition is based on monthly data and a crisis can last for twelve months. The pre-crisis period
covers the average development of three pre-crisis years. We also applied different lengths (from 1
to 4 years) of the pre-crisis and crisis period and have found our results to be robust.
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the post-crisis economic performance, or the economic development determines the
central bank’s ability to defend the exchange rate successfully or not. Against this
background, it is essential to show that the pre-crisis economic environment cannot
be assigned with bad or good economic fundamentals. Only in this case, our crisis
classification will not be linked to specific post-crisis economic outcomes by construc-
tion, and thus we are able to make adequate statements about the central bank’s
response to a currency crisis (see, e. g. Eichengreen and Rose, 2003).
We follow the literature and focus in particular on output, consumer prices, current
account balances, private capital inflows, the real effective as well as the nominal
exchange rate, money and reserves (see, e. g., Calvo and Reinhart, 2000; Chiodo and
Owyang, 2002; Hong and Tornell, 2005; Gupta et al., 2007; Lahiri and Végh, 2007;
Bussière et al., 2010).
In our analysis output growth plays a fundamental role, as the costs of currency
crises are often measured in terms of output loss. By taking inflation into account
we consider two aspects. On the one hand we control for the economic consequences
of high inflationary periods and on the other hand it serves as a policy response
indicator (see, e. g. Hong and Tornell, 2005; Bussière et al., 2010).
Changes in the current account balance and foreign private capital inflows might
affect output growth, if – for instance – less foreign capital is available. Due to a lack
of financial resources firms might be unable to finance investments (see, e. g. Hong
and Tornell, 2005), and hence output growth is likely to slow down (see, for example
Calvo and Reinhart, 2000; Gupta et al., 2007).
Exchange rate changes can mitigate the negative effects of a currency crisis. A
depreciation of the domestic currency that translates into a real devaluation enhances
the economy’s competitiveness and fosters exports (see Gupta et al., 2007).10
10Though, at the same time the nominal depreciation increases the real value of the country’s
foreign debt that is not denominated in domestic currency.
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Likewise, monetary policy could support or restrain economic growth. A tighter
monetary policy can increase the chance to defend the exchange rate successfully, yet
it can also have a negative impact on growth at least in the short to medium term
(see, among others, Chiodo and Owyang, 2002; Lahiri and Végh, 2007).
Moreover we take the country’s exchange rate regime into account. For example,
in case of a hard peg policy, a depreciation of the exchange rate might imply greater
uncertainty in the course of a speculative attack than in the case of a more flexible
exchange rate regime and could therefore have a negative impact on output growth
(see, e. g. Eichengreen and Rose, 2003). Additionally, we include the change in foreign
exchange reserves in order to account for a country’s ability to defend the exchange
rate.
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics with respect to the macroeconomic environ-
ment during the pre-crisis and post-crisis period.11 In addition it provides a summary
of the results of the non-parametric Wilcoxon test that examines whether the alter-
native economic indicators differ from one type of crisis to the other.12
Column 1 reports the sample mean for the no-crisis periods. Columns 2 – 5
display the means for the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, distinguishing between the
three types of currency crises. Shaded areas denote statistically significant differences
between the crisis events. Since the test allows to compare only two crisis types
simultaneously, a single shaded value indicates that the respective crisis in each case is
statistically significant different from the two other types of crises at the 5% level.13
11See section 3.4.3 regarding the tests of additional variables.
12We additionally performed the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test which yields identical results.
13For example, to examine pre-crisis inflation rates we perform 3 Wilcoxon tests, namely, (i) im-
mediate depreciation vs. successful defense, (ii) immediate depreciation vs. unsuccessful defense
and (iii) successful defense vs. unsuccessful defense. As a result, we obtain 2 out of 3 signifi-
cant test statistics. The first statistic indicates that successful interventions have significant lower
pre-crisis inflation rates than immediate depreciations. The second statistic shows that successful
interventions are associated to significant lower pre-crisis inflation rates compared to unsuccessful
interventions. Given that, the value of pre-crisis inflation rate is shaded gray in case of a successful
defense.
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Table 3.1: Mean values of macroeconomic indicators by different crisis events
Variable no
crisis
(1)
all
crises
(2)
immediate
depreciation
(3)
successful
defense
(4)
unsuccessful
defense
(5)
pre-crisis
Output growth 0.059 0.046 0.037 0.049 0.050
Inflation 0.059 0.091 0.106 0.072 0.123
Current account −0.008 0.004 −0.007 0.017 −0.015
Private capital inflows 0.016 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.012
∆ Real effective exchange rate 0.005 0.013 0.021 0.002 0.030
∆ Nominal exchange rate 0.014 0.086 0.124 0.047 0.137
∆ M1 0.159 0.217 0.212 0.199 0.266
∆ Total reserves 0.182 0.162 0.135 0.175 0.164
Exchange rate regime 6.8 8.2 9.5 7.2 9.2
post-crisis
Output growth 0.059 0.036 0.029 0.054 0.002
Inflation 0.059 0.101 0.111 0.062 0.186
Current account −0.008 0.002 −0.016 0.010 0.005
Private capital inflows 0.016 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.007
∆ Real effective exchange rate 0.005 −0.008 −0.002 0.011 −0.056
∆ Nominal exchange rate 0.014 0.143 0.167 0.024 0.403
∆ M1 0.159 0.197 0.183 0.149 0.327
∆ Total reserves 0.182 0.099 0.160 0.100 0.032
Exchange rate regime 6.8 8.8 9.7 7.3 11.3
Notes: The post-crisis period is defined as the crisis year and the first post-crisis year. The pre-crisis
period covers the average development of three pre-crisis years. We also applied different lengths of
the pre-crisis and crisis period and have found our results to be robust.
A nominal depreciation is defined as an increase in the nominal exchange rate. A real depreciation
is given by a decrease in the real effective exchange rate. The Exchange rate regime classification is
based on Ilzetzki et al. (2008) and ranges from 1 to 15 – from de facto pegged to de facto floating.
Shaded areas denote statistically significant differences at the 5% level of one type of crisis compared
to the two other types of crises within the respective group.
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Table 3.1 indicates that there is only weak evidence for systematic pre-crisis dif-
ferences between the three types of crises. With the exception of inflation and the
exchange rate regime the macroeconomic indicators do not differ significantly between
the three types of crises during the pre-crisis period. In the case of inflation we find a
significant pre-crisis difference between a successful defense and the other two types
of crises, i. e. between on the one hand the case of a stable exchange rate and on the
other hand a drop of the exchange rate either due to an immediate depreciation or an
unsuccessful defense. The pre-crisis inflation rate of successful interventions is about
7.2% (column 4) and significantly lower than the pre-crisis inflation rates of immedi-
ate depreciations (10.6%) and unsuccessful interventions (12.3%). In the case of the
exchange rate regime we also find some evidence for pre-crisis differences.14 Successful
interventions are associated with somewhat less flexible exchange rate regimes (ERA
index of 7.2) than immediate depreciations (9.5) and unsuccessful defenses (9.2).
Taking together, the summary statistics do not seem to indicate major pre-crisis
differences in fundamentals between the three types of currency crises.
In contrast, the test statistics indicate that post-crisis there are considerable dif-
ferences in macroeconomic developments between the different types of crises. For
instance, we find significant differences between output growth in the case of un-
successful defenses, which is the lowest (0.2%), immediate depreciations with an
intermediate value of 2.9% and successful defenses with the highest value of 5.4%.
Differences between the three crisis types can also be found for inflation, the nom-
inal exchange rate as well as the real effective exchange rate. In the case of inflation,
the depreciation events, i. e. immediate depreciations and unsuccessful interventions,
are associated with significantly higher inflation than successful defenses. The in-
crease in inflation is especially strong in case of unsuccessful interventions. Real
14We use the ERA fine classification, ranging from 1 to 15 – from de facto pegged to de facto
floating (see Ilzetzki et al., 2008).
40
3.3 Some stylized facts
−0.20
−0.10
0.00
0.10
0.20
Immediate depreciation Successful defense Unsuccessful defense
Pre−crisis Post−crisis
Figure 3.3: Currency crises and output growth
depreciations are significantly stronger in the aftermath of an unsuccessful defense as
the relatively high inflation is overcompensated by the very high nominal deprecia-
tion. Likewise, immediate depreciations are associated with a significant depreciation
of the nominal exchange rate, which is not as pronounced as in case of unsuccessful
interventions. In case of successful defenses, a stable exchange rate can be observed
as expected. We also find significant differences in the behavior of total reserves. For
unsuccessful interventions the growth of total reserves is significantly slower than in
the case of the other two crisis types.
To gain further insight in the crisis differences, figure 3.3 provides further infor-
mation on output growth for the pre- and post-crisis periods. The light gray shaded
box plots exhibit the distribution of pre-crisis output growth while the dark gray
shaded boxes display the distribution of post-crisis output growth.15 A successful
defense of the domestic currency does not seem to be associated with a significant
deviation from the pre-crisis growth. Though, the post-crisis median is somewhat
15Regarding the definition of the pre-crisis and post-crisis period see footnote 9.
41
Chapter 3 To Intervene, or Not to Intervene: Monetary Policy & Currency Crises
higher than the pre-crisis median (0.1%). In case of an immediate depreciation the
post-crisis median of output growth deviates from pre-crisis median by –0.6% (see
the two boxes on the left of figure 3.3). Furthermore, as the pre-crisis median tends
to be above the post-crisis box, a slightly lower post-crisis growth seems to be likely.
In contrast, in the case of unsuccessful interventions the distribution of the post-crisis
growth is widespread and is strongly skewed towards negative output growth. The
deviation of the post-crisis median from the pre-crisis median is –3.8%. Most of the
crises – nearly 75% – are accompanied by growth rates, which are below pre-crisis
level. Taken together, delayed depreciations are associated with high economic costs.
In contrast, in case of an immediate depreciation output growth is only slightly lower
while no significant decline in growth can be observed for successful interventions.
To summarize the stylized facts, we find only few differences in the pre-crisis
period between the three types of crises while in the post-crisis period considerable
differences in the economic development become apparent. We take this finding as
a first evidence that crisis management – in particular the decision of the monetary
authority to defend or to not adopt defensive measures – might be an important factor
with respect to the economic development in the aftermath of a speculative attack.16
On average, successful attempts to defend the exchange rate are associated with the
best result in terms of output growth and inflation, while in the case of abandoned
interventions high economic costs in terms of lower output growth and higher inflation
seem to be likely. Abstaining from interventions, i. e. to let the domestic currency
depreciate immediately, are associated with an intermediate development in output
and inflation.
16When even removing country and time specific effects (see table 3.14), the pre-crisis differences
disappear while the post-crisis differences are still statistically significant. This aspect also supports
our view that the central bank’s crisis management seems to play an important role concerning the
economic costs of currency crises.
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The empirical analysis is divided in two steps: (i) a static panel analysis exam-
ines the impact of the three types of currency crises on output growth given several
macroeconomic control variables, (ii) a dynamic panel approach supports the static
analysis and evaluates the dynamic responses of various macroeconomic variables in
the aftermath of a crisis.
3.4.1 Output costs of currency crises
In a first step, we quantify the impact of crises on output growth and examine the
role of central bank intervention policies and therefore the three types of currency
crises based on two-way fixed effects panel regressions. Our benchmark equation is
given by:
git = αi + ωt +
∑
n
βnx¯ni +
3∑
k=1
αkDkit−1 + it,
where git is the output growth (annual growth in real GDP) in country i in year t,
x¯ni is a set of lagged explanatory control variables and it is an i. i. d. error term.
To eliminate business cycle effects we compute averages over the last three years,
covering the period from t − 3 to t − 1. To quantify the impact of the different
types of currency crises on output growth, we include the dummy variables Dkit−1.
Specifically, Dkit−1 takes on the value one for the year t − 1 identified as a k type
currency crisis in country i. We do not include contemporaneous values of x and D
to avoid potential endogeneity problems (see, e. g., Hong and Tornell, 2005; Gupta
et al., 2007; Bussière et al., 2010).17 We additionally control for time-constant but
17The results do not qualitatively change when using contemporaneous currency crisis dummies
instead.
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cross-sectional varying effects (αi) as well as time-varying but cross-section constant
factors (ωt). Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are
calculated. As macroeconomic controls we use the variables discussed in section 3.3
(see also table 3.1). The regression results are reported in table 3.2.
Column 1 of table 3.2 depicts the results of a pooled regression and corresponds to
a simplified version of our benchmark equation.18 The results for the crisis dummy
variables indicate that the two types of crises that are associated with a depreciation,
namely abstaining from interventions and delayed depreciations, are characterized by
high economic costs. In the case of an immediate depreciation there is a statistically
significant drop of output growth by –1.4 percentage points. The negative effect of
unsuccessful interventions on output growth is even stronger with –5.7 percentage
points. In contrast, successful defenses do not appear to have significant output ef-
fects. These results point to the considerable risk for a central bank if she intervenes
to defend the exchange rate. If the central bank is successful there is no output loss.
However, if she abandons the interventions, she is likely to face the worst outcome
with the highest output loss of the three cases. In contrast, an immediate deprecia-
tion, i. e. the decision not to intervene, is likely to imply an only intermediate output
loss. The empirical results also imply that to not differentiate between the different
types means that the severe economic consequences of an unsuccessful intervention
are underestimated and those of an immediate depreciation are overestimated. The
economic effects of a successful defense are, most likely, judged too negative. For in-
stance, if we use a crisis dummy that combines all three types of crises, the estimation
results show a significant impact on growth of about –1.3 percentage points. Likewise,
if we use two different crisis dummies that either indicate successful interventions or
18The equation for the pooled data regression is given by git = α+
∑
n βnx¯ni+
∑3
k=1 αkDkit−1 +
it, where git is the output growth in country i in year t, x is the set of explanatory variables, Dk is
the specific crisis dummy and it is an i. i. d. error term. Regressions are estimated using OLS with
robust standard errors.
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Table 3.2: Output growth effects of currency crises by different types of crises
Pooled
(1)
Panel
(2)
Panel
(3)
Panel
(4)
CPI inflation −0.042∗∗∗ −0.028∗ −0.027∗ −0.026∗
(−2.7) (−1.7) (−1.6) (−1.6)
Current account 0.029 0.015 0.017 0.016
(1.1) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
Private capital inflows −0.093 0.010 0.016 0.013
(−1.6) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1)
∆ Real effective exchange rate 0.016 0.034∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.030∗∗
(1.2) (2.6) (2.1) (2.2)
∆ M1 0.036∗∗ 0.027∗ 0.026∗ 0.027∗
(2.1) (1.6) (1.6) (1.6)
∆ Total reserves 0.008∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(2.5) (4.2) (3.2) (4.1)
Immediate depreciation dummy −0.014∗∗ −0.010∗ −0.012∗ −0.011∗
(−2.3) (−1.7) (−1.9) (−1.8)
Successful defense dummy 0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002
(0.3) (−0.2) (−0.5) (−0.5)
Unsuccessful defense dummy −0.057∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗
(−4.7) (−4.4) (−4.5) (−4.5)
(CPI inflation) × (im. dep.) 0.014 0.019∗
(1.2) (1.9)
(CPI inflation) × (su. def.) 0.001 −0.004
(0.1) (−0.4)
(CPI inflation) × (un. def.) −0.030 −0.018
(−1.3) (−0.9)
Exchange rate regime (err) −0.000 −0.000
(−0.7) (−0.6)
(Exch. rate regime) × (im. dep.) −0.000 −0.001
(−0.4) (−0.9)
(Exch. rate regime) × (su. def.) 0.000 0.000
(0.2) (0.2)
(Exch. rate regime) × (un. def.) −0.002∗ −0.001
(−1.8) (−1.3)
R2 (within) 0.166 0.189 0.190 0.195
Country fixed effects – Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects – Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 547 547 547 547
Countries 28 28 28 28
Notes: Dependent variable: Output growth in country i in year t. T-values in
parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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successful attacks – immediate depreciation and unsuccessful interventions – we find
a significant impact on output growth for successful attacks of about –2.7 percentage
points, thereby underestimating the negative consequences of unsuccessful defenses.
Therefore, empirical studies, as provided by Eichengreen and Rose (2003) who treat
immediate depreciations and unsuccessful interventions as successful attacks, might
indicate that not trying to defend also leads to high economic costs. For that reason
monetary authorities should rather try to defend the domestic currency more fre-
quently than to immediately give in to a speculative attack. Based on those studies
the costs of an unsuccessful defense seem to be relatively small compared to our dif-
ferentiated analysis, while the economic costs of an immediate depreciation seem to
be relatively high. However, our results suggest that – in contrast to an unsuccessful
defense – allowing for an immediate depreciation in case of speculative attack is a
reasonable alternative.
The remaining columns (2 – 4) contain the results of the two way fixed effects panel
regressions. The estimated coefficients for the crisis dummies indicate an impact on
growth that is similar to the pooled regression. Unsuccessful defenses are associated
with the largest reduction in output growth ranging between –5.0 and –5.2 percentage
points, while no significant output losses are found in the case of successful defenses.
Again immediate depreciations can be considered as an intermediate case with a
decline of the output growth rate in the range of –1.0 to –1.2 percentage points.
Since we find some evidence for pre-crisis differences between the three types of
crises concerning inflation dynamics and the exchange rate regime, we allow for in-
teraction terms between the specific crisis type and inflation as well as the exchange
rate regime in order to control for these pre-crisis differences (see columns 2 – 4).19
The estimation results weakly indicate that in the case of an immediate depreciation
19We also included additional interaction terms, e. g. private capital inflows, but do not find any
other robust results.
46
3.4 Empirical analysis
the higher the pre-crisis inflation the more the economy benefits from a depreciation
of the domestic currency (see column 4). The analysis also shows that in general the
exchange rate regime does not have a significant effect on output growth (see column
3). However, when controlling for the impact of the exchange rate arrangement with
respect to the three different types of currency crises, weak differences become appar-
ent. In particular the results indicate, that if interventions fail the growth effects are
particularly severe if the central bank tries to stabilize an exchange rate that was de
facto floating during the pre-crisis period. Monetary authorities who do not pursue a
consistent policy, i. e. unsuccessfully pegging a former floating exchange rate, suffer
relatively high economic costs possibly related to an associated loss of confidence in
the monetary authority.
Taken together, the empirical results illustrate the risk involved in exchange market
interventions and the important role central banks play in the face of speculative
attacks. If the central bank is successful in defending her currency, she achieves the
best result in terms of output growth, namely no loss of output. However, if she
is unable or unwilling to continue her interventions, she is likely to face the worst
scenario with a considerable loss of output. If the monetary authority decides to
abstain from interventions an intermediate scenario seems to follow with a moderate
slowdown in output.
3.4.2 Macroeconomic dynamics of currency crises
In a next step we complement the static approach of section 3.4.1 with a dynamic
analysis. We estimate a univariate panel autoregressive model in x applying the
methodology used in Cerra and Saxena (2008), Bussière et al. (2010) and Kappler
et al. (2011), and simulate impulse responses of several macroeconomic variables for
the three different types of currency crises. This way we are able to analyze how the
macroeconomic adjustments differ between the three types of currency crises.
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Our benchmark model is given by:
xit = αi + ωt +
3∑
j=1
βjxit−j +
3∑
k=1
3∑
s=1
αksDkit−s + it,
where xit denotes the macroeconomic variable of interest in country i in year t. Since
the dependent variable xit is either defined as a growth rate or a ratio (e. g., output
growth, inflation, current account over GDP or private capital inflows over GDP),
the model specification accounts for the non-stationarity of x in levels20 and for serial
correlation of x. The dummy variable Dkit−s takes on the value one if a k type
currency crisis occurs in country i in year t − s. We additionally control for time
(ωt) and country specific effects (αi). The i. i. d. error term is denoted by it. The
lag length is set to three, as we do not find any significant coefficients beyond the
third lag for most indicators.21 Furthermore, heteroscedasticity consistent standard
errors are computed. In order to avoid potential endogeneity problems we estimate a
dynamic model for each variable that only captures the lagged effects of a currency
crisis. To examine the crisis dynamics, namely the deviation from the no-crisis trend
behavior, we simulate impulse response functions of several macroeconomic variables
to shocks of the different types of crises.22
20Test statistics show that all underlying variables are integrated of order 1.
21We use a common lag length for all model specifications in order to ensure a direct comparison
of impulse response functions of the different macroeconomic indicators (see Kappler et al., 2011,
pp. 13).
22To ensure that the impulse response functions are not driven by overlapping currency crises we
apply a time window, which determines the singular event status of a currency crisis, and consider
only crisis events without overlapping time windows (see also section 3.2). Precisely, currency crises
have to be two years apart to be kept in our analysis. We also applied different lengths of this
time window (from 0 to 3 years) and have found our results to be robust (results are available upon
request).
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The upper part of figure 3.4 shows that the output effects of a currency crisis
substantially differ between the three types of crises.23 For immediate depreciations
and unsuccessful interventions the impulse response functions show a V-shaped drop
and recovery of output growth. Moreover, the decline in output growth in case of
unsuccessful interventions is about threefold the drop in case of immediate depreci-
ations. Successful defenses do not show any significant output effect. In addition,
the results imply a highly persistent impact on the output level in the aftermath of
an unsuccessful defense. In particular, the accumulated output loss is more than 5
percentage points after 5 years (see table 3.7).
Likewise inflation is characterized by distinct differences between the three types
of crises in the post-crisis period. Both immediate depreciations and unsuccessful
interventions appear to be associated with higher inflation during the post-crisis
period. While immediate depreciations vaguely show a prolonged period of higher
inflation rates up to 9 percentage points above trend, unsuccessful defenses seem to
be followed by a strong one time inflation peak of about 11 percentage points. Again,
no significant effects are found in the case of successful interventions.
Concerning current account effects, we find a particularly strong response in the
case of unsuccessful interventions (see figure 3.5). The current account improves
persistently and shows the largest effect of about 4 percentage points three years
after the crisis, thereby mitigating the decline in output. Immediate depreciations
are associated with a small improvement in the current account, whereas no change
is apparent in the case of successful interventions.
In the case of private capital inflows, post-crisis the three types of crises are associ-
ated with diverging developments. While capital inflows show no significant response
23As recommended by Sims and Zha (1999), the interpretation of the impulse response functions
presented in this paper is based on error bands with coverage .68 instead of conventional significance
levels.
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Figure 3.4: Impulse responses of output growth and inflation
in the case of successful interventions, they overshoot in the following period in the
case of immediate depreciations. In contrast, they strongly decline in case of un-
successful interventions and only recover slowly which might be related to increased
uncertainty concerning the future economic development, further suggesting a loss of
confidence among investors (see, e. g., Radelet and Sachs, 1998).24
Taken together the findings from the impulse response functions indicate that
depreciation events – immediate depreciation and unsuccessful defense – are associ-
24From a first insight, the impulse response functions seem to show a somewhat different behavior
compared to the test statistics of table 3.1. However, these differences are not surprising as table 3.1
only reports simple mean values, while the underlying regressions of the impulse response functions
also consider important time series effects. The impulse response functions therefore indicate the
details of the post-crisis dynamics, which are not captured by the simple comparison of the pre- and
post-crisis mean values of table 3.1.
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Figure 3.5: Impulse responses of current account and private capital inflows
ated with lower output growth and higher inflation during the post-crisis period.25
Particularly, in case of an unsuccessful defense the output loss seems to be highly
persistent. The empirical results provide further evidence on the risk associated with
defending the domestic currency. On the one hand, if the central bank decides to
let the currency depreciate without trying to defend it, the country is likely to face
a mild recession. On the other hand, if she decides to intervene, she is either suc-
cessful and avoids negative output effects or she abandons the exchange rate and
most likely suffers high economic costs in terms of output loss. Monetary authorities
that pursue an apparently consistent policy, i. e. either successfully defending the do-
mestic currency or immediately giving in to a speculative attack, seem to fare best.
25Table 3.7 in the appendix provides an additional overview of the results obtained from the
impulse response functions presented in this section.
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In the inconsistent case of an unsuccessful defense, i. e. defending the exchange rate
and later giving in to the speculative attack, negative expectational effects associated
with the loss of the nominal exchange rate anchor are likely to lead to high economic
cost in terms of output (see also Eichengreen and Rose, 2003). From this perspective,
the case of an unsuccessful intervention seems to combine the worst of both worlds,
namely the negative expectational and reputational effects due to the depreciation
and the temporarily restrictive monetary policy in the futile attempt to defend the
domestic currency.
3.4.3 Robustness analysis
Section 3.3 indicates that a central bank’s crisis management seems to play a crucial
role for the crisis outcome as the different types of currency crises do not depend on
the pre-crisis economic development. Since we are interested in the economic impacts
of the different types of crises, it is essential to show that there is no or at least weak
evidence regarding the pre-crisis fundamentals’ performance of the economies with
respect to the different types of currency crises. Only if this is the case, the obvious
different post-crisis outcomes are likely to be the consequences of the different types
of currency crises (see also Eichengreen and Rose, 2003), thus indicating that the
crisis management of the monetary authority might play an important role.
In the baseline analysis we have checked the macroeconomic data for pre-crisis
differences between the three types. As we did not find significant results we took
this finding as a first evidence that the central bank’s decision to defend or to not
defend might play a crucial role. To address this issue more deeply we additionally
analyze to what extent the decision to intervene or to abstain from intervention is
based on a cost-benefit analysis as proposed by second generation currency crisis
models (see, e. g. Jeanne, 2000). To deal with this potential endogeneity, we compare
pre-crisis forecasts of expected post-crisis economic developments between the three
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different types of crises.26 Table 3.15 reports the on average expected post-crisis
development with respect to the three types of crises. The results indicate that
the forecasts concerning the post-crisis macroeconomic development do not differ
significantly, pointing out the absence of reversed causality.
Moreover, we control for differences regarding the banking/financial sector sta-
bility. We test if a specific crisis type is vulnerable to instabilities in the bank-
ing/financial sector during the pre-crisis period and thus also to currency crises.
Likewise, we examine whether there are pre-crisis differences concerning the external
debt status, which could lead to a relevant currency mismatch. Table 3.16 indicates
that there are no significant differences concerning the financial sector stability, how-
ever. The results therefore again point to the importance of the central bank behavior
during currency crises.
In order to further discuss the endogeneity issue, we perform additional panel logit
regressions to examine whether there are feedback effects from the pre-crisis and
expected economic development with respect to the three different types of crises.
Specifically, we test whether output growth, inflation, private capital inflows or cur-
rent account imbalances increase the probability of (i) an immediate depreciation,
(ii) a successful defense, (iii) an unsuccessful defense or (iv) a currency crisis in gen-
eral. Nevertheless, to avoid ambiguities, the aim of our paper is not to explain the
occurrence of a specific crisis type with respect to the underlying economic devel-
opment. In particular, this research question is accounted for by the literature of
early warning indicators. Notwithstanding, the vast empirical literature on early
warning systems illustrates time and again, that macroeconomic variables are no-
toriously inapt and unreliable in predicting speculative attacks. Recent studies in
general use a wide variety of economic variables. However, it is hard to find reliable
26As we are not aware of published forecasts, we approximate these values by means of autoregres-
sive processes. On the basis of these estimated autoregressive models we then forecast the expected
post-crisis development for each crisis event.
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indicators. The prediction power still seems to be very poor, even “in sample” (see,
e. g., Rose and Spiegel, 2011). Though, Bussière and Fratzscher (2006), for instance,
show that the performance of early warning systems can be increased by the use of
more complex empirical methods. However, those indicators are still accompanied
by a rate of false alarms of more than 50%, pointing out that the results of early
warning systems/indicators do not seem to be that clear as they appear from a first
insight. Furthermore, even theory – in particular the second generation of currency
crisis models – proposes the existence of a large gray zone with respect to macroe-
conomic fundamentals. The environment of those fundamentals might be associated
with the absence as well as the occurrence of a currency crisis at the same time (see,
e. g., Jeanne, 2000). Taking all this into consideration, the empirical results and the
theory could also be interpreted as evidence for the important role central banks play
during speculative attacks.
In general, the empirical evidence of the panel logit regressions indicates that the
pre-crisis macroeconomic performance does not increase the crisis probability (see
table 3.12), since the lagged parameters of the different indicators in each regression
are jointly insignificant. Only a few individual lags are statistically significant. In
case of the aggregated crisis definition, solely the second lag of output growth is
significant at the 5% level. All other individual lags do not have a statistically
significant impact on the probability of the occurrence of a crisis. We find a similar
pattern for immediate depreciations – only the first lag of current account and the
second lag of private capital inflows are significant at the 10% level. Also, in case
of a successful defense the first lag of output growth has a statistically significant
impact on the likelihood of a crisis. For unsuccessful interventions we find all lags
of inflation and the third lag of the current account balance to be significant. As
the central bank’s decision might also depend on the expected economic performance
we additionally control for current and forecasted economic developments. Since
some individual lags or forecast indicators appear to be statistically significant (see
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table 3.13) the results slightly hint to the the aspect that the different types of
crises could be determined simultaneously. However, we do not find clear systematic
differences in the occurrence of a crisis event between the three different types. Taken
together, the results provide only weak evidence concerning the impact of the past
and expected economic development for currency crises in year t.27 Taking all this
into consideration, the panel logit regressions on the one hand and the examination
of the macroeconomic pre-crisis environment seem to indicate that the central bank
essentially determines the way an economy will take through the crisis. The results
again underline the importance of the central bank’s crisis management for the crisis
outcome.
To check the robustness of the results of section 3.4.1, we perform a number of
sensitivity checks. In particular we examine the effects of more restrictive crisis def-
initions. The identification of crisis events depends crucially on the assumptions
regarding significant depreciations, significant interventions and the time windows
(see section 3.2). Hence, applying alternative thresholds within our crisis identifica-
tion approach could even lead to a change in the crisis type that is assigned to a crisis
event. We therefore analyze how the results of section 3.4.1 are subject to changes
in the crisis identification procedure. Firstly, a depreciation is considered significant
only if it is larger than the average of the exchange rate changes during the previous
12 months plus three times the standard deviation of these changes – rather than the
two standard deviations assumed in section 3.2. Secondly, an intervention is consid-
ered to be significant if the INTX exceeds the average during the previous 12 months
plus four standard deviations instead of the three standard deviations used before.
Moreover, we change the time horizon for calculating the country and time specific
27Nevertheless, one could also expect, for example, banking sector vulnerability and external debt
burden to be important factors influencing the crisis probability. When additionally controlling for
these factors the results (available upon request) remain qualitatively unchanged.
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standard deviations and means. Instead of 12 months we apply a 24 months window.
Likewise, we increase the time span that determinates whether an intervention is con-
sidered to be either successful or unsuccessful from 12 to 24 months. Additionally, as
opposed to the crisis identification approach used in section 3.2 we do not drop crisis
events with overlapping time windows. The respective estimation results are shown
in tables 3.8 – 3.11.
We find that the results of section 3.4.1 are robust and remain qualitatively un-
changed. Given the several definitions the output effects of immediate depreciations
are associated with a significant reduction in output growth between –1.1 and –1.6
percentage points.28 In the case of unsuccessful defenses we again observe the most
severe negative growth effects, which range between –2.7 and –5.3 percentage points,
while successful defenses in general are not associated with statistically significant
output effects.
To sum up, the empirical results of the robustness analysis again stress the risk
of exchange rate interventions. A central bank that decides to defend the exchange
rate can avoid an economic slowdown if she is successful, while she faces the most
severe economic costs in terms of output if she is forced to abandon the exchange
rate regime. An immediate depreciation results in an “intermediate” outcome with a
small loss in output.
3.5 Conclusion
Contrary to the typical public perception, currency crises can be very heterogeneous
events with quite different real effects. The monetary authorities with their decisions
to intervene or not to intervene seem to play an important role for the economic costs
28Only one definition shows no significant effects for immediate depreciations (see table 3.9).
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of such financial crises. In case of a speculative attack, a central bank can in principle
either intervene in the foreign exchange market to defend the exchange rate or she
can remain passive, i. e. abstain from an intervention. If the central bank decides to
intervene she can then either succeed or fail and let the currency depreciate. This
gives rise to three distinct crisis events, namely immediate depreciations, successful
defenses and unsuccessful defenses.
Our empirical analysis indicates that a successful defense, i. e. the central bank
is able to stabilize the exchange rate with her interventions, yields the best result in
terms of output growth. In this case the central bank can basically counteract the
speculative attack, apparently without facing any economic costs, e. g. a recession
due to a restrictive monetary policy. However, there is no free lunch of exchange rate
intervention. If the central bank starts to intervene in the currency market she faces
the possibility of an unsuccessful defense either because she suspends her intervention
voluntarily, e. g. the benefits of a stable exchange rate no longer exceed the costs of
stabilizing, or involuntarily, e. g. as the reserves are depleted. Such an unsuccessful
defense seems to be associated with the worst possible outcome with an average loss
of around 5 per cent of GDP. If the central bank decides not to intervene, i. e. if she
lets the domestic currency depreciate right away, she can expect an “intermediate”
loss, with the economy passing through a mild recession. The decision to defend
therefore is evidently quite risky. Abstaining from an intervention policy could be an
interesting alternative for a conservative, risk-aware central bank.
57
Chapter 3 To Intervene, or Not to Intervene: Monetary Policy & Currency Crises
3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Regression results of the dynamic model
Table 3.3: Output growth effects by different crisis events
Output growth Coef. Std. Err. t Prob.
Output growtht−1 0.352 0.089 3.97 0.000
Output growtht−2 −0.117 0.070 −1.68 0.103
Output growtht−3 −0.006 0.047 −0.14 0.891
imdept−1 −0.009 0.010 −0.97 0.339
imdept−2 −0.003 0.003 −0.94 0.353
imdept−3 0.001 0.010 0.12 0.908
sudeft−1 −0.001 0.004 −0.23 0.819
sudeft−2 −0.003 0.005 −0.50 0.619
sudeft−3 −0.004 0.005 −0.74 0.464
undeft−1 −0.052 0.015 −3.53 0.001
undeft−2 0.019 0.011 1.74 0.092
undeft−3 −0.007 0.009 −0.77 0.446
Constant 0.063 0.009 6.93 0.000
Notes: imdep= immediate depreciation, sudef= successful defense, undef=unsuccessful defense.
Table 3.4: Inflation effects by different crisis events
Inflation Coef. Std. Err. t Prob.
Inflationt−1 0.567 0.251 2.26 0.031
Inflationt−2 −0.209 0.213 −0.98 0.334
Inflationt−3 0.204 0.066 3.10 0.004
imdept−1 0.001 0.013 0.07 0.948
imdept−2 0.035 0.045 0.79 0.436
imdept−3 0.069 0.054 1.27 0.213
sudeft−1 0.015 0.011 1.39 0.173
sudeft−2 0.000 0.009 −0.01 0.992
sudeft−3 −0.005 0.007 −0.70 0.486
undeft−1 0.112 0.050 2.24 0.033
undeft−2 −0.087 0.073 −1.20 0.240
undeft−3 0.018 0.036 0.50 0.619
Constant 0.064 0.026 2.46 0.020
Notes: imdep= immediate depreciation, sudef= successful defense, undef=unsuccessful defense.
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Table 3.5: Current account effects by different crisis events
Current account Coef. Std. Err. t Prob.
Current accountt−1 0.815 0.063 12.91 0.000
Current accountt−2 −0.173 0.051 −3.39 0.002
Current accountt−3 0.059 0.063 0.94 0.357
imdept−1 0.006 0.005 1.08 0.287
imdept−2 −0.004 0.005 −0.73 0.471
imdept−3 0.010 0.008 1.31 0.201
sudeft−1 −0.001 0.004 −0.12 0.904
sudeft−2 0.001 0.004 0.31 0.762
sudeft−3 0.005 0.005 1.13 0.267
undeft−1 0.034 0.011 2.95 0.006
undeft−2 0.010 0.006 1.60 0.119
undeft−3 0.005 0.007 0.81 0.427
Constant −0.001 0.010 −0.09 0.927
Notes: imdep= immediate depreciation, sudef= successful defense, undef=unsuccessful defense.
Table 3.6: Private capital inflow effects by different crisis events
Private capital inflows Coef. Std. Err. t Prob.
Private capital inflowst−1 −0.063 0.081 −0.77 0.448
Private capital inflowst−2 −0.073 0.043 −1.68 0.104
Private capital inflowst−3 −0.061 0.068 −0.90 0.373
imdept−1 0.006 0.005 1.07 0.293
imdept−2 0.011 0.006 1.98 0.057
imdept−3 0.020 0.007 3.02 0.005
sudeft−1 −0.001 0.005 −0.25 0.804
sudeft−2 0.000 0.005 −0.06 0.955
sudeft−3 0.002 0.007 0.32 0.749
undeft−1 −0.013 0.008 −1.60 0.119
undeft−2 −0.017 0.015 −1.11 0.277
undeft−3 −0.009 0.004 −2.21 0.034
Constant −0.013 0.003 −4.89 0.000
Notes: imdep= immediate depreciation, sudef= successful defense, undef=unsuccessful defense.
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Table 3.7: Behavior of macroeconomic indicators after different crisis events
Year after crisis 1 2 3 4 5
Immediate depreciation
Output 0.000 −0.009 −0.015 −0.015 −0.014
Inflation 0.000 0.001 0.036 0.088 0.042
Private capital inflows 0.000 0.006 0.011∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ −0.002
Current account 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.010 0.008
Successful defense
Output 0.000 −0.001 −0.004 −0.009 −0.010
Inflation 0.000 0.015 0.008 −0.003 −0.001
Private capital inflows 0.000 −0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000
Current account 0.000 −0.001 0.001 0.006 0.005
Unsuccessful defense
Output 0.000 −0.052∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗ −0.052∗ −0.052∗
Inflation 0.000 0.110∗∗ −0.024 −0.019 0.017
Private capital inflows 0.000 −0.013∗ −0.016 −0.007 0.002
Current account 0.000 0.033∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗
Notes: Cumulative effects in percentage points for output. Percentage points for inflation. Percent-
age points over GDP for private capital inflows and current account. Significance levels: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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3.6.2 Robustness analysis
Table 3.8: Output growth effects of currency crises by different types of crises
Pooled
(1)
Panel
(2)
Panel
(3)
Panel
(4)
CPI inflation −0.041∗∗∗ −0.028∗ −0.029∗∗ −0.027∗
(−2.9) (−1.9) (−2.0) (−1.9)
Current account 0.019 0.047 0.029 0.046
(0.8) (1.0) (0.6) (0.9)
Private capital inflows −0.103∗ 0.005 0.004 0.008
(−1.8) (0.1) (0.0) (0.1)
∆ Real effective exchange rate 0.025∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(1.9) (3.2) (2.9) (3.2)
∆ M1 0.031∗∗ 0.022 0.021 0.021
(2.1) (1.5) (1.4) (1.5)
∆ Total reserves 0.007∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(2.3) (2.9) (2.5) (2.9)
Immediate depreciation dummy −0.016∗ −0.014∗ −0.014∗ −0.014∗
(−2.3) (−1.9) (−1.9) (−1.8)
Successful defense dummy −0.005 −0.005 −0.004 −0.004
(−0.8) (−0.8) (−0.7) (−0.7)
Unsuccessful defense dummy −0.051∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗
(−4.0) (−4.1) (−4.0) (−4.0)
(CPI inflation) × (im. dep.) −0.050∗ −0.046
(−1.7) (−1.3)
(CPI inflation) × (su. def.) −0.021 −0.028∗
(−1.5) (−1.7)
(CPI inflation) × (un. def.) −0.092∗∗∗ −0.128∗∗∗
(−2.7) (−2.9)
Exchange rate regime 0.000 0.000
(0.3) (0.1)
(Exchange rate regime) × (im. dep.) −0.001 −0.000
(−1.4) (−0.2)
(Exchange rate regime) × (su. def.) −0.000 0.001
(−0.2) (0.9)
(Exchange rate regime) × (un. def.) −0.002∗ 0.001
(−1.6) (1.4)
R2 (within) 0.131 0.172 0.156 0.175
Country fixed effects – Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects – Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 605 605 605 605
Countries 28 28 28 28
Notes: Dependent variable: Output growth in country i in year t. T-values in parentheses. Significance
levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
As opposed to the definition used in section 3.2 we applied more restrictive thresholds. A depreciation
is significant if it is larger than the average of the exchange rate changes during the previous 12 months
plus three times the standard deviation of these changes. An intervention is considered to be significant
if the INTX exceeds the average during the previous 12 months plus four standard deviations. Based on
this definition, we identify 141 crisis events with 56 immediate depreciations, 60 successful interventions
and 25 unsuccessful interventions.
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Table 3.9: Output growth effects of currency crises by different types of crises
Pooled
(1)
Panel
(2)
Panel
(3)
Panel
(4)
CPI inflation −0.036∗∗ −0.014 −0.018 −0.018
(−2.4) (−1.0) (−1.1) (−1.0)
Current account 0.046∗ 0.037 0.026 0.035
(1.7) (0.7) (0.5) (0.7)
Private capital inflows −0.134∗∗ −0.060 −0.063 −0.061
(−2.3) (−0.7) (−0.8) (−0.7)
∆ Real effective exchange rate 0.017 0.023∗ 0.020 0.022∗
(1.2) (1.7) (1.4) (1.6)
∆ M1 0.034∗∗ 0.025 0.024 0.026∗
(2.1) (1.5) (1.6) (1.6)
∆ Total reserves 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(2.8) (3.1) (2.9) (3.1)
Immediate depreciation dummy −0.007 −0.006 −0.007 −0.006
(−0.9) (−0.8) (−1.0) (−0.8)
Successful defense dummy −0.001 −0.005 −0.005 −0.005
(0.3) (−0.3) (−0.9) (−0.8)
Unsuccessful defense dummy −0.053∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗
(−5.0) (−4.4) (−4.4) (−4.4)
(CPI inflation) × (im. dep.) −0.084 −0.169
(−1.1) (−1.4)
(CPI inflation) × (su. def.) −0.002 −0.014
(−0.2) (−0.9)
(CPI inflation) × (un. def.) −0.061∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗
(−3.5) (−2.2)
Exchange rate regime −0.000 −0.000
(−0.2) (−0.2)
(Exchange rate regime) × (im. dep.) −0.001 0.001
(−0.8) (1.3)
(Exchange rate regime) × (su. def.) 0.000 0.001
(0.5) (1.0)
(Exchange rate regime) × (un. def.) −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001
(−3.0) (−1.0)
R2 (within) 0.151 0.183 0.172 0.188
Country fixed effects – Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects – Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 559 559 559 559
Countries 28 28 28 28
Notes: Dependent variable: Output growth in country i in year t. T-values in parentheses. Significance
levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
As opposed to the definition used in section 3.2 we changed the time horizon for calculating the country
and time specific SDs and means. Instead of 12 months we applied 24 months (see point 1 on page
34). Based on this definition, we identify 145 crisis events with 37 immediate depreciations, 71 successful
interventions and 37 unsuccessful interventions.
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Table 3.10: Output growth effects of currency crises by different types of crises
Pooled
(1)
Panel
(2)
Panel
(3)
Panel
(4)
CPI inflation −0.042∗∗∗ −0.026 −0.028∗ −0.026
(−2.8) (−1.6) (−1.8) (−1.6)
Current account 0.030 0.024 0.023 0.026
(1.1) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5)
Private capital inflows −0.102∗ 0.031 0.023 0.030
(−1.8) (0.3) (0.2) (0.3)
∆ Real effective exchange rate 0.019 0.033∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.030∗∗
(1.5) (2.7) (2.2) (2.3)
∆ M1 0.036∗∗ 0.027∗ 0.026∗ 0.027∗
(2.2) (1.6) (1.6) (1.6)
∆ Total reserves 0.009∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(2.8) (3.9) (3.6) (4.0)
Immediate depreciation dummy −0.015∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.014∗∗ −0.014∗∗
(−2.4) (−2.1) (−2.2) (−2.2)
Successful defense dummy 0.002 −0.000 −0.002 −0.002
(0.4) (−0.1) (−0.4) (−0.4)
Unsuccessful defense dummy −0.040∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
(−4.1) (−4.3) (−4.2) (−4.2)
(CPI inflation) × (im. dep.) −0.068 −0.067
(−1.2) (−1.0)
(CPI inflation) × (su. def.) 0.006 0.002
(0.4) (0.1)
(CPI inflation) × (un. def.) −0.040∗ −0.027
(−2.0) (−1.5)
Exchange rate regime −0.000 −0.000
(−0.4) (−0.6)
(Exchange rate regime) × (im. dep.) −0.001 −0.000
(−1.2) (−0.3)
(Exchange rate regime) × (su. def.) 0.000 0.000
(0.0) (0.1)
(Exchange rate regime) × (un. def.) −0.002∗∗ −0.001
(−2.3) (−1.4)
R2 (within) 0.137 0.177 0.173 0.183
Country fixed effects – Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects – Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 578 578 578 578
Countries 28 28 28 28
Notes: Dependent variable: Output growth in country i in year t. T-values in parentheses. Significance
levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
As opposed to the definition used in section 3.2 we changed the time horizon that is relevant for deter-
mining if an intervention is either successful or unsuccessful (see points 2 – 4 on page 35). Based on this
definition, we identify 174 crisis events with 38 immediate depreciations, 82 successful interventions and
54 unsuccessful interventions.
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Table 3.11: Output growth effects of currency crises by different types of crises
Pooled
(1)
Panel
(2)
Panel
(3)
Panel
(4)
CPI inflation −0.034∗∗∗ −0.021 −0.016 −0.020
(−2.7) (−1.6) (−1.2) (−1.5)
Current account 0.033 0.026 0.026 0.024
(1.3) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
Private capital inflows −0.110∗ −0.020 −0.020 −0.017
(−2.0) (−0.2) (−0.2) (−0.2)
∆ Real effective exchange rate 0.020∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(1.7) (3.1) (2.8) (2.8)
∆ M1 0.031∗∗ 0.020 0.020∗ 0.020
(2.4) (1.6) (1.6) (1.6)
∆ Total reserves 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(2.9) (3.5) (3.2) (3.5)
Immediate depreciation dummy −0.018∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.012∗∗
(−3.5) (−2.4) (−2.3) (−2.3)
Successful defense dummy −0.001 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
(−0.3) (−0.5) (−0.5) (−0.5)
Unsuccessful defense dummy −0.036∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗
(−4.6) (−3.3) (−3.3) (−3.3)
(CPI inflation) × (im. dep.) 0.011 0.014
(1.1) (1.2)
(CPI inflation) × (su. def.) 0.022∗∗∗ 0.019∗
(2.6) (1.9)
(CPI inflation) × (un. def.) −0.017 −0.010
(−1.3) (−0.6)
Exchange rate regime −0.000 −0.000
(−0.5) (−0.3)
(Exchange rate regime) × (im. dep.) 0.000 −0.000
(0.4) (−0.4)
(Exchange rate regime) × (su. def.) 0.001∗ 0.000
(1.8) (0.7)
(Exchange rate regime) × (un. def.) −0.001 −0.001
(1.3) (−0.8)
R2 (within) 0.132 0.144 0.138 0.146
Country fixed effects – Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects – Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 670 670 670 670
Countries 28 28 28 28
Notes: Dependent variable: Output growth in country i in year t. T-values in parentheses. Significance
levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
As opposed to the crisis identification approach used in section 3.2 we do not drop crisis events with
overlapping time windows (see page 35). Based on this procedure, we identify 331 crisis events with 96
immediate depreciations, 161 successful interventions and 74 unsuccessful interventions.
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Table 3.12: Exogeneity test – Panel logit regression I
all
crises
(1)
immediate
depreciation
(2)
successful
defense
(3)
unsuccessful
defense
(4)
Individual lags
Output growth
t− 1 2.665 −8.058 8.530∗ 12.316
(0.9) (−1.5) (1.8) (1.6)
t− 2 −7.663∗∗ −8.886 −7.384 1.270
(−2.2) (−1.3) (−1.5) (0.2)
t− 3 2.285 8.205 2.354 0.814
(0.8) (1.1) (0.6) (0.1)
All lags are zero (Chi2) 5.095 5.526 4.482 2.697
Prob. 0.165 0.137 0.214 0.441
Inflation
t− 1 0.842 −0.307 0.658 2.667∗
(1.4) (−0.1) (0.6) (1.9)
t− 2 −1.537 −0.159 −2.120 −5.144∗
(−1.6) (−0.0) (−1.0) (−1.9)
t− 3 0.689 0.432 0.699 1.474∗
(1.5) (0.2) (1.0) (1.7)
All lags are zero (Chi2) 3.364 0.137 1.305 4.671
Prob. 0.339 0.987 0.728 0.198
Current account
t− 1 −2.373 −12.087∗ 2.454 −1.424
(−0.7) (−1.8) (0.5) (−0.2)
t− 2 3.819 8.607 2.180 9.569
(0.9) (1.0) (0.4) (0.9)
t− 3 0.710 1.691 0.826 −19.425∗∗
(0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (−2.0)
All lags are zero (Chi2) 1.825 4.125 1.943 4.703
Prob. 0.610 0.248 0.584 0.195
Private capital inflows
t− 1 1.394 −0.733 1.911 16.107
(0.5) (−0.1) (0.5) (1.4)
t− 2 2.739 21.573∗ −0.284 −0.450
(1.0) (1.7) (−0.1) (−0.0)
t− 3 −0.370 −5.041 3.749 −6.767
(−0.1) (−1.0) (0.9) (−0.7)
All lags are zero (Chi2) 1.186 3.632 0.894 2.294
Prob. 0.756 0.304 0.827 0.514
Country & time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 644 259 425 233
Countries 32 20 30 19
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary variable that takes on the value one if a crisis occurs and zero otherwise.
Z-values in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 3.13: Exogeneity test – Panel logit regressions II
all
crises
(1)
immediate
depreciation
(2)
successful
defense
(3)
unsuccessful
defense
(4)
Individual lags
Output growth
t + 1 forecast −62.128∗ −31.030 −110.348∗∗ −120.636
(−1.7) (−0.4) (−2.1) (−1.3)
t −4.121 −10.632 4.572 −26.287∗∗∗
(−1.3) (−1.4) (0.8) (−3.4)
t− 1 12.880∗∗ −0.950 16.549∗∗ 21.489
(2.3) (−0.1) (2.0) (1.4)
t− 2 −9.085∗∗ −8.925 −10.110∗ −8.397
(−2.3) (−1.2) (−1.9) (−0.9)
t− 3 −0.185 4.043 −0.579 −3.122
(−0.1) (0.5) (−0.1) (−0.3)
Inflation
t + 1 forecast −2.605 −2.041 −3.455 −11.574∗
(−1.1) (−0.4) (−1.1) (−1.8)
t 0.130 −0.383 −6.051 3.259
(0.3) (−0.3) (−1.5) (1.7)
t− 1 2.300 1.354 3.272 4.295
(1.6) (0.3) (1.6) (0.8)
t− 2 −2.315∗∗ −1.490 −2.195 −6.482
(−2.0) (−0.3) (−1.1) (−1.4)
t− 3 0.990∗ 1.088 1.212 2.613∗
(2.0) (0.5) (1.6) (1.7)
Current account
t + 1 forecast 30.796 27.731 34.864 18.173
(1.6) (0.7) (1.2) (0.3)
t −8.685∗∗ −16.508∗ −6.846 −34.387∗∗∗
(−2.4) (−1.9) (−1.3) (−3.6)
t− 1 −10.278 −22.288 −9.830 13.037
(−1.1) (−1.1) (−0.7) (0.5)
t− 2 5.632 15.967 3.712 10.814
(1.2) (1.5) (0.6) (0.8)
t− 3 −2.790 −2.630 −1.472 −25.050∗∗
(−0.7) (−0.3) (−0.3) (−2.2)
Private capital inflows
t + 1 forecast −30.623 15.189 −70.047 −19.370
(−0.6) (0.1) (−0.9) (−0.2)
t −9.585∗∗ −16.974∗∗ −9.474 −13.887∗
(−2.6) (−2.5) (−1.6) (−1.8)
t− 1 −0.199 2.385 −1.490 37.905∗∗
(−0.1) (0.3) (−0.3) (2.5)
t− 2 0.746 23.530 −2.952 −16.231
(0.2) (1.5) (−0.6) (−1.6)
t− 3 0.973 −5.939 3.731 −9.420
(0.3) (−0.9) (0.8) (−0.7)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 614 239 403 222
Countries 32 19 30 19
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary variable that takes on the value one if a crisis occurs and zero otherwise.
Z-values in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
66
3.6 Appendix
Table 3.14: Mean values of macroeconomic indicators by different crisis events
Variable no
crisis
(1)
all
crises
(2)
immediate
depreciation
(3)
successful
defense
(4)
unsuccessful
defense
(5)
pre-crisis
Output growth 0.013 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.011
Inflation −0.067 −0.015 −0.012 −0.015 −0.020
Current account −0.009 0.000 −0.006 0.009 −0.016
Private capital inflows 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
∆ Real effective exchange rate 0.004 0.010 0.011 0.002 0.026
∆ Nominal exchange rate −0.077 −0.029 0.004 −0.039 −0.043
∆ M1 −0.026 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.009
∆ Total reserves 0.034 0.026 0.005 0.037 0.024
Exchange rate regime −1.5 −0.3 0.3 −0.8 0.2
post-crisis
Output growth 0.013 −0.005 −0.009 0.009 −0.037
Inflation −0.067 −0.003 −0.012 −0.031 0.075
Current account −0.009 −0.003 −0.016 0.001 0.004
Private capital inflows 0.005 −0.003 −0.001 −0.003 −0.004
∆ Real effective exchange rate 0.004 −0.012 −0.012 0.010 −0.061
∆ Nominal exchange rate −0.077 0.034 0.036 −0.054 0.244
∆ M1 −0.026 −0.007 −0.031 −0.036 0.091
∆ Total reserves 0.034 −0.030 0.027 −0.030 −0.091
Exchange rate regime −1.5 0.3 0.423 −0.691 2.343
Notes: A nominal depreciation is defined as an increase in the nominal exchange rate. A real depreciation is given by a
decrease in the real effective exchange rate. The Exchange rate regime classification is based on Ilzetzki et al. (2008) and
ranges from 1 to 15 – from de facto pegged to de facto floating. Shaded areas denote statistically significant differences
at the 5% level of one type of crisis compared to the two other types of crises within the respective group.
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Table 3.15: Post-crisis forecasts of macroeconomic indicators by different crisis events
Variable all
crises
(1)
immediate
depreciation
(2)
successful
defense
(3)
unsuccessful
defense
(4)
post-crisis forecasts
Output growth 0.043 0.040 0.047 0.038
Inflation 0.144 0.178 0.106 0.197
Current account 0.003 −0.008 0.013 −0.007
Private capital inflows 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.011
Notes: The forecast are obtained from estimating AR(3) processes. The lag length is set to three, as
we do not find significant coefficients beyond the third lag for most indicators. Shaded areas denote
statistically significant differences at the 5% level of one type of crisis compared to the two other types
of crises within the respective group.
Table 3.16: Mean values of financial stability indicators by different crisis events
Variable all
crises
(1)
immediate
depreciation
(2)
successful
defense
(3)
unsuccessful
defense
(4)
pre-crisis development
Ext. debt (short term) / GDP 0.073 0.071 0.072 0.077
Ext. debt (long term) / GDP 0.325 0.337 0.314 0.333
Ext. debt (total) / GDP 0.411 0.421 0.400 0.423
# of Banking crises 0.193 0.213 0.204 0.146
# of Financial crises 0.832 0.828 0.816 0.867
Notes: Shaded areas denote statistically significant differences at the 5% level of one type of crisis
compared to the two other types of crises within the respective group.
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3.6.3 The data
Data sources
Table 3.17: The data
Data Description Source
Output growth Growth of GDP (constant), yoy WDI
Inflation Change in consumer price index, yoy WDI
Current account Exports minus imports as a share of GDP, ratio WDI
Private capital inflows Foreign portfolio investments in the resp.
economy as a share of GDP, ratio
IFS
Real effective exchange rate – WMM
Nominal exchange rate Exchange rate LC per EUR or USD WMM, IFS
Change in M1 Change in money stock, yoy WMM
Change in total reserves Change in foreign exchange reserves, yoy WMM, IFS
Exchange rate regime Exchange rate arrangements fine classification IRR
Short term interest rate – WMM, IFS
Dates on financial crises – RR
External debt External debt as a share of GDP WDI
IFS: International Financial Statistics, IMF
IRR: Ilzetzki et al. (2008)
RR: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)
WDI: World Development Indicators, World Bank
WMM: World Market Monitor, IHS Global Insight
List of countries (and anchor currency)
Argentina (US dollar), Brazil (US dollar), Bulgaria (Euro), Chile (US dollar), China (US dollar), Colombia (US
dollar), Czech Republic (Euro), Ecuador (US dollar), Estonia (Euro), Hong Kong (US dollar), Hungary (Euro), India
(US dollar), Indonesia (US dollar), Korea (US dollar), Latvia (US dollar), Lithuania (US dollar), Malaysia (US dollar),
Mexico (US dollar), Pakistan (US dollar), Peru (US dollar), Philippines (US dollar), Poland (US dollar), Russia (US
dollar), Singapore (US dollar), Slovak Republic (Euro), Slovenia (Euro), South Africa (US dollar), Sri Lanka (US
dollar), Taiwan (US dollar), Thailand (US dollar), Turkey (US dollar), Venezuela (US dollar)
The anchor currency classification refers to the background material of Ilzetzki et al. (2008) which is available
online at http://www.carmenreinhart.com/research/publications-by-topic/exchange-rates-and-dollarization.
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Chapter 4 Defending against speculative attacks
4.1 Introduction
Currency crises are considered to be painful events as they are often associated with
poor economic developments, i. e. negative real growth, high inflation as well as severe
trade and budget deficits. However, a closer look reveals that economic developments
after currency crises differ considerably. Korea, for example, was subject to five
currency crises between 1990 and 2006, which had quite different real effects (see
figure 4.1).1 While output growth remained relatively stable during the post-crisis
periods of 1991 and 1995, it declined severely after the crisis of 1997/98. In the
aftermath of the crisis in 2000 output growth decelerated only somewhat, while during
the post-crisis period of 2005 output growth even increased.
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Figure 4.1: Korea: Real GDP and currency crises (1990 – 2006)
In analyzing why the economic costs of currency crises vary so greatly, neither
theoretical nor empirical studies have paid much attention to central banks’ inter-
1For details concerning the identification of crisis events, see section 4.5.1.
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Figure 4.2: Crisis definitions
vention policies.2 In case of a speculative attack the central bank can in principle
either remain passive or intervene in the foreign exchange market in order to avoid a
depreciation. This gives rise to the following four outcomes: three different types of
currency crises, namely, (i) immediate depreciation, (ii) successful defense, and (iii)
unsuccessful defense (see figure 4.2) and the no attack situation.3 In this context
an unsuccessful defense might also be characterized as a delayed depreciation. Once
a central bank has started to intervene in the foreign exchange market she can end
the intervention and let the currency depreciate for basically two reasons: she is no
longer either able to intervene, e. g. the reserves are depleted, or she is not willing to
further intervene, e. g. the expected benefits of the intervention policy do no longer
exceed the expected costs. As we can not differentiate between these two cases we
use the terms unsuccessful defense and delayed depreciation interchangeably.
This paper analyzes how central bank intervention policies affect the economic
costs of currency crises. Accordingly, we distinguish the various types of currency
2Among the few exception are, e. g., Bauer and Herz (2007) and Daniëls et al. (2011), who
explicitly model the simultaneous interactions between policy makers and speculative traders.
3Since currency crises – as we define them (see 4.5.1) – are not limited to de jure or de facto
fixed exchange rate regimes and to simplify terminology, we uniformly apply the term depreciation
to depreciation as well as devaluation events.
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crises and identify the three cases. We find that intervention policies do make a
difference for the economic development after currency crises. The empirical results
provide evidence that a central bank has two options to mitigate the costs of specu-
lative attacks, an immediate depreciation and a successful defense. Abstaining from
an intervention, i. e. allowing an immediate depreciation, yields an “intermediate”
scenario with only a relatively mild recession. If the central bank intervenes and
permanently succeeds she can achieve the best economic performance and avoid out-
put losses all together. However, if she is only able to stabilize the exchange rate
transitorily and ultimately fails in her intervention policy, she faces the worst of the
three scenarios with a particularly bad economic performance.
The paper closest to our empirical analysis of the costs of different types of cur-
rency crises is Eichengreen and Rose (2003), who analyze and compare the economic
consequences of successful attacks and successful defenses. The authors find that a
successful attack is on average followed by a loss of 3% of GDP in the subsequent
year. However, their results are not informative concerning the important decision
whether a central bank should intervene or not intervene as they combine an imme-
diate depreciation and an unsuccessful defense to the successful attack scenario. In
another interesting study Gupta et al. (2007) analyze the output effects of currency
crises in a more general approach. The authors adopt the crisis definitions of other
studies, i. e. they only identify those periods as crisis years that were already tagged
by a majority of other studies, thereby intermingling different types of crisis defini-
tions. Their empirical results indicate that crises can have very different economic
outcomes and are typically more severe in the case of large capital inflows during
pre-crisis periods, fewer capital market restrictions, lower trade openness and higher
external long-term debt. Again, due to the encompassing crisis definition it remains
unclear what role central bank policies could have in explaining the diversity of crisis
outcomes. Cerra and Saxena (2008) and Bussière et al. (2010) propose a new way to
examine the persistence of output effects in the aftermath of currency crises. Their
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findings indicate that currency crises are associated with a permanent output loss of
2–6% of GDP relative to the no-crisis trend. However, as both studies are based on
aggregated crisis definitions, namely the so-called Exchange Market Pressure Index
(EMPI) in the case of Cerra and Saxena (2008) and a significant depreciation mea-
sure in the study of Bussière et al. (2010) they can not differentiate between the three
types of crises and the respective role of central banks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents some stylized facts. The
empirical analysis to evaluate the economic consequences of the different types of
currency crises which is based on a panel VAR framework is outlined in section 4.3.
The main findings are summarized in section 4.4.
4.2 Some stylized facts
To examine the economic consequences of the three types of crises, namely immediate
depreciations, successful interventions, and unsuccessful interventions, we character-
ize these crisis events along two dimensions. On the one hand we use an intervention
index (INTX) to capture the central bank’s (no)intervention decision. The INTX is
defined as the standard deviations weighted sum of interest rate changes and per-
centage changes in reserves (INTX = ∆it/σ∆it − ∆rt/σ∆rt). On the other hand we
use changes of the exchange rate (∆st) to measure the outcome of the central bank’s
policy.4
Our empirical analysis is in principle based on annual data due to data limitations.
However, as the data relevant for the timing of currency crises, especially interest
rates, exchange rates and reserves, are typically available at higher frequencies, we
4To be more precise, we first check the input data for significant interventions and depreciations.
In a second step, we examine whether the interventions are followed by deprecations within a 12-
month time window or if both are single situations. This allows us to differentiate between the three
crisis types. For further details see appendix and Bauer et al. (2012).
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determine the crisis events on the basis of monthly data and assign them to the
respective years (see, e. g., Bussière et al., 2010). An important issue in identifying
crisis events is to appropriately differentiate whether subsequent crises are individual
events or part of an ongoing crisis. After determining currency crisis events we apply
a one-year window and drop all crises with overlapping time windows, i. e. crises
have to be at least two years apart to be considered as distinct currency crises.5 By
doing so we ensure that the effects of a specific crisis type in year T are not biased
by other nearby currency crises. If, for instance, a successful defense occurs in year
T and an unsuccessful defense in year T + 1, the post-crisis effects of the successful
defense could be influenced by the effects of the unsuccessful defense. Therefore, to
avoid possible interferences in such a situation, these two crisis events are dropped
from our analysis.
Our sample covers the years from 1960–2011 and incorporates 32 emerging market
economies. We identify 163 crisis events with 42 immediate depreciations, 87 suc-
cessful interventions and 34 unsuccessful interventions.6 To better understand the
role of macroeconomic fundamentals and central bank policies on the course of cur-
rency crises we examine several macroeconomic indicators in the pre- and post-crisis
periods. We follow the literature and focus in principle on output, consumer prices,
current account balances and private capital inflows (see, e. g., Calvo and Reinhart,
2000; Hong and Tornell, 2005; Rancière et al., 2006; Gupta et al., 2007; Lahiri and
Végh, 2007; Bussière et al., 2010). In addition, we consider components of aggre-
gate demand to better understand how the different sectors of an economy behave
in the wake of the different types of crises. Furthermore, we take into account the
development of the unemployment rate, the real effective exchange rate, the nominal
exchange rate, money, and reserves.7
5See Bussière et al. (2010) for a similar approach.
6See appendix for an overview concerning the identified currency crises across the different
countries.
7See appendix for a detailed description of the data.
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Output growth plays a crucial role in our analysis, as the costs of currency crises
are often defined in terms of output loss. By taking inflation into account we consider
on the one hand the economic consequences of high inflationary periods and on the
other hand it serves as a policy response indicator (see, e. g. Hong and Tornell, 2005;
Bussière et al., 2010).
Changes in the current account balance and foreign private capital inflows might
affect real growth, if – for instance – less foreign capital is available. Real growth is
likely to slow down (see, for example Calvo and Reinhart, 2000; Gupta et al., 2007),
if firms are not able to finance investments due to a lack of financial resources (see,
e. g. Hong and Tornell, 2005).
We decompose aggregate demand – private consumption, investment, exports and
imports – to consider potential different transmission channels of the three types
of crises. For instance, in the wake of an unsuccessful defense the exchange rate
volatility rises and thus uncertainty increases. As a result private investments could
decrease.
The impact of currency crises on exports and imports can be ambiguous. Exchange
rate changes can mitigate the negative effects of a currency crisis, if the depreciation
of the nominal exchange rate translates into a real devaluation. This enhances the
economy’s competitiveness and thus exports might increase (see Gupta et al., 2007).8
However, currency crises could also be accompanied by negative effects on exports
and imports (see, e. g., Ma and Cheng, 2005). In particular, depreciation events
which lead to higher exchange rate volatility can increase the exchange rate exposure
of trade businesses. Thus, importers and exporters may decide to lower their trade
engagement in order to reduce the exchange rate risk.
8At the same time the nominal depreciation increases the real value of the country’s foreign debt
that is not denominated in domestic currency.
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Despite the previously described effects, monetary policy could likewise support
or restrain economic growth. A tighter monetary policy can increase the chance of a
successful defense, yet it can also have a negative impact on growth at least in the
short to medium term (see, among others, Chiodo and Owyang, 2002; Lahiri and
Végh, 2007).
Moreover we take the country’s exchange rate regime into account. For example,
in case of a hard peg policy, a depreciation of the exchange rate might imply greater
uncertainty in the course of a speculative attack than in the case of a more flexible
exchange rate regime and could therefore have a more negative impact on real growth
(see, e. g. Eichengreen and Rose, 2003). Finally, foreign exchange reserves are of in-
terest as they are an important indicator of a country’s ability to defend the exchange
rate. Accordingly, reserve losses are an important dimension of the economic costs of
currency crises.
Table 4.1 displays summary statistics with respect to the macroeconomic environ-
ment during the pre-crisis period (upper panel) and post-crisis period (lower panel).9
In addition, it provides results of a non-parametric Wilcoxon test that examines
whether macroeconomic fundamentals differ from one type of crisis to the other.10 If
macroeconomic fundamentals do not differ significantly in the pre-crisis period be-
tween the different types of crises while differences appear to be significant during
the post-crisis period this could be an indication that central bank policy might have
an important effect on the economic costs of currency crises. Column 1 of table 4.1
reports the sample mean for the no-crisis periods. Columns 2 – 5 of table 4.1 display
the means for the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, distinguishing between the three
9As our crisis definition is based on monthly data and a crisis can last for twelve months, the
post-crisis period is defined as the crisis year and the first post-crisis year. The pre-crisis period
covers the average development of three pre-crisis years. We also applied different lengths (from 1
to 4 years) of the pre-crisis and crisis period and have found our results to be robust.
10We additionally performed a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test which yields identical results.
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Table 4.1: Mean values of macroeconomic indicators by different crisis events
Variable no
crisis
(1)
all
crises
(2)
immediate
depreciation
(3)
successful
defense
(4)
unsuccessful
defense
(5)
pre-crisis
Output growth 0.059 0.046 0.037 0.049 0.050
Inflation 0.059 0.091 0.106 0.072 0.123
Current account −0.008 0.004 −0.007 0.017 −0.015
Private capital inflows 0.016 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.012
Private consumption growth 0.053 0.047 0.042 0.047 0.056
Investment growth 0.083 0.055 0.046 0.055 0.067
Export growth 0.092 0.075 0.063 0.081 0.077
Import growth 0.095 0.077 0.059 0.077 0.100
Debt-to-GDP ratio 0.442 0.403 0.391 0.391 0.453
Unemployment rate 0.072 0.076 0.094 0.065 0.082
∆ Real effective exchange rate 0.005 0.013 0.021 0.002 0.030
∆ Nominal exchange rate 0.014 0.086 0.124 0.047 0.137
∆ M1 0.159 0.217 0.212 0.199 0.266
∆ Total reserves 0.182 0.162 0.135 0.175 0.164
Exchange rate regime 6.8 8.2 9.5 7.2 9.2
post-crisis
Output growth 0.059 0.036 0.029 0.054 0.002
Inflation 0.059 0.101 0.111 0.062 0.186
Current account −0.008 0.002 −0.016 0.010 0.005
Private capital inflows 0.016 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.007
Private consumption growth 0.053 0.038 0.033 0.057 −0.002
Investment growth 0.083 0.029 0.028 0.072 −0.073
Export growth 0.092 0.067 0.049 0.083 0.047
Import growth 0.095 0.051 0.043 0.094 −0.042
Debt-to-GDP ratio 0.442 0.414 0.452 0.381 0.457
Unemployment rate 0.072 0.080 0.100 0.064 0.091
∆ Real effective exchange rate 0.005 −0.008 −0.002 0.011 −0.056
∆ Nominal exchange rate 0.014 0.143 0.167 0.024 0.403
∆ M1 0.159 0.197 0.183 0.149 0.327
∆ Total reserves 0.182 0.099 0.160 0.100 0.032
Exchange rate regime 6.8 8.8 9.6 7.3 11.3
Notes: A nominal depreciation is defined as an increase in the nominal exchange rate. A real depreci-
ation is given by a decrease in the real effective exchange rate. The exchange rate regime classification
is based on Ilzetzki et al. (2008) and ranges from 1 to 15 – from de facto pegged to de facto floating.
Shaded areas denote statistically significant differences at the 5% level of one type of crisis compared
to the two other types of crises within the respective group.
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types of currency crises. Due to the test design we are only able to analyze if one
crisis type is statistically significant from the other two types, or if all three types are
statistically significant from each other at the same time. A single shaded area there-
fore denotes a crisis type which is statistically significant different from the other two
types at the 5% level. Three simultaneously shaded areas point to statistically signif-
icant differences between the three types at the same time. For example, to examine
pre-crisis inflation rates we perform three Wilcoxon tests, namely, (i) immediate de-
preciation vs. successful defense, (ii) immediate depreciation vs. unsuccessful defense
and (iii) successful defense vs. unsuccessful defense. As a result, we obtain 2 out of
3 significant test statistics. The first statistic indicates that successful interventions
have significantly lower pre-crisis inflation rates than immediate depreciations. The
second statistic shows that successful interventions are associated with significantly
lower pre-crisis inflation rates compared to unsuccessful interventions. Given this,
the value of pre-crisis inflation rate is shaded gray in case of a successful defense.
Table 4.1 indicates that there is only weak evidence for systematic pre-crisis dif-
ferences between the three types of crises. With the exception of inflation, import
growth and the exchange rate regime, the macroeconomic indicators do not differ
significantly between the three types of crises during the pre-crisis period. In the
case of inflation we find a significant pre-crisis difference between a successful defense
and the other two types of crises, i. e. between on the one hand the case of a stable
exchange rate and on the other hand a drop of the exchange rate either due to an
immediate depreciation or an unsuccessful defense. The pre-crisis inflation rate of
successful interventions is about 7.2% (column 4) and significantly lower than the
pre-crisis inflation rates of immediate depreciations (10.6%) and unsuccessful inter-
ventions (12.3%). The pre-crisis growth rate of imports is significantly higher for
unsuccessful interventions (10.0%) compared to immediate depreciations (5.9%) and
successful interventions (7.7%). In the case of the exchange rate regime we also
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find some evidence for pre-crisis differences.11 Successful interventions are associated
with somewhat less flexible exchange rate regimes (ERA index of 7.2) than immedi-
ate depreciations (9.5) and unsuccessful defenses (9.2). Taken together, the summary
statistics do not point to major pre-crisis differences in fundamentals between the
three types of currency crises.
In contrast, the test statistics indicate that there are considerable differences in
post-crisis macroeconomic developments between on the one hand successful defenses
and immediate depreciations and on the other hand unsuccessful interventions. For
instance, real growth is highest in the case of successful defenses (5.4%), immediate
depreciations seem to be an “intermediate case” (2.9%) and unsuccessful defenses
show the lowest value (0.2%).
Differences can also be found for inflation, consumption, investment, export and
import growth, unemployment rate, and the nominal exchange rate as well as the real
effective exchange rate. In the case of inflation, the depreciation events, i. e. imme-
diate depreciations and unsuccessful interventions, are associated with significantly
higher inflation than successful defenses. The increase in inflation is especially strong
in case of unsuccessful interventions.
Consumption and investment both show the highest growth rates for successful
interventions (5.7% and 7.2%). Immediate depreciations are associated with an
intermediate development with a growth of consumption and investment of about
3%, while they severely decline in the wake of an unsuccessful defense (−0.2% and
−7.3%). In the case of exports we find significantly higher growth rates for success-
ful interventions (8.3%) than for immediate depreciations (4.9%) and unsuccessful
interventions (4.7%). Concerning imports, the growth rate is again the highest for
successful interventions (9.4%), while immediate depreciations show an intermediate
11We use the ERA fine classification, ranging from 1 to 15 – from de facto pegged to de facto
floating (see Ilzetzki et al., 2008).
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Figure 4.3: Currency crises and real growth (dashed lines indicate the respective crisis mean)
development with a post-crisis growth rate of 4.3%. On the contrary, unsuccessful
defenses are accompanied by a fall in imports of about −4.2%. The unemployment
rate is on average the lowest in the case of a successful defense of the exchange rate
(6.4%).
To gain further insights in the differences between the various types of crises,
figure 4.3 provides further information on the costs of currency crises, namely on
changes in output growth. The left panel exhibits the distribution of pre-crisis values
while the right panel displays the distribution of the post vs. pre-crisis differences.12
The left panel of figure 4.3 supplements the summary statistics of table 4.1. In
particular the distribution of real growth rates is not significantly different between
the three types of crises. However, when comparing post-crisis output performance
(right panel of figure 4.3), significant differences become apparent.
12Regarding the definition of the pre-crisis and post-crisis period see footnote 9.
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In case of an immediate depreciation and a successful defense only minor deviations
of growth can be seen. On average output growth deviates from pre-crisis trend by
−0.8 percentage points for immediate depreciations and by +0.5 percentage points for
successful defenses (see histogram 4.3b.1 and 4.3b.2). The deviations from pre-crisis
growth in the case of unsuccessful interventions are on average −4.8 percentage points
and particularly widespread as well as strongly skewed towards negative deviations
(see histogram 4.3b.3). Most of the crises – approximately 85% – are contractionary.
To summarize, we only find few differences between macroeconomic fundamentals
in the pre-crisis period with respect to the three types of crises while in the post-crisis
period considerable differences are apparent. We take this finding as a first indication
that crisis management – in particular the decision of the central bank to defend or
to not defend – might be crucial for the economic development after a speculative
attack.13 Successful attempts to defend the exchange rate are associated with the best
result in terms of output growth, while failed interventions are followed by the highest
economic costs in terms of output losses. Immediate depreciations, i. e. abstaining
from an intervention, are associated with an “intermediate” development.
4.3 Empirical analysis
The empirical analysis is based on two complementary approaches. Firstly, we ex-
amine the impact of the three types of currency crises on real growth, inflation,
current account and private capital inflows in a panel VAR framework to explicitly
take into account the interdependencies between these macroeconomic fundamentals.
Secondly, a univariate panel autoregressive approach complements the panel VAR
13It is also worth mentioning that the pre-crisis differences almost disappear while the post-crisis
differences are still observable and statistically significant when removing country and time specific
effects. This further indicates that the central bank’s crisis management could be an important
determinant of the economic costs of currency crises.
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analysis in order to evaluate the dynamic responses of various macroeconomic vari-
ables – in particular we take a deeper look at the components of aggregate demand.
4.3.1 A panel VAR approach
Our benchmark panel VAR model is given by:
Xit = Γ(L)Xit + F(L)Kit + ωi + dt + it, (4.1)
where Xit is a vector of stationary14 variables, namely real growth, inflation, current
account, and private capital inflows. Generally, the criteria influencing the conse-
quences of currency crises are overall economic stability, defensive power in economic
terms and financial means for the defense. We thus choose four variables measuring
these characteristics. Real growth serves as an indicator for economic stability and
defensive power. Low inflation implies stable monetary policy in the past and thus
a stable monetary system. Positive current account and high private capital inflows
indicate both soundness of the economy and financial means to defend the currency.
Size itself is an ambiguous variable as larger countries on the one hand have a higher
defensive power but on the other hand also might attract a larger number of specu-
lators. We thus omit a size variable like GDP and use current account and private
capital inflows as ratios to GDP.
Kit is a vector of predetermined dummies describing the respective crisis type;
Γ(L) and F(L) are matrix polynomials in the lag operator with Γ(L) = Γ1L1 +
Γ2L
2 + . . . + ΓqL
q and F(L) = F1L1 + F2L2 + . . . + FqLq, and it is a vector of
14We checked the stationarity of variables using several panel unit root tests. Precisely we
implemented standard panel unit root test, namely the augmented Dickey and Fuller test (1979)
(ADF), the Phillips and Perron test (1988) (PP), the Levin, Lin and Chu test (2002) (LLC) as well as
the Im, Pesaran and Shin test (2003) (IPS). Additionally, to take potential dependencies between the
panel individuals into account we implemented the test suggested by Pesaran (2007) (PESCADF).
As in every case the null hypothesis of non-stationarity can be rejected, all test statistics indicate
stationarity of variables (see table 4.3).
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idiosyncratic errors. We additionally control for time-constant but cross-sectional
varying effects (ωi) as well as time-varying but cross-section constant factors (dt).15
In our estimations we restrict the number of endogenous variables to four in order
to prevent over-parameterization. Based on the Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test for
autocorrelation in the residuals, we set the lag length to three.
Since we allow for individual heterogeneity, least squares estimation of equation
(4.1) would yield biased coefficients. Therefore, we apply the panel VAR technique
suggested by Love and Zicchino (2006). In order to remove the country fixed ef-
fects we use forward mean-differencing (Helmert’s transformation).16 This procedure
transforms all variables in deviations from forward means.17 Moreover, it has the
advantage of preserving the orthogonality between the transformed variables and the
lagged regressors (see Arellano and Bover, 1995, p. 41). Thus, we are able to use the
lagged regressors as instruments and to estimate the coefficients by system GMM.
To identify the currency crises shocks and to simulate the corresponding impulse
response functions we assume that currency crisis shocks affect real growth, inflation,
current account and private capital inflows only with a lag.18 Moreover, ensuring
that the respective crisis types have only lagged effects provides a natural way to
avoid potential endogeneity problems. The alternative approach, namely to derive
15Since we include individual specific and time specific effects, we implicitly allow for shifts in the
individual specific intercepts as well as in the time intercepts (see Baltagi, 2006, p. 177). Additionally,
we have tested whether the economic impact of the three types of crises differ between “old type”
and “modern type” currency crises. In particular, we have checked if the economic crisis effects as
estimated in our VAR approach differ for the periods prior and after 1990 (and 1995, respectively).
However, the empirical evidence (available upon request) does not indicate any structural break.
16Our model also allows for time specific effects. We remove these effects by subtracting the
means of each variable for each period. As the employed empirical framework assumes cross sectional
independence, the removing of those time effects is a simple way to mitigate potential dependencies
due to common factors (see Levin et al., 2002, p. 13).
17Formally, the transformation is given by: xhit = δt[xit − 1/(T − t)(xi(t+1) + . . . + xiT )] with
t = 1, . . . , T − 1, and where δt =
√
(T − t)(T − t+ 1) (see, e. g., Arellano and Bover, 1995, p. 41).
18Furthermore, we assume that there are no effects from the macroeconomic variables to the
crisis dummies. This assumption is supported by several robustness checks. They indicate that – in
general – the macroeconomic performance does not increase the crisis probability (see tables 4.12
and 4.13).
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restrictions on parameters and temporal correlations among the three types from a
theoretical model, does not seem to be feasible as we are not aware of an adequate
theoretical model concerning the interdependencies between the different types of
crises.
Based on the estimated crisis coefficients of the panel VAR model given in (4.1)
we simulate impulse responses of real growth, inflation, current account and private
capital inflows to different shocks, namely the three types of currency crises (see
figures 4.4 and 4.5 and table 4.5).19
As most parameters appear to be statistically significant for unsuccessful interven-
tions, the results point to noticeable macroeconomic consequences only in case of an
unsuccessful defense. In contrast, the economic development in the aftermath of im-
mediate depreciations and successful interventions does not seem to be accompanied
by severe real effects.
Regarding output, the simulation results indicate that the three types of currency
crises give rise to two distinct patterns (see upper part of figure 4.4). On the one
hand, the impulse response function for an unsuccessful defense shows a clear V-
shaped drop (−5.1 percentage points) and recovery of real growth, implying a highly
persistent impact on the output level in the aftermath of the crisis. On the other hand,
successful interventions and immediate depreciations are not followed by distinct
changes in output. In the case of an immediate depreciation the change in the real
growth is insignificant, while the successful defense even is associated with positive,
partly significant output effects.
Inflation is again characterized by different responses to the three types of crises
(see lower panel of figure 4.4). Both immediate depreciations and unsuccessful inter-
19As recommended by Sims and Zha (1999), the interpretation of the impulse response functions
presented in this paper is based on error bands with coverage .68 instead of conventional significance
levels.
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Figure 4.4: Impulse responses of output growth and inflation to currency crises
ventions appear to be associated with higher inflation during the post-crisis period.
While immediate depreciations show a prolonged period of higher inflation rates of
up to 8 percentage points above trend, unsuccessful defenses are followed by a strong
one time inflation peak of about 13 percentage points. No significant effects are found
in the case of successful interventions.
Regarding current account effects, we find a particularly strong response in the
case of unsuccessful interventions (see upper part of figure 4.5). The current ac-
count improves persistently and shows the largest effect of about 4 percentage points
one year after the crisis, thereby mitigating the decline in output. No changes are
apparent for successful interventions and immediate depreciations.
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Figure 4.5: Impulse responses of current account and private capital inflows to currency
crises
In the case of private capital inflows, the three types of crises again are associated
with diverging developments. While capital inflows show no significant response in
the case of successful interventions, they show a light positive evolution for the imme-
diate depreciation scenario. In contrast, they strongly decline in case of unsuccessful
interventions and only recover slowly – which might be related to increased uncer-
tainty concerning the future economic development – suggesting a loss of confidence
among investors (see, e. g., Radelet and Sachs, 1998).
The impulse response functions reflect the quite different policy approaches taken
by central banks in the face of a speculative attack. In the case of successful defenses
the central bank follows a policy that is consistent with a stable exchange rate and is
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thereby able to basically neutralizing the effect of the speculative attack. In the case
of an immediate depreciation the central bank voluntarily abandons the exchange
rate regime without intervening. Additionally, she tends to implement an expansion-
ary monetary policy which can be inferred from the higher (tolerated) inflation rates,
possibly to support real growth. This strategy may be considered as a distinct alter-
native monetary policy compared to defending the domestic currency. In contrast,
the impulse response functions show a somewhat inconsistent monetary policy in case
of an unsuccessful defense (delayed depreciation). Specifically, the intervention poli-
cies are not expansionary enough to prevent a recession and not restrictive enough
to stabilize the exchange rate and/or to prevent inflation. Among speculators this
inconsistency could raise expectations about future inflation as well as a potential
depreciation. As a consequence, the intervention measures to defend the exchange
rate turn out to be ineffective (see also Hong and Tornell, 2005, p. 77).
Taken together, the findings from the impulse response functions indicate that
central banks can heavily influence the economic costs of currency crises. They have in
principle two options to notably reduce the costs of currency crises, either successfully
defending the exchange rate or to refrain from interventions. The decision to defend
the exchange rate is risky. If the central bank intervenes she can either succeed
and achieve the best result in terms of overall economic performance, or she can fail
and face the worst case scenario. Abstaining from an intervention, i. e. allowing an
immediate depreciation, typically results in an “intermediate” economic post-crisis
development.
4.3.2 Macroeconomic dynamics of currency crises
In a next step we complement the panel VAR with a univariate panel autoregressive
approach to gain further insights in the adjustment processes associated with the
three types of currency crises and the potential role of central banks in mitigating
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the costs of currency crises. In estimating the univariate panel autoregressive model
we follow Cerra and Saxena (2008), Bussière et al. (2010) and Kappler et al. (2011),
and simulate impulse responses of several macroeconomic variables – in particular
various components of aggregate demand – for the three different types of currency
crises.
Our benchmark model is given by:
xit = αi + ωt +
3∑
j=1
βjxit−j +
3∑
k=1
3∑
s=1
αksDkit−s + it,
where xit denotes the macroeconomic variable of interest in country i in year t. The
dummy variable Dkit−s takes on the value one if a k type currency crisis occurs in
country i in year t − s. We additionally control for time (ωt) and country specific
effects (αi). The i. i. d. error term is denoted by it. We estimate an autoregressive
model in x of order three, as we do not find any significant coefficients beyond the
third lag for most indicators. Moreover, we use a common lag length for all model
specifications in order to ensure a consistent basis for comparison of impulse response
functions of the different macroeconomic indicators (see Kappler et al., 2011, pp. 13).
Furthermore, heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are computed. To avoid
potential endogeneity problems we only allow for lagged effects of currency crises. To
examine the crisis dynamics, namely the deviation from the no-crisis trend behav-
ior, we again simulate impulse response functions to shocks of the different types of
crises.
To relate the empirical results of the univariate panel autoregressive models with
the panel VAR approach of the previous section 4.3.1, we start with estimating uni-
variate panel autoregressive models for output growth, inflation, capital account and
private capital inflows. Figure 4.6 reports the simulated impulse response functions
which are very similar to the results from the panel VAR approach. We take these
similarities as an indication that univariate panel autoregressive models are quite
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Figure 4.6: Impulse responses of output growth, inflation, current account, and private
capital inflows to currency crises
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Figure 4.7: Impulse responses of private consumption and investment to currency crises
informative on the macroeconomic dynamics of currency crises and focus in the fol-
lowing on a number of other important macroeconomic variables, such as private
consumption, investment, exports, imports, debt-to-GDP ratio, and unemployment
rate.
Figure 4.7 shows that the consumption and investment effects of currency crises
clearly differ between the three types and reflect the respective output effects (see
figure 4.6). In particular, in case of unsuccessful interventions both consumption and
investment growth fall, possibly due to increased uncertainty among households and
investors. For immediate depreciations and successful interventions the consumption
impulse response functions do not show any significant changes. Concerning invest-
ment growth, immediate depreciations seem to be associated with a weak decline in
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Figure 4.8: Impulse responses of exports and imports to currency crises.
investment growth in the first post-crisis year, while no significant effects are found
in the aftermath of successful interventions.
In the case of export and import growth, the three types of crises are associated
with diverging developments. While both exports and imports show no significant
responses in the case of successful interventions, they both decline in the post-crisis
period in the case of immediate depreciations and unsuccessful interventions. For im-
mediate depreciations and unsuccessful defenses the drop in export growth is about
−6 percentage points, whereas the decline in export growth seems to persist longer in
the case of unsuccessful interventions (see figure 4.8). The differences in imports are
even more pronounced. Import growth strongly declines by about −18.5 percentage
points in case of an unsuccessful defense and by about −6.4 percentage points in the
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case of immediate depreciations. The decline in imports for these two depreciation
events can be primarily explained by higher import prices caused by the nominal
depreciation of the domestic currency (see table 4.1). Furthermore, in case of an un-
successful defense, the decrease in output growth additionally contributes to a slow
down of imports. However, it might come as a surprise that for an unsuccessful de-
fense we also observe a decline in export growth even though the economy faces a
real depreciation (see table 4.1), which should improve the economy’s competitive-
ness. Indeed, the results indicate that the increased exchange rate volatility and
the subsequently greater uncertainty which follows a depreciation event (immediate
depreciation or unsuccessful defense) might lead importers and exporters to reduce
their trading activities (see, e. g., Ma and Cheng, 2005).
Concerning the debt-to-GDP ratio we again find the strongest crisis impact in case
of an unsuccessful defense. While immediate depreciations and successful defenses are
associated with an increase between 1 and 2 percentage points, unsuccessful defenses
are followed by a debt-to-GDP ratio that is up to 8 percentage points above trend in
the aftermath of a crisis.20
The evolution of the unemployment rate in the wake of a currency crisis is also
characterized by differences between the three types. Again, no significant effects are
found in the case of successful interventions. On the contrary, immediate deprecia-
tions and unsuccessful interventions are both associated with higher unemployment
during the post-crisis period. While immediate depreciations show a slight increase of
about 0.7 percentage points, unsuccessful defenses are followed by an unemployment
rate that is about 1.3 percentage points above trend.
20Please note that the rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio is primarily driven by the drop in output.
When taking this output effect into account the increase in debt is similar for the three types of
currency crises.
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Figure 4.9: Impulse responses of debt-to-GDP ratio and unemployment rate to currency
crises
Taken together, the more differentiated analysis confirms that the central bank
can neutralize a speculative attack in the case of a successful defense. This type of
crisis event does not seem to be associated with any economic costs. Yet, intervening
to stabilize the exchange rate can not be considered a free lunch. Instead, there is
the risk that the intervention is prone to be unsuccessful leading to the worst of the
three scenarios with a deeper recession, higher unemployment and higher debt. If
the monetary authority instead decides to let the currency depreciate without trying
to defend it, the economy is likely to only face a mild recession. In general, mone-
tary authorities that pursue a consistent policy, i. e. either implementing a credible
exchange rate anchor or immediately giving in to a speculative attack, seem to fare
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best. Unsuccessful defenses seem to be the result of inconsistent policies, i. e. first
defending the exchange rate with restrictive monetary policy and subsequently giv-
ing in to the speculative attack followed by an expansionary monetary policy. Due
to negative expectational effects associated with the loss of the nominal exchange
rate anchor, high economic costs are the likely result (see also Eichengreen and Rose,
2003).
4.3.3 Robustness analysis
The stylized facts presented in section 4.2 indicate that the likelihood of the different
types of currency crises does not depend on the pre-crisis economic development.
Only if there is no – or at least only weak – evidence that the pre-crisis macroe-
conomic development is fundamental for the different types of currency crises is it
likely that the different post-crisis outcomes are associated with the crisis manage-
ment of the monetary authority (see also Eichengreen and Rose, 2003). Therefore,
we perform additional regression analyses to examine whether the pre-crisis economic
development is associated with the three different types of crises. Specifically, we test
whether macroeconomic fundamentals increase the probability of (i) an immediate
depreciation, (ii) a successful defense, (iii) an unsuccessful defense or (iv) a currency
crisis in general. Please note, that it is not the aim of this paper to explain the
occurrence of a specific crisis type with respect to the underlying economic develop-
ment. The occurrence of a crisis type is in particular subject to the research on early
warning indicators. Interestingly, this vast empirical literature illustrated time and
again, that macroeconomic variables are notoriously inapt and unreliable in predict-
ing speculative attacks. This could in our context also be interpreted as evidence
that macroeconomic fundamentals are not informative for the occurrence of the three
types of currency crises and also that central banks’ crisis management might play an
important role for the costs of currency crises. Nonetheless, in order to further clarify
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this issue, we perform panel logit regressions for each type of crisis separately as well
as the aggregated crisis definition. We test whether real growth, inflation, private
capital inflows or current account imbalances increase the probability of either an
immediate depreciation, a successful defense, an unsuccessful defense or a currency
crisis in general. If the economic development does not influence the crisis probability
then it is likely that monetary authority’s crisis management plays a major role.21
Tables 4.12 and 4.13 in the appendix display the estimation results. Column 1 reports
the results for all crises aggregated, while columns 2 – 4 contain the results for each
specific type of crisis. In general, the empirical evidence indicates that the pre-crisis
macroeconomic performance does not increase the crisis probability (see table 4.12),
since the lagged parameters of the different indicators in each regression are jointly
insignificant. Only a few individual lags are statistically significant. When further
controlling for current and forecasted economic developments (see table 4.13), we also
do not find systematic differences in the occurrence of a crisis event between the three
different types. All in all, the panel logit regressions seem to indicate that central
banks’ policies essentially determine the economic development through crises.
To further check that our results are not driven by potential correction mechanisms
originating from previous crises we increase the time window concerning the singular
event status of a currency crisis. In particular we make sure, that no other crisis
event takes place two years before and two years after an identified currency crisis,
i. e. currency crises have to be at least three years apart to be considered as a crisis
event. Also, we increased the time span that determinates whether an intervention is
considered to be either successful or unsuccessful from 12 to 24 months. Additionally,
we checked our results if we do not apply a time window at all, i. e. we analyze every
identified currency crisis. The results again depict that unsuccessful defenses are as-
sociated with severe macroeconomic consequences, while immediate depreciations can
21In order to avoid endogeneity problems we do not include exchange rate changes and monetary
policy tools related indicators, as these variables are already mirrored by the respective crisis type.
97
Chapter 4 Defending against speculative attacks
be characterized by an “intermediate” development.22 No remarkable macroeconomic
effects can be observed in case of successful interventions.23
Moreover, to check the robustness of the impulse response functions, we perform
a number of sensitivity checks for possible contagion either due to contemporaneous
banking and/or debt crises or currency crises in other countries. As pointed out by,
among others, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Laeven and Valencia (2012) currency
crises frequently occur together with banking and debt crises. We control for these
twin and triple crises effects in order to isolate the economic consequences that can be
attributed to one of the three specific currency crisis events. In our sample 36 out of
163 currency crises are accompanied by banking crises, 14 coincide with debt crises,
and 7 involve both banking and debt crises. Tables 4.6 – 4.8 summarize the impulse
response functions of the macroeconomic indicators of interest to the three types of
currency crisis shocks when controlling for the occurrence of banking and debt crises.
The empirical results indicate that successful interventions and immediate depreci-
ations are not accompanied by noticeable negative effects. In contrast, unsuccessful
defenses again are associated with a significant worsening of the fundamentals.
Another aspect that is worth controlling for are contagion effects from currency
crises in other countries. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), Fratzscher (2003), and
Dreher et al. (2006) emphasize that financial crises can be triggered by crises in other
22The respective estimation results are available upon request.
23It is worth mentioning that the employed empirical framework assumes homogeneous slope
coefficients across the individuals and cross sectional independence. However, due to the occurrence
of global/common as well as national shocks these assumptions could be violated, resulting in biased
estimation results (see, e. g., Belke et al., 2011). To address these issues we additionally applied
the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator (Pesaran et al., 1999) and the Common Correlated
Effects (CCE) estimator (Pesaran, 2006). The results remain qualitatively unchanged except for
private capital inflows that do no longer show any significant response. However, the estimation
results still confirm and underline the aspect that unsuccessful interventions are associated with
high economic costs, particularly in terms of lower real growth and higher inflation. Besides those
different estimators we also repeated our baseline estimations and dropped countries from our sample
randomly. The obtained results again show that unsuccessful interventions are associated with high
economic costs. The results are available upon request.
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countries. We check our empirical results for potential contagion effects by including
a dummy variable that takes on the value one if a currency crisis occurs somewhere
else in the sample at the same time. Table 4.9 indicates that in general the crisis
effects are somewhat weaker when taking contagion effects into account. However,
qualitatively the results remain unchanged.
Moreover, we control for the influence of the exchange rate regime. For instance, it
is not unlikely that the institutional arrangement in which a central bank has pursued
her policy influences her reputation and the expectation of speculative traders and
other economic agents and thus in turn affects future interventions. To control for
this impact we include an additional dummy variable describing the exchange rate
regime in place. The respective estimation results are shown in table 4.10. Again,
unsuccessful interventions are characterized by distinct macroeconomic consequences,
while immediate depreciations tend to be associated with an “intermediate” develop-
ment. No remarkable effects can be observed for successful interventions. However,
when controlling for the impact of the exchange rate arrangement with respect to
the three different types of currency crises, the underlying estimation results point to
weak differences.24 The results indicate that if interventions fail the growth effects are
particularly severe if the central bank tries to stabilize an exchange rate that was de
facto floating during the pre-crisis period. Monetary authorities who do not pursue a
consistent policy, i. e. unsuccessfully pegging a former floating exchange rate, suffer
relatively high economic costs.
Finally, we additionally control for the strength of speculative attacks approxi-
mated by the attack duration. In particular we include a variable that measures
the time span between the first intervention and the last intervention in case of a
successful defense or between the first intervention and the significant depreciation
in case of an unsuccessful defense (see table 4.11). Compared to our main results of
24The full results are available upon request.
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section 4.3 the results are mostly identical. Taken together, the empirical results of
the robustness checks (see tables 4.6 – 4.11) indicate that the results of section 4.3 are
robust and remain qualitatively unchanged. Over all the robustness checks suggest
a significant worsening of fundamentals particularly in case of unsuccessful interven-
tions.
4.4 Conclusions
Currency crises can have very different economic outcomes, that range from busts –
as is the typical perception of policy makers and the public – to even booms. Which
development an economy takes in the course of a currency crisis seems to depend in
a fundamental way on the central banks’ crisis management. In case of a speculative
attack the central bank can either intervene in the foreign exchange market or she can
abstain from countermeasures. If the central bank intervenes she can either succeed
or suspend her intervention policy giving rise to three distinct crisis events, namely
immediate depreciation, unsuccessful defense and successful defense.
The empirical analysis indicates that a central bank has two options to substan-
tially reduce the costs of currency crises, (i) an immediate depreciation and (ii) a
successful defense. In case of a successful defense the central bank can even expect
to completely neutralize the effect of a speculative attack without any negative side
effects such as a stabilization recession. In contrast unsuccessful defenses tend to be
associated with high costs in terms of output loss in the range of about −5 percentage
points.
With the decision to intervene in the foreign exchange market a central bank can
achieve the best result in terms of output growth if she is successful. This outcome
could be referred to a real victory. However, interventions could turn into a pyrrhic
victory when the stabilizing interventions are suspended, either voluntarily or – due
100
4.4 Conclusions
to lack of reserves for example – involuntarily. The economy then faces the worst
result in terms of output loss. If the central bank does not intervene in the case of
a speculative attack, i. e. if she lets the domestic currency depreciate immediately,
she can expect an “intermediate” economic development with little economic costs
in terms of output loss. Not intervening and accepting the subsequent depreciation
in case of a speculative attack might thus be an attractive option for a risk-averse
central bank.
Our analysis also implies that to not differentiate between the different types of
crises is likely to bias policy recommendations in favor of exchange rate interventions.
Analyses which intermingle the different types of currency crises typically overesti-
mate the costs of immediate depreciations as the high costs of unsuccessful defenses
dominate the relatively low costs of immediate depreciations and successful defenses.
Subsequently, monetary authorities are inclined to intervene “too often” rather than
to immediately give in to a speculative attack.
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4.5 Appendix
4.5.1 The (not-so-trivial) definition of currency crises
Our crisis differentiation is based on a stylized version of the monetary model of
the exchange rate (see, e. g., Eichengreen et al., 1994; Klaassen and Jager, 2011).
On the basis of significant exchange rate changes and significant interventions we
identify the specific crisis events, namely immediate depreciation, successful defense
and unsuccessful defense, by applying the subsequent set of rules (see Bauer et al.,
2012):
1.a A depreciation is significant if it is larger than the average of the exchange rate
changes during the previous 12 months plus two times the standard deviation
of these changes. Additionally, the exchange rate change has to be greater than
5%.25 All means and standard deviations in this study are calculated time and
country specific.
1.b Analogously, an intervention is considered to be significant if the INTX exceeds
the average value during the previous 12 months plus three standard devia-
tions.26
2.a A successful defense in year T is defined as a significant intervention in month s
of year T without a significant depreciation during the subsequent 12 months.
25Increases of the exchange rate of less than 5% are not classified as significant depreciations even
if they exceed the standard deviation threshold, e. g. in a strictly managed exchange rate regime
(see Bauer et al., 2012). In fact, a managed exchange rate regime is typically announced with a
respective exchange rate band (see, for example, Ilzetzki et al., 2008).
26We apply a more restrictive threshold than in the case of depreciations to account for central
banks’ adjustments of reserve holdings that are due to portfolio alignment only and are not due to
intentional intervention in the foreign exchange market.
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2.b An unsuccessful defense in year T is defined as a significant intervention in
month s of year T followed by a significant depreciation during the subsequent
12 months.
2.c An immediate depreciation in year T is defined as a significant depreciation
without a significant intervention during the preceding 12 months.
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4.5.2 Data
Table 4.2: The data
Data Description Source
Output growth Growth of GDP (constant), yoy WDI
Inflation Change in consumer price index, yoy WDI
Current account Exports minus imports as a share of GDP, ratio WDI
Private capital inflows Foreign portfolio investments in the resp.
economy as a share of GDP, ratio
IFS
Private consumption growth Household final consumption expenditure, etc.
(constant)
WDI
Investment growth Growth of gross fixed capital formation
(constant), yoy
WDI
Export growth Growth of exports of goods and services
(constant), yoy
WDI
Import growth Growth of imports of goods and services
(constant), yoy
WDI
Debt-to-GDP ratio Central government debt as a share of GDP WDI
Unemployment rate Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) WDI
Real effective exchange rate – WMM
Nominal exchange rate Exchange rate LC per EUR or USD WMM, IFS
Change in M1 Change in money stock, yoy WMM
Change in total reserves Change in foreign exchange reserves, yoy WMM, IFS
Exchange rate regime Exchange rate arrangements fine classification IRR
Short term interest rate – WMM, IFS
Dates on banking and debt crises – RR
IFS: International Financial Statistics, IMF
IRR: Ilzetzki et al. (2008)
RR: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)
WDI: World Development Indicators, World Bank
WMM: World Market Monitor, IHS Global Insight
Table 4.3: Panel unit root tests
Panel unit root test ADF PP LLC IPS PESCADF
Output growth −15.10∗∗∗ −16.50∗∗∗ −13.13∗∗∗ −16.28∗∗∗ −10.22∗∗∗
Inflation −14.22∗∗∗ −18.22∗∗∗ −22.78∗∗∗ −17.08∗∗∗ −6.55∗∗∗
Current account −7.46∗∗∗ −7.60∗∗∗ −5.49∗∗∗ −7.28∗∗∗ −4.69∗∗∗
Private capital inflows −8.72∗∗∗ −13.73∗∗∗ −8.05∗∗∗ −9.41∗∗∗ −5.70∗∗∗
Private consumption growth −15.44∗∗∗ −18.60∗∗∗ −14.42∗∗∗ −17.22∗∗∗ −10.55∗∗∗
Investment growth −15.53∗∗∗ −15.68∗∗∗ −12.76∗∗∗ −16.15∗∗∗ −12.46∗∗∗
Export growth −16.43∗∗∗ −19.62∗∗∗ −15.82∗∗∗ −18.75∗∗∗ −12.95∗∗∗
Import growth −17.22∗∗∗ −20.12∗∗∗ −17.50∗∗∗ −19.36∗∗∗ −14.87∗∗∗
Debt-to-GDP ratio −2.62∗∗∗ −2.26∗∗ −6.39∗∗∗ −2.79∗∗∗ −1.28∗
Unemployment rate −4.68∗∗∗ −1.77∗∗ −4.01∗∗∗ −4.50∗∗∗ −2.26∗∗
Notes: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 4.4: List of countries, anchor currencies and currency crises
Country
(anchor)
Immediate depreciation Successful defense Unsuccessful defense
ARG (USD) 1981, 1982, 1983, 1987 1991, 1992, 1995, 1997, 2006,
2007
1985, 1986, 1989, 2001
BRA (USD) 1964, 1965, 1968, 1981, 1986,
1987, 1988, 1991, 1999, 2001,
2004
1977, 1980, 1989, 1997, 2000,
2002
1966, 1967, 1975, 1979, 1982,
1985, 1993, 2008
BUL (EUR) 1993, 1994 1998, 2007, 2008 1996
CHI (USD) 1979, 2001, 2008, 2010 1977, 1981, 1995, 1998 1982, 1984
CHN (USD) 1986, 1994 1982, 1983, 1985, 1988, 1992,
1995, 2010
1984, 1989
COL (USD) 1985, 1997, 2002, 2006, 2007 1986, 1992, 1993, 1994, 2005 1998, 2008
CZE (EUR) 1999 1997, 2004, 2008
ECU (USD) 1983, 1985, 1988, 1991 1984, 1986 1992, 1995, 1996, 1998
EST (EUR) 1997, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2007
HKG (USD) 2002, 2004
HUN (EUR) 1989, 1991, 1994, 2003 1997, 1998, 2006, 2010 1995, 2008
IND (USD) 1966, 1972, 1993, 1997 1973, 1975, 1979, 1980, 1983,
1988, 1999, 2006
1990, 1995, 2008
IDN (USD) 2008 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1994,
2001
1997
KOR (USD) 2000 1971, 1973, 1976, 1978,
1984, 1989, 1991, 1992,
1995, 2005
1970, 1974, 1980, 1997, 2007
LVA (USD) 2010 1995, 2005 2008
LTU (USD) 2008, 2010 1993, 2005
MAS (USD) 1975, 1994 1970, 1972, 1982, 1983, 1984,
1986, 1988, 1995, 2001,
2003, 2005, 2008, 2010
1997
MEX (USD) 1976, 1982 1978, 1986, 2006 1981, 1985, 1987, 1994, 1997,
1998, 2008
PAK (USD) 1972, 1993, 1995, 1999, 2008 1966, 1970, 1971, 1979,
1990, 1996, 2004, 2010
2000
PER (USD) 1967, 1976, 1977, 1982, 1984,
1987
1962, 1991, 1998, 2007 1975, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986,
1988, 1990
PHI (USD) 1986, 2008 1987, 1989, 1990, 1992, 2003 1983, 1997, 2000
POL (USD) 1991, 1992, 1993, 1998, 2000,
2008, 2010
1996, 2001, 2004
RUS (USD) 1995, 2001, 2005 1997, 1998, 2009
SIN (USD) 1973, 1979, 1980, 2001, 2004 1975, 1997
SVK (EUR) 1993, 1997, 2006, 2008 1998
SVN (EUR) 1992 1993, 2005, 2007
RSA (USD) 1972, 1975, 1983, 1985, 1996,
2000, 2001, 2004, 2008
1970, 1973, 1988, 1990,
1992
1981, 1984, 1998, 2006
SRI (USD) 1989, 1993, 1998 1980, 1981, 1983, 1987,
2006, 2009
2000
TWN (USD) 1997 1987, 1989, 1995, 2007,
2010
THA (USD) 1981, 1984 1977, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1995,
2000, 2001, 2004, 2008, 2010
1997
TUR (USD) 1986, 2001, 2004, 2008 1998, 2003 1987, 1991, 1994, 1995, 2006
VEN (USD) 1984, 1986, 1992, 1994,
1995, 2010
1990, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000,
2005, 2007
1989, 2002, 2004
Notes: The table reports all crisis events we found in our sample, while bold values denote those currency crises that
are defined as single events and are therefore the basis for our analysis.
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4.5.3 Regression results of the dynamic model
Table 4.5: Main results of a panel VAR
Responses of Output growth Inflation Current
account
Private
capital inflows
Responses to:
Output growtht−1 0.553∗∗∗ −0.507∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗ −0.001
(7.81) (−2.23) (−2.60) (−0.02)
Output growtht−2 0.140∗∗ 0.213 0.027 0.058
(2.08) (0.69) (0.39) (0.64)
Output growtht−3 0.062 −0.011 0.063 −0.003
(0.91) (−0.05) (1.00) (−0.06)
Inflationt−1 0.012 0.624∗∗∗ −0.003 0.015∗∗∗
(1.16) (2.69) (−0.41) (3.07)
Inflationt−2 −0.004 −0.197 0.002 0.005
(−0.37) (−1.00) (0.48) (1.13)
Inflationt−3 −0.005 0.204∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001
(−0.42) (4.05) (0.20) (0.07)
Current accountt−1 0.194 0.248 0.793∗∗∗ −0.185
(0.85) (0.44) (4.58) (−0.84)
Current accountt−2 0.000 −0.167 −0.164∗∗ 0.133
(0.01) (−0.58) (−2.21) (1.30)
Current accountt−3 −0.177 0.066 0.132 −0.153
(−1.51) (0.18) (1.49) (−1.46)
Private capital inflowst−1 0.034 −0.002 0.108∗∗ 0.020
(0.70) (−0.01) (2.52) (0.20)
Private capital inflowst−2 −0.140∗∗∗ 0.128 0.048 −0.058
(−2.96) (0.75) (1.29) (−0.67)
Private capital inflowst−3 0.049 −0.046 −0.036 −0.012
(0.99) (−0.22) (−0.78) (−0.14)
Immediate depreciationt−1 0.002 −0.004 −0.003 0.003
(0.37) (−0.16) (−0.54) (0.40)
Immediate depreciationt−2 0.002 0.044 −0.006 0.007
(0.23) (1.06) (−0.81) (0.87)
Immediate depreciationt−3 0.002 0.057 0.007 0.015∗
(0.18) (1.27) (0.88) (1.73)
Successful defenset−1 0.004 0.002 −0.005 −0.003
(1.04) (0.18) (−1.29) (−0.55)
Successful defenset−2 0.009∗∗ −0.016 −0.003 −0.003
(2.23) (−1.06) (−0.80) (−0.55)
Successful defenset−3 0.001 −0.004 0.003 0.004
(0.20) (−0.31) (0.55) (0.59)
Unsuccessful defenset−1 −0.051∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ −0.015∗
(−3.21) (2.00) (3.05) (−1.61)
Unsuccessful defenset−2 0.029∗∗ −0.171∗∗ −0.004 −0.017
(2.28) (−1.93) (−0.73) (−1.44)
Unsuccessful defenset−3 0.005 0.029 0.006 −0.006
(0.52) (0.65) (0.80) (−1.00)
Country fixed effects Yes
Time fixed effects Yes
Obs. 466
Countries 32
Notes: The VAR model is estimated by system GMM. Heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics are in
parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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4.5.4 Robustness analysis
Table 4.6: Behavior of macroeconomic indicators after different crisis events controlled for
twin crises effects (occurrence of currency and banking crises)
Year after crisis 1 2 3 4 5
Output growth
Immediate depreciation 0.002 0.000 0.009 0.003 0.001
Successful defense 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.000
Unsuccessful defense −0.038 0.006 0.012 0.003 0.001
Inflation
Immediate depreciation −0.011 0.005 0.069 0.058 0.017
Successful defense −0.006 −0.010 −0.013 −0.008 −0.004
Unsuccessful defense 0.098 −0.004 −0.005 0.027 0.026
Current account
Immediate depreciation 0.006 0.005 0.022 0.018 0.011
Successful defense −0.003 −0.001 0.010 0.008 0.005
Unsuccessful defense 0.022 0.034 0.037 0.026 0.018
Private capital inflows
Immediate depreciation 0.013 0.019 0.022 0.001 0.001
Successful defense 0.006 0.004 −0.001 0.000 0.000
Unsuccessful defense −0.003 −0.009 −0.005 0.000 0.000
Private consumption growth
Immediate depreciation 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Successful defense 0.002 0.008 −0.004 −0.001 0.000
Unsuccessful defense −0.024 0.005 −0.006 −0.001 0.000
Investment growth
Immediate depreciation −0.015 −0.023 −0.042 −0.011 0.001
Successful defense −0.011 −0.016 −0.020 −0.004 0.001
Unsuccessful defense −0.147 −0.002 0.013 0.006 0.000
Export growth
Immediate depreciation −0.067 −0.004 0.005 −0.002 0.000
Successful defense −0.023 0.001 0.008 0.000 0.000
Unsuccessful defense −0.064 −0.046 0.005 −0.003 −0.001
Import growth
Immediate depreciation −0.059 −0.010 −0.021 0.000 0.004
Successful defense −0.029 −0.013 −0.002 0.003 0.001
Unsuccessful defense −0.164 −0.001 0.007 0.008 0.000
Debt-to-GDP ratio
Immediate depreciation 0.007 −0.008 0.001 0.001 0.001
Successful defense 0.015 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000
Unsuccessful defense 0.044 0.016 0.018 0.016 0.013
Unemployment rate
Immediate depreciation 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Successful defense 0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
Unsuccessful defense 0.007 0.004 0.000 0.000 −0.001
Notes: Shaded areas denote significant values at the 10% level.
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Table 4.7: Behavior of macroeconomic indicators after different crisis events controlled for
twin crises effects (occurrence of currency and debt crises)
Year after crisis 1 2 3 4 5
Output growth
Immediate depreciation 0.001 0.002 0.011 0.004 0.001
Successful defense −0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
Unsuccessful defense −0.038 0.010 0.011 0.002 0.001
Inflation
Immediate depreciation −0.032 0.018 0.059 0.035 0.005
Successful defense −0.003 0.006 0.001 −0.003 −0.002
Unsuccessful defense 0.058 0.004 0.003 0.020 0.019
Current account
Immediate depreciation 0.008 0.006 0.012 0.009 0.006
Successful defense −0.001 0.000 0.008 0.006 0.004
Unsuccessful defense 0.028 0.035 0.023 0.015 0.010
Private capital inflows
Immediate depreciation 0.008 0.013 0.020 0.001 0.000
Successful defense 0.004 0.001 −0.001 0.000 0.000
Unsuccessful defense −0.008 −0.014 −0.007 −0.001 0.000
Private consumption growth
Immediate depreciation 0.005 0.003 0.008 0.001 0.000
Successful defense 0.000 0.009 −0.002 −0.001 0.000
Unsuccessful defense −0.024 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000
Investment growth
Immediate depreciation −0.023 −0.004 −0.015 −0.004 0.001
Successful defense −0.016 −0.009 −0.014 −0.003 0.001
Unsuccessful defense −0.158 0.021 0.041 0.013 −0.001
Export growth
Immediate depreciation −0.063 −0.001 0.012 −0.001 0.000
Successful defense −0.021 0.001 0.013 0.000 0.000
Unsuccessful defense −0.065 −0.042 0.019 −0.001 0.000
Import growth
Immediate depreciation −0.059 −0.002 0.002 0.003 0.000
Successful defense −0.030 −0.010 0.004 0.003 0.000
Unsuccessful defense −0.167 0.006 0.033 0.011 −0.004
Debt-to-GDP ratio
Immediate depreciation 0.007 0.008 0.003 0.002 0.002
Successful defense 0.019 0.021 0.011 0.008 0.007
Unsuccessful defense 0.040 0.037 0.018 0.015 0.013
Unemployment rate
Immediate depreciation 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000
Successful defense 0.002 0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
Unsuccessful defense 0.009 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.000
Notes: Shaded areas denote significant values at the 10% level.
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Table 4.8: Behavior of macroeconomic indicators after different crisis events controlled for
triple crises effects (occurrence of currency, banking and debt crises)
Year after crisis 1 2 3 4 5
Output growth
Immediate depreciation 0.002 0.003 0.010 0.004 0.001
Successful defense −0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
Unsuccessful defense −0.034 0.013 0.012 0.003 0.001
Inflation
Immediate depreciation −0.015 0.015 0.076 0.058 0.019
Successful defense −0.005 −0.008 −0.007 −0.004 −0.002
Unsuccessful defense 0.079 0.014 0.020 0.034 0.026
Current account
Immediate depreciation 0.008 0.005 0.011 0.009 0.006
Successful defense −0.001 0.000 0.008 0.007 0.004
Unsuccessful defense 0.025 0.036 0.022 0.014 0.011
Private capital inflows
Immediate depreciation 0.008 0.014 0.022 0.001 0.000
Successful defense 0.003 0.002 −0.001 0.000 0.000
Unsuccessful defense −0.007 −0.014 −0.003 0.000 0.000
Private consumption growth
Immediate depreciation 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.000
Successful defense 0.000 0.009 −0.004 −0.001 0.000
Unsuccessful defense −0.021 0.011 0.002 0.000 0.000
Investment growth
Immediate depreciation −0.018 −0.009 −0.014 −0.003 0.001
Successful defense −0.017 −0.013 −0.018 −0.004 0.001
Unsuccessful defense −0.134 0.026 0.045 0.012 −0.001
Export growth
Immediate depreciation −0.064 −0.004 0.011 −0.001 0.000
Successful defense −0.021 −0.002 0.012 0.000 0.000
Unsuccessful defense −0.063 −0.036 0.019 −0.001 0.000
Import growth
Immediate depreciation −0.054 0.003 −0.001 0.002 0.000
Successful defense −0.028 −0.008 0.002 0.003 0.001
Unsuccessful defense −0.148 0.017 0.029 0.007 −0.004
Debt-to-GDP ratio
Immediate depreciation 0.019 0.013 0.009 0.008 0.007
Successful defense 0.017 0.021 0.017 0.014 0.012
Unsuccessful defense 0.017 0.009 −0.011 −0.009 −0.007
Unemployment rate
Immediate depreciation 0.005 0.003 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
Successful defense 0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001
Unsuccessful defense 0.010 0.009 0.002 0.000 0.000
Notes: Shaded areas denote significant values at the 10% level.
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Table 4.9: Behavior of macroeconomic indicators after different crisis events controlled for
contagion effects
Year after crisis 1 2 3 4 5
Output growth
Immediate depreciation −0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Successful defense 0.001 0.003 −0.002 −0.001 0.000
Unsuccessful defense −0.038 0.014 0.005 0.002 0.000
Inflation
Immediate depreciation 0.013 0.041 0.077 0.040 0.015
Successful defense 0.006 −0.005 −0.012 −0.005 −0.001
Unsuccessful defense 0.119 −0.035 −0.025 0.018 0.009
Current account
Immediate depreciation 0.003 0.001 0.011 0.009 0.006
Successful defense −0.001 0.001 0.009 0.007 0.004
Unsuccessful defense 0.031 0.034 0.027 0.018 0.013
Private capital inflows
Immediate depreciation 0.005 0.012 0.021 −0.002 −0.002
Successful defense 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000
Unsuccessful defense −0.014 −0.015 −0.005 0.002 0.001
Private consumption growth
Immediate depreciation 0.009 0.004 0.000 −0.001 0.000
Successful defense 0.003 0.007 −0.010 −0.002 0.000
Unsuccessful defense −0.033 0.008 −0.003 0.001 0.000
Investment growth
Immediate depreciation −0.018 −0.005 −0.013 −0.003 0.000
Successful defense −0.003 −0.013 −0.010 −0.002 0.001
Unsuccessful defense −0.175 0.022 0.042 0.017 0.000
Export growth
Immediate depreciation −0.040 −0.014 0.002 0.000 0.000
Successful defense −0.004 −0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000
Unsuccessful defense −0.046 −0.038 0.006 0.002 −0.001
Import growth
Immediate depreciation −0.043 0.002 −0.012 −0.001 0.002
Successful defense −0.012 −0.011 −0.006 0.001 0.001
Unsuccessful defense −0.159 0.030 0.027 0.004 −0.005
Debt-to-GDP ratio
Immediate depreciation 0.001 0.004 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
Successful defense 0.009 0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004
Unsuccessful defense 0.052 0.032 0.029 0.023 0.018
Unemployment rate
Immediate depreciation 0.003 0.002 0.000 −0.001 −0.001
Successful defense −0.001 −0.003 −0.002 −0.001 0.000
Unsuccessful defense 0.010 0.006 0.002 0.000 −0.001
Notes: Shaded areas denote significant values at the 10% level.
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Table 4.10: Behavior of macroeconomic indicators after different crisis events controlled for
exchange rate regime effects
Year after crisis 1 2 3 4 5
Output growth
Immediate depreciation −0.013 0.001 0.011 0.006 0.002
Successful defense −0.002 0.001 −0.004 −0.002 −0.001
Unsuccessful defense −0.054 −0.003 0.003 0.005 0.002
Inflation
Immediate depreciation 0.014 0.046 0.089 0.049 0.025
Successful defense 0.019 0.007 0.000 0.003 0.003
Unsuccessful defense 0.118 −0.048 −0.044 0.002 −0.001
Current account
Immediate depreciation 0.012 0.017 0.019 0.014 0.009
Successful defense 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.006 0.004
Unsuccessful defense 0.037 0.042 0.026 0.017 0.013
Private capital inflows
Immediate depreciation 0.008 0.018 0.024 −0.004 −0.003
Successful defense 0.001 0.004 0.005 −0.001 −0.001
Unsuccessful defense −0.014 −0.013 −0.005 0.003 0.001
Private consumption growth
Immediate depreciation −0.005 0.000 0.012 0.003 0.000
Successful defense −0.001 0.005 −0.010 −0.002 0.000
Unsuccessful defense −0.048 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.000
Investment growth
Immediate depreciation −0.055 −0.024 −0.020 −0.002 0.002
Successful defense −0.017 −0.020 −0.015 −0.003 0.001
Unsuccessful defense −0.203 −0.026 0.047 0.027 0.006
Export growth
Immediate depreciation −0.045 0.010 0.009 −0.001 −0.001
Successful defense 0.000 0.008 0.012 0.000 −0.001
Unsuccessful defense −0.056 −0.034 0.011 0.003 −0.001
Import growth
Immediate depreciation −0.085 −0.015 0.007 0.008 0.001
Successful defense −0.025 0.001 0.009 0.003 −0.001
Unsuccessful defense −0.200 −0.012 0.046 0.021 −0.003
Debt-to-GDP ratio
Immediate depreciation 0.042 0.061 0.045 0.036 0.029
Successful defense 0.025 0.026 0.012 0.009 0.008
Unsuccessful defense 0.089 0.114 0.086 0.068 0.055
Unemployment rate
Immediate depreciation 0.009 0.006 0.000 −0.002 −0.002
Successful defense 0.000 −0.003 −0.003 −0.002 −0.001
Unsuccessful defense 0.015 0.014 0.007 0.003 0.000
Notes: Shaded areas denote significant values at the 10% level.
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Table 4.11: Behavior of macroeconomic indicators after different crisis events controlled for
strength effects of the speculative attack
Year after crisis 1 2 3 4 5
Output growth
Immediate depreciation −0.007 0.000 0.008 0.004 0.001
Successful defense 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000
Unsuccessful defense −0.052 0.006 0.009 0.004 0.001
Inflation
Immediate depreciation 0.000 0.036 0.086 0.043 0.016
Successful defense 0.022 0.006 −0.004 0.001 0.003
Unsuccessful defense 0.125 −0.031 −0.017 0.023 0.012
Current account
Immediate depreciation 0.007 0.002 0.010 0.008 0.005
Successful defense 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.003
Unsuccessful defense 0.034 0.037 0.027 0.018 0.012
Private capital inflows
Immediate depreciation 0.007 0.011 0.018 −0.002 −0.002
Successful defense −0.002 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000
Unsuccessful defense 0.003 −0.016 −0.007 0.001 0.001
Private consumption growth
Immediate depreciation 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.001 −0.001
Successful defense 0.008 0.009 −0.007 −0.003 −0.001
Unsuccessful defense −0.060 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.001
Investment growth
Immediate depreciation −0.032 −0.007 −0.006 0.000 0.001
Successful defense −0.015 −0.015 −0.001 0.002 0.001
Unsuccessful defense −0.168 0.017 0.046 0.017 0.000
Export growth
Immediate depreciation −0.056 −0.009 0.019 0.000 −0.002
Successful defense 0.001 0.001 0.010 0.000 −0.001
Unsuccessful defense −0.086 −0.042 0.019 0.002 −0.002
Import growth
Immediate depreciation −0.066 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000
Successful defense −0.024 −0.009 0.009 0.004 −0.001
Unsuccessful defense −0.125 0.027 0.032 0.005 −0.006
Debt-to-GDP ratio
Immediate depreciation 0.020 0.015 0.009 0.007 0.006
Successful defense −0.012 −0.010 −0.018 −0.015 −0.012
Unsuccessful defense 0.012 0.010 −0.004 −0.005 −0.004
Unemployment rate
Immediate depreciation 0.007 0.004 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002
Successful defense −0.002 −0.004 −0.003 −0.002 −0.001
Unsuccessful defense 0.022 0.018 0.008 0.003 0.000
Notes: Shaded areas denote significant values at the 10% level.
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Table 4.12: Panel logit regression I
all
crises
(1)
immediate
depreciation
(2)
successful
defense
(3)
unsuccessful
defense
(4)
Individual lags
Real growth
t− 1 2.665 −8.058 8.530∗ 12.316
(0.9) (−1.5) (1.8) (1.6)
t− 2 −7.663∗∗ −8.886 −7.384 1.270
(−2.2) (−1.3) (−1.5) (0.2)
t− 3 2.285 8.205 2.354 0.814
(0.8) (1.1) (0.6) (0.1)
All lags are zero (Chi2) 5.095 5.526 4.482 2.697
Prob. 0.165 0.137 0.214 0.441
Inflation
t− 1 0.842 −0.307 0.658 2.667∗
(1.4) (−0.1) (0.6) (1.9)
t− 2 −1.537 −0.159 −2.120 −5.144∗
(−1.6) (−0.0) (−1.0) (−1.9)
t− 3 0.689 0.432 0.699 1.474∗
(1.5) (0.2) (1.0) (1.7)
All lags are zero (Chi2) 3.364 0.137 1.305 4.671
Prob. 0.339 0.987 0.728 0.198
Current account
t− 1 −2.373 −12.087∗ 2.454 −1.424
(−0.7) (−1.8) (0.5) (−0.2)
t− 2 3.819 8.607 2.180 9.569
(0.9) (1.0) (0.4) (0.9)
t− 3 0.710 1.691 0.826 −19.425∗∗
(0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (−2.0)
All lags are zero (Chi2) 1.825 4.125 1.943 4.703
Prob. 0.610 0.248 0.584 0.195
Private capital inflows
t− 1 1.394 −0.733 1.911 16.107
(0.5) (−0.1) (0.5) (1.4)
t− 2 2.739 21.573∗ −0.284 −0.450
(1.0) (1.7) (−0.1) (−0.0)
t− 3 −0.370 −5.041 3.749 −6.767
(−0.1) (−1.0) (0.9) (−0.7)
All lags are zero (Chi2) 1.186 3.632 0.894 2.294
Prob. 0.756 0.304 0.827 0.514
Country & time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 644 259 425 233
Countries 32 20 30 19
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary variable that takes on the value one if a crisis occurs and zero
otherwise. Z-values in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 4.13: Panel logit regressions II
all
crises
(1)
immediate
depreciation
(2)
successful
defense
(3)
unsuccessful
defense
(4)
Individual lags
Real growth
t + 1 forecast −62.128∗ −31.030 −110.348∗∗ −120.636
(−1.7) (−0.4) (−2.1) (−1.3)
t −4.121 −10.632 4.572 −26.287∗∗∗
(−1.3) (−1.4) (0.8) (−3.4)
t− 1 12.880∗∗ −0.950 16.549∗∗ 21.489
(2.3) (−0.1) (2.0) (1.4)
t− 2 −9.085∗∗ −8.925 −10.110∗ −8.397
(−2.3) (−1.2) (−1.9) (−0.9)
t− 3 −0.185 4.043 −0.579 −3.122
(−0.1) (0.5) (−0.1) (−0.3)
Inflation
t + 1 forecast −2.605 −2.041 −3.455 −11.574∗
(−1.1) (−0.4) (−1.1) (−1.8)
t 0.130 −0.383 −6.051 3.259
(0.3) (−0.3) (−1.5) (1.7)
t− 1 2.300 1.354 3.272 4.295
(1.6) (0.3) (1.6) (0.8)
t− 2 −2.315∗∗ −1.490 −2.195 −6.482
(−2.0) (−0.3) (−1.1) (−1.4)
t− 3 0.990∗ 1.088 1.212 2.613∗
(2.0) (0.5) (1.6) (1.7)
Current account
t + 1 forecast 30.796 27.731 34.864 18.173
(1.6) (0.7) (1.2) (0.3)
t −8.685∗∗ −16.508∗ −6.846 −34.387∗∗∗
(−2.4) (−1.9) (−1.3) (−3.6)
t− 1 −10.278 −22.288 −9.830 13.037
(−1.1) (−1.1) (−0.7) (0.5)
t− 2 5.632 15.967 3.712 10.814
(1.2) (1.5) (0.6) (0.8)
t− 3 −2.790 −2.630 −1.472 −25.050∗∗
(−0.7) (−0.3) (−0.3) (−2.2)
Private capital inflows
t + 1 forecast −30.623 15.189 −70.047 −19.370
(−0.6) (0.1) (−0.9) (−0.2)
t −9.585∗∗ −16.974∗∗ −9.474 −13.887∗
(−2.6) (−2.5) (−1.6) (−1.8)
t− 1 −0.199 2.385 −1.490 37.905∗∗
(−0.1) (0.3) (−0.3) (2.5)
t− 2 0.746 23.530 −2.952 −16.231
(0.2) (1.5) (−0.6) (−1.6)
t− 3 0.973 −5.939 3.731 −9.420
(0.3) (−0.9) (0.8) (−0.7)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 614 239 403 222
Countries 32 19 30 19
Notes: Dependent variable: Binary variable that takes on the value one if a crisis occurs and zero
otherwise. Z-values in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
114
Chapter 5
TARGET2:
How costly is buying time?
Chapter 5 is based on Erler and Hohberger (2014). I would like to thank conference participants
at Prato and Bayreuth for many helpful suggestions. In particular, the very helpful comments by
Bernhard Herz, Stefan Hohberger, and Matthias Kollenda are gratefully acknowledged.
Chapter 5 TARGET2: How costly is buying time?
5.1 Motivation
The German claims on the Eurosystem through TARGET21 have gained increasing
attention since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007 as well as during the twin
debt and banking crisis in the euro area. Figure 5.1 shows that claims of the Deutsche
Bundesbank on the Eurosystem increased from close to zero to more than 700 billion
euros at the end of 2012. During 2013 the claims reduced slightly to around 600
billion euros.2
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Figure 5.1: Germany’s TARGET2 claims on the Eurosystem (in bn. euros)
A closer look at the TARGET2 balances within the European Monetary Union
(EMU) reveals that TARGET2 imbalances are concentrated on a few member coun-
tries (see figure 5.2). Apart from Germany’s almost 600 billion euros, Luxembourg,
1TARGET denotes Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross Settlement Express Transfer
and refers to the European transaction settlement system through which commercial banks make
payments.
2For a detailed balance sheet description of the TARGET2 mechanism, see, e. g., Cecchetti et al.
(2012). For a more analytical framework of the origins and development of TARGET2 positions
and their potential financial risks, see Bindseil and König (2012).
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Figure 5.2: TARGET2 balances within EMU, August 2013 (in bn. euros)
the Netherlands and Finland additionally accumulated 200 billion euros of TARGET2
claims vis-à-vis Austria, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, and Spain. Italy and Spain
alone are associated with TARGET2 liabilities of about 550 billion euros.
The literature on TARGET2 balances has become quite extensive over the last
three years. While some authors deal with several problems at once and others with
specific aspects, the academic literature on TARGET2 balances cannot easily be
characterized. To highlight two main directions, one strand focuses specifically on the
time period during the financial crisis in 2007 when countries like Greece and Portugal
apparently financed their current account deficits through TARGET2 liabilities (see,
e. g., Sinn and Wollmershäuser, 2012a,b; Cecchetti et al., 2012; Mayer et al., 2012).
This interpretation is confirmed, for instance, by a panel analysis by Auer (2013).
He finds that current account balances were entirely unrelated to the evolution of
TARGET2 balances before the onset of the financial crisis 2007, however, in the
period after 2007 a correlation of 0.808 suits well with the interpretation that current
117
Chapter 5 TARGET2: How costly is buying time?
account imbalances are being financed by central bank liquidity that has replaced
private capital flows.
The other strand argues that TARGET2 balances reflect a funding crisis within
the euro area since 2011 (see, e. g., Buiter et al., 2011; Bindseil and König, 2012;
Cecioni and Ferrero, 2012; Mody and Bornhorst, 2012). Mody and Bornhorst (2012)
argue that TARGET2 mirrors a reversal of capital flows within Europe. During the
European debt and banking crisis, increasing capital flows from southern European
economies to Germany, which is still running a current account surplus, indicate
capital flight that led to a lack of financial resources in the distressed economies.
Cour-Thimann (2013) provides a comprehensive analysis and an extensive literature
review of TARGET2 balances in the context of the crisis in the euro area.
These studies have in common that they focus on the dynamics of the TARGET2
system, in particular, by answering questions like, how do TARGET2 balances arise,
and what are the economic implications of holding TARGET2 claims. CESifo (2014),
for instance, calculates the potential losses for Germany in case of a euro area collapse
and the subsequent insolvencies of the respective crisis economies. The calculation
shows that holding TARGET2 claims might lead to potential losses of about 470
bn. euros. Contrary, Fahrholz and Freytag (2012) discuss potential misallocations of
real resources due to the existence of TARGET2 imbalances – however, the economic
costs of these misalignments are not quantified.
Summarizing, the existing literature primarily focuses on potential risks and costs,
which are associated with a breakdown of the TARGET2 system, e. g. the costs in case
of a euro area collapse or a member country exit. In contrast, this paper evaluates the
current economic losses incurred from holding TARGET2 claims in real terms. Since
TARGET2 claims and liabilities are interest-bearing and generally remunerated at the
interest rate of the ECB’s main refinancing operations (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2011),
Germany receives, on the one hand, nominal interest gains for holding TARGET2
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claims vis-à-vis the deficit countries. On the other hand, the nominal revenues have
to be adjusted by price level changes over time, i. e. by the real exchange rate, to
account for price differentials between EMU member countries. Due to the focus on
real terms, this approach is able to shed light on the dimension of TARGET2 to a
redistribution of real resources within the euro area.
Using a stylized two-period model based on the approach by Jin and Choi (2013),
the paper finds that by the end of 2013 Germany has incurred accumulated losses
of around 13 billion euros in real terms. Additionally, calculating the real losses and
gains for every euro area member country reveals that the TARGET2 systems acts as
an implicit redistribution mechanism with a cumulated distribution volume of about
30 billion euros.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the stylized background of
TARGET2 within the European Monetary Union. Section 5.3 describes the empirical
framework, which is used to evaluate and to discuss the real losses and gains of
TARGET2 balances. The main findings are summarized in section 5.4.
5.2 TARGET2 in a currency union
In order to assess the real losses and gains of Germany’s TARGET2 claims we follow
the approach by Jin and Choi (2013) and compare the accumulation of TARGET2
claims in a currency union with an accumulation of foreign reserves in a fixed exchange
rate regime.3 Analogously to, e. g., Homburg (2012), Neumann (2012), and Sinn and
Wollmershäuser (2012b), we make use of the balance of payment identity:
3For further discussions about the similarities between TARGET2 balances and balance of pay-
ment crises in fixed exchange rate regimes, see, e. g., Kohler (2012) and Bernholz (2012).
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CA+KA+ ∆S ≡ 0 (5.1)
where KA = KI − KE. The current account balance, CA, mirrors the capital
account balance, KA, defined as the difference of private and public capital imports
KI over capital exports KE. The term ∆S ensures that the balance of payment is
balanced. In a fixed exchange rate regime the term ∆S corresponds to the changes in
foreign exchange reserves.4 Assuming a country whose current account deficit cannot
be financed by capital inflows (net borrowing), the central bank sells her foreign
reserves to provide domestic debtors with foreign currency to balance their liabilities.
In the EMU, the foreign reserves (∆S) are replaced by TARGET2 balances due to
the loss of autonomous monetary policy and the abandonment of national currencies
(see Sinn and Wollmershäuser, 2012a).
The similarity in the adjustment mechanism of foreign reserves and TARGET2
balances is illustrated in the stylized balance sheet of a central bank (see figure 5.3).
We assume two current account surplus countries, one in a fixed exchange rate regime
(e. g. China) and one in a currency union (e. g. Germany as member of the EMU).
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Figure 5.3: Central bank’s balance sheet
4In a floating exchange rate regime ∆S should be zero, since an appreciation or a depreciation
of the exchange rate is supposed to ensure a balanced BOP.
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Basically, assets like gold, government bonds, and foreign reserves (Reserves) as
well as loans granted to commercial banks (Domestic Credit) are booked on the
left-hand side, while the financing base (Base Money), which has been created by
the central bank, is booked on the right-hand side as liability. In a fixed exchange
rate regime without corresponding net private capital outflows the central bank of
a current account surplus economy has to accumulate foreign exchange reserves to
avoid appreciation pressure on the nominal exchange rate, thereby increasing the
monetary base.5 In the case of the EMU the accumulation of foreign reserves is
replaced by creating TARGET2 claims vis-à-vis the deficit countries to substitute for
private capital flows. These similarities are also discussed in Sinn and Wollmershäuser
(2012a,b). The authors additionally point out that contrary to a fixed exchange rate
regime there is no natural restriction in the sense of a limited stock of foreign reserves
in the deficit countries. The central bank of a deficit country can incur as much
TARGET2 liabilities as long as the banks of the deficit country provide sufficiently
good collaterals. Since the standard of eligible collaterals can be lowered by the ECB
there are de facto no limits for TARGET2 liabilities and claims.
5.3 Quantifying real TARGET2 gains and losses
As long as trade is financed by private capital flows, TARGET2 does not play an im-
portant role. Accordingly, figure 5.4 depicts that during the pre-crisis period (2002–
2007) current account balances are financed by private capital flows as no clear rela-
tionship between TARGET2 balances and the current account can be observed. Since
the beginning of the European debt and banking crisis in 2010 there seems to be a
one-to-one relationship between current account balances and TARGET2 balances.
5Accompanying risks of inflation and/or required sterilizing operations by reducing domestic
credit have been left out for the sake of simplicity.
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Figure 5.4: Cumulative current account balances and changes in TARGET2 balances in
bn. euros (based on Cecchetti et al., 2012)6
This supports the assumption that private capital flows are replaced by TARGET2
balances (see, e. g., Cecchetti et al., 2012; Sinn and Wollmershäuser, 2012b).
To keep the calculation of current losses and gains as simple as possible, we ana-
lyze the dynamics of the TARGET2 mechanism in a two-period framework, following
the approach by Jin and Choi (2013). In order to justify the simplification of our
calculation approach, we show impulse response functions of a stylized small open
economy model to gain some intuition behind the dynamics of the TARGET2 sys-
tem.7 Macroeconomic data indicate that during the last decade Germany faced a
persistent real exchange rate depreciation vis-à-vis the rest of the euro area (RoEA),
which boosted exports and led to a growing trade surplus. We therefore simulate
6Data of the national central bank TARGET2 balances were obtained from the CESifo institute
and current account data from the European Commission.
7The simulation is based on a small open economy model within a monetary union according
to Herz and Hohberger (2013). Some stylized information about the model structure and model
equations can be found in the appendix. For a detailed description of the model see Herz and
Hohberger (2013).
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Figure 5.5: Impulse responses for a negative price shock
dynamic responses to a negative price shock in order to imitate Germany’s real ex-
change rate depreciation.8 Figure 5.5 shows that a decline in domestic prices depre-
ciates (increase) the real exchange rate, implying a current account surplus through
an improvement of international competitiveness. Based on our assumption that pri-
vate capital flows are substituted by TARGET2 balances, an increase in the current
account is accompanied by an increase in TARGET2 claims.
The crucial point for the subsequent simplification derives from the adjustment
dynamics to the steady state. A future appreciation (decrease) of the real exchange
rate induces a reduction of the current account surplus as well as the TARGET2
claims. Hence, a real exchange rate depreciation today must be balanced by a real
8A productivity shock or a risk premium shock would have similar effects on the real exchange
rate (depreciation) and the current account.
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exchange rate appreciation in the future to ensure stationarity in the long-run. In
Figure 5.5, the first period reflects the real exchange rate depreciation and the ac-
cumulation of TARGET2 claims, the second period (shaded gray) reflects the real
exchange rate appreciation and the reduction of TARGET2 claims.
5.3.1 Real gains and losses in a two-period model
Within our two-period framework, we assume that Germany’s trade surplus is fi-
nanced by holding TARGET2 claims as private capital flows suddenly stop between
countries (see, e. g. Cecchetti et al., 2012; Sinn and Wollmershäuser, 2012b). Fur-
thermore, we assume that trade depends on the real exchange rate ().
As baseline scenario we assume that trade is balanced (CA0 = 0) at the equilibrium
real exchange rate 0.9 If the real exchange rate differs from the equilibrium rate,
Germany faces a trade surplus or deficit. For example, if Germany is subject to
a real exchange rate depreciation vis-à-vis the RoEA (1 ↑, since 1 = g[CA] with
g′[CA] > 0), a trade surplus (+CA) occurs given the Marshall-Lerner-condition holds.
Since trade must be balanced over two periods, Germany must have a trade deficit
(−CA) in period 2. As private capital flows between both countries are replaced by
TARGET2 balances (TB), the RoEA’s trade deficit is financed through Germany’s
TARGET2 claims vis-à-vis the ECB, thus TB = CA.
Given that TARGET2 balances are remunerated at the ECB’s main refinancing
rate i, Germany’s real trade surplus measured in foreign goods (TARGET2 claim
vis-à-vis RoEA) grows to TB(1 + r) in the second period, where r is defined as the
difference between nominal interest rate and RoEA’s inflation rate. Reversing this
amount in period 2 to finance the trade deficit, it has to be adjusted by the real
exchange rate in period 2 to measure the revenues in domestic goods, TB(1 + r)2,
where 2 = g[−TB(1 + r)].
9For the sake of simplicity we assume that the equilibrium real exchange rate is unity.
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Hence, the total real gains pi in period 1 are:
pi1 = TB1((1 + r1)g[−TB1(1 + r1)]− g[TB1])
= TB1(1 + r1)2 − TB11 = TB12 + r1TB12 − TB11 (5.2)
The real gains equal the “market” value of the TARGET2 balance in period 2 plus
the interest rate income in period 2 stemming from holding the TARGET2 balance
in period 1 less the costs of setting up the balance in period 1.
If Germany faces a real depreciation in period 1 and chooses to hold TARGET2
claims in order to finance its exports – private capital flows are no longer available –
then 1 > 1 and TB1 > 0. Under this scenario, the development of gains and losses
particularly depends on the real interest rate r. This can be seen by differentiating
(5.2) with respect to TB:
∂pi
∂TB
= (1 + r)g[−TB(1 + r)]− g(TB)
− TB((1 + r)2g′[−TB(1 + r)] + g′(TB)) (5.3)
Evaluating equation (5.3) at TB = 0, we get
∂pi
∂TB
= (1 + r)g(0)− g(0) = r < 0, (5.4)
which implies that pi is decreasing in TB. In case of positive (negative) real
interest rates, i. e. r > 0 (r < 0), Germany gains (incurs losses) by holding TARGET2
claims.
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5.3.2 Cumulative real gains and losses
Since TARGET2 balances are not completely liquidated in each period, it is of partic-
ular interest to assess the cumulative gains and losses of Germany’s TARGET2 claims.
In order to accumulate the gains in each period, we assume that TBi is the TARGET2
balance in period i, which is zero at the beginning of period 1. Hence, at the end of
period 1, the TARGET2 balance (TB1) equals the trade surplus (TB1 = CA1) and
the corresponding TARGET2 balance in period 2 is given by TB2 = TB1 + ∆TB2.
As Germany holds a TARGET2 balance in period 2 (TB2) its real costs are mirrored
by TB22. Therefore, the corresponding gains in period 2 can be formulated as:
pi2 = TB2(1 + r2)3 − TB22 = TB23 + r2TB23 − TB22 (5.5)
The gains of period 2 equal the “market” value of the TARGET2 balance plus the
interest rate income in period 3 that stems from holding the TARGET2 balance in
period 2 minus the costs of holding the balance in period 2.10
In order to get the real value of cumulative TARGET2 gains at the end of period 2,
the gains have to be evaluated with the real exchange rate in period 3 (market value
of TB2). Additionally, the interest rate income resulting from previous TARGET2
balances and the costs of TARGET2 “interventions” in previous periods have to be
considered. The cumulative gains in period 2 are given by:
Π2 = TB23 + r1TB12 + r2TB23 − (∆TB11 + ∆TB22) (5.6)
10Analogously, the gains of period t can be expressed as follows: pit = TBt(1 + rt)t+1−TBtt =
TBtt+1 + rtTBtt+1 − TBtt.
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Since TB0 = 0 and ∆TB2 = TB2 − TB1, equation (5.6) can be rewritten as:
Π2 = TB23 + r1TB12 + r2TB23 − (TB11 + (TB2 − TB1)2)
= TB12 + r1TB12 − TB11 + TB23 + r2TB23 − TB22
= pi1 + pi2 (5.7)
According to equation (5.7), the cumulative real gains of holding a TARGET2
balance in period T are:
ΠT = TBT T+1 +
T∑
t=1
rtTBtt+1 −
T∑
t=1
∆TBtt =
T∑
t=1
pi(t) (5.8)
In other words, the cumulative real gains of holding TARGET2 claims or liabilities
can be obtained by adding up the real gains of each previous period.
5.3.3 Data
The calculation of real gains and losses is based on monthly data and covers the years
from 1999 to 2013.
The real exchange rate between Germany and RoEA – based on seasonally adjusted
HCPIs11 – is calculated with data from the European Commission. Specifically, the
real exchange rate is given by  = P ∗/P , where P ∗ is the HCPI of the euro area
without Germany and P is the HCPI of Germany, respectively. Both HCPIs are
set to 100 in January 1999. As the RoEA’s HCPI is not available by itself, it is
constructed in the following way: Firstly, the monthly relative changes of the HCPI
of the euro area and the HCPI of Germany were calculated. Secondly, based on the
ECB’s CPI weights, the German contribution to the monthly change of the HCPI
11Seasonally adjusted HCPIs were constructed by using the X-12 procedure.
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of the euro area was removed to obtain a time series that only mirrors the monthly
changes of the HCPI of the euro area without Germany. Lastly, these changes were
accumulated to construct the HCPI of the rest of the euro area (RoEA).
The monthly real interest rate is computed by dividing the difference between the
ECB’s main refinancing rate and the RoEA’s annual inflation rate by 12.
Data of the national central bank TARGET2 balances are available from CESifo
institute.12 In order to take into account price differentials between Germany and
RoEA, the nominal TARGET2 balance of Germany is deflated by the HCPI of the
RoEA to express the TARGET2 balance in units of foreign goods.
5.3.4 Current gains and losses for Germany
Based on equation (5.2), we calculate Germany’s real monthly gains from holding
TARGET2 balances. According to the implementation of the common currency in
January 1999 we compute the respective gains and losses in real terms for the period
1999m1− 2013m6. The results for the accumulated gains in real terms are shown in
figure 5.6 (solid line).
It illustrates that in the early years of the currency union the accumulated gains
in real terms, namely in constant 1999 prices, were close to 0 until 2007. The gains
started to increase with the beginning of the global financial crisis, reaching its peak
of nearly 4 billion euros in 2010. The gains within this period are mainly driven
by the accumulation of TARGET2 claims in association with positive real interest
rates, and – from a German perspective – future real exchange rate depreciations.13
However, since the end of 2011 Germany’s gains declined sharply and turned into
12For more detailed information, see http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/policy/Spezialthem
en/Policy-Issues-Archive/Target.html.
13More intuition regarding the driving forces of real gains and losses and the decomposition of
annual gains is given below (see also figure 5.7).
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Figure 5.6: Cumulative gains and losses of Germany in bn. euros
losses. Since 2012, Germany’s real losses increase to around 13 billion euros. The
results underline that even without an euro area break-up or exit of one member
country, holding TARGET2 claims can cause high economic costs.
Looking at TARGET2 balances in nominal terms would yield a different picture.
As TARGET2 balances are remunerated at the ECB’s main refinancing rate – which
is still positive – and because of the absence of nominal exchange rate fluctuations,
holding TARGET2 claims results in respective profits in nominal terms. Adjusting
for (real) economic differences, i. e. by incorporating the real exchange rate between
Germany and the RoEA, it becomes evident that holding nominal TARGET2 claims
incurs losses in real terms, however (see figure 5.6).
After calculating Germany’s current losses it is of particular interest to assess what
future gains and losses can be expected from holding TARGET2 claims. To analyze
the driving forces of gains and losses of TARGET2 balances, we differentiate equation
(5.2) with respect to TBt, rt, t, t+1, in order to gain some intuition on the general
properties concerning the development of real gains:
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∂pit
∂TBt
= t+1(1 + r)− t − TBt ∂t
∂TBt
(5.9)
∂pit
∂rt
= TBtt+1 (5.10)
∂pit
∂t
= −TBt + (t+1(1 + rt)− t)∂TBt
∂t
(5.11)
∂pit
∂t+1
= TBt(1 + rt) (5.12)
Although future gains depend on the change of TARGET2 balances (see eq. 5.9),
the TARGET2 balances itself might be considered an endogenous process in the sense
that a change in the trade balance is automatically accompanied by a change in the
TARGET2 balance. Nevertheless, evaluating equation 5.9 at TB = 0 implies that the
development of gains in real terms depends on the real interest rate r. For instance,
in case of positive real interest rates, holding TARGET2 claims is associated with
real gains and vice versa. This effect is based on the balance of payment adjustment
mechanism in the currency union when private capital does not flow between member
countries. Likewise, an increase in the real interest rate increases c. p. Germany’s
gains from holding TARGET2 claims (see eq. 5.10).
A real exchange rate depreciation (t ↑) due to domestic prices decreasing relative
to foreign prices, lowers Germany’s gains in real terms due to a deterioration of the
terms of trade (see eq. 5.11), i. e. a given amount in domestic goods corresponds to
a smaller amount in foreign goods. On the other hand, a future real exchange rate
appreciation (t+1 ↓) decreases current gains (see eq. 5.12), i. e. a given amount in
foreign goods realizes a smaller amount in domestic goods.
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Based on the partial derivatives, we are able to decompose the respective evolution
of gains of Germany. Figure 5.7 illustrates that since 2008 the decline in real gains is
mainly driven by decreasing real interest rates and real exchange rate depreciations.
5.3.5 Future gains and losses for Germany
Given the current costs, what can we expect to be a likely scenario concerning the
future development of gains and losses in real terms? In order to shed some light
on this issue we calculate real gains and losses under 4 different scenarios within our
two-period framework. Specifically, we focus on the question what would happen
if Germany liquidated its TARGET2 balance in period 2.14 We assume that the
14For simplicity reasons, the 4 scenarios are based on annual calculations.
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German economy has TARGET2 claims in real terms of about 418.5 bn. euros in
period 1 and liquidates its claims in period 2. The theoretical discussion at the
beginning of this section indicates that – from a German point of view – a real
appreciation is needed in order to return to a balanced current account. As the
recent ratio of the German consumer price index (HCPI) to the RoEA consumer
price index is 1.08, Germany is undervalued by 8%. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume a linear (symmetric) relationship between the TARGET2 balance and the
real exchange rate, i. e. an appreciation rate of more than 15% would be necessary
to reduce the TARGET2 balance to zero. Thus, TARGET2 claims in real terms of
about 418.5 bn. euros associated with a real exchange rate of about 1.08 in period
1 imply a real exchange rate of 0.92 in period 2 in order to liquidate TARGET2
claims completely. This hypothetical scenario, namely a future real appreciation,
can basically be achieved in two ways, all other things being equal: (i) inflation in
Germany (domestic adjustment) or (ii) deflation in RoEA (external adjustment).
Table 5.1 reports the expected gains and losses from the liquidation of the German
TARGET2 claims in case of domestic adjustment and external adjustment (RoEA)
with respect to 4 different nominal interest rate scenarios. The results indicate that
both adjustment scenarios would imply different costs and highlight the sensitivity to
alternative macroeconomic developments. If, for instance, Germany would liquidate
its TARGET2 claims in period 2, the accumulated losses would be substantial higher
in case of a German inflation compared to a deflation in RoEA. The reason is that a
future real exchange rate appreciation increases current losses measured in domestic
goods due to an improvement in the terms of trade, i. e. the given amount in foreign
goods realizes a smaller amount in domestic goods. As monetary policy is typically
interested in preventing deflation, it is in our sense more plausible to assume that
the real appreciation will be attained through an increasing price level in Germany.
For that reason the current German accumulated losses of about 13 bn. euros are
expected to increase even further.
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Table 5.1: Liquidation of the German TARGET2 balance in 4 scenarios (’99 const. prices)
Variable Scenario
(1)
Scenario
(2)
Scenario
(3)
Scenario
(4)
Nominal interest rate 0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00
TARGET2 balance1 418.50 418.50 418.50 418.50
∆TARGET2 balance2 −418.50 −418.50 −418.50 −418.50
t 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08
t+1 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Domestic adjustment
InflationGermany 17.05 17.05 17.05 17.05
InflationRoEA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Real interest rate 0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00
Cumulative gains −78.94 −71.23 −63.51 −55.80
External adjustment (RoEA)
InflationGermany 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
InflationRoEA −14.57 −14.57 −14.57 −14.57
Real interest rate 14.57 16.57 18.57 20.57
Cumulative gains −22.76 −15.04 −7.33 0.38
Concerning the interest rate development, an increasing nominal interest rate
would increase the gains from holding TARGET2 claims in period 1. As the cur-
rent interest rate level appears to be very low in a historical context, we might expect
rising interest rates that would in general contribute to increasing gains or decreasing
losses, respectively. Nevertheless, it seems to be unlikely that interest rate increases
might lead to gains which would outweigh the losses stemming from the real appre-
ciation.
Table 5.1 also indicates that – in theory – it would be possible to reduce the
real TARGET2 balance back to zero without incurring any losses (scenario 4, RoEA
adjustment). Though, this scenario seems to be unlikely as in this situation the RoEA
would face a sharp deflation accompanied by high nominal interest rates.
Summarizing the potential future developments – from a German perspective –
further losses in real terms seem to be a likely scenario. Basically, the results are
in line with Fahrholz and Freytag (2012). They argue that the emergence of TAR-
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GET2 balances contributes to persistent real misalignments. These misalignments
are in principle mirrored by our quantified TARGET2 gains and losses in real terms.
Fahrholz and Freytag (2012) point out that the TARGET2 balances have been sub-
stituted for the missing private capital flows between EMU countries. Thus, the
TARGET2 balances can be considered non market based subsidies. In particular
they help current account deficit economies to receive the necessary capital imports,
which financial markets no longer offer to these countries. As long as these capital
flows are non market based they no longer reflect the decision-making process of pri-
vate agents and will therefore lead to an inefficient capital allocation. Accordingly,
this development will result in high economic costs, which mainly have to be borne
by economies with positive TARGET2 balances such as Germany.
5.3.6 Distribution across EMU member countries
The TARGET2 system by itself is a “closed” system between EMU countries, i. e. if
there is a country that incurs losses then there also has to be a country, which gains.
Therefore, the question arises how the gains and losses are distributed across the
EMU member countries.
Adapting the calculation approach of gains and losses to each member country of
the EMU, the results indicate that the TARGET2 system can be characterized as an
implicit redistribution mechanism. Figure 5.8 shows that especially surplus European
countries are associated with losses, while deficit European countries benefit from the
TARGET2 system. The respective gains and losses in figure 5.8 are calculated in real
terms but are reported in current prices for comparison reasons. The gross redistri-
bution volume is about 30 billion euros. Compared to all European “rescue packages”
this volume appears to be relatively small. However, compared to the EU budget
(payments appropriations) of about 130 billion euros in 2013, the volume seems to
be quite high (nearly 25%). To some extent the implicit redistribution mechanism
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Figure 5.8: Cumulative gains and losses in bn. euros (in current prices).
of the TARGET2 system is similar to the economic effects of the introduction of
Eurobonds, which would also lead to distributional effects between euro area mem-
ber countries (see, e.g., Hild et al., 2014; Homburg, 2012). Through the adaption of
Eurobonds, member countries with recently higher interest rates would benefit from
the lower average interest rate of the Eurobond. In contrast, countries with relatively
low interest rates, e. g. Germany, would face higher interest rate payments.
In line with Bindseil and König (2012), the TARGET2 system is a fundamental
component of a well-functioning euro area and serves as an adjustment-buffer mech-
anism in the current European debt and banking crisis. TARGET2 balances might
buy time to implement structural reforms that may remove the intra-European im-
balances.
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5.4 Conclusions
It is often stated that TARGET2 balances mirror missing private capital flows due to
structural imbalances in the euro area. Economists argue that if structural imbalances
will be removed, private capital flows would recover and, thus, TARGET2 balances
would disappear – without causing economic costs. The existing literature focuses on
potential costs and risks, which are associated with the TARGET2 system, e. g. the
costs in case of a euro area collapse or a member country exit. These studies, however,
seem to neglect the aspect that the TARGET2 system might be associated with
current economic costs. The aim of this paper was to evaluate the economic costs in
real terms and to gain insights into the distributional effects that come along with
the TARGET2 system.
Since TARGET2 balances are published in current prices, it seems to be inappro-
priate to provide arguments concerning the TARGET2 system on a nominal basis,
while price differentials between member countries are in place. Taking these imbal-
ances reliably into account, holding TARGET2 claims can incur losses in real terms
– even without a collapse of the euro area.
The paper finds that by the end of 2013 Germany has incurred losses from holding
TARGET2 claims of around 13 bn. euros in real terms (in constant 1999 prices). The
calculation of real gains and losses for each EMU member country indicates that the
TARGET2 system can be considered an implicit redistribution mechanism. On the
one hand, this mechanism might help to finance necessary (real) economic adjust-
ments. On the other hand, as real gains and losses basically mirror real economic
differences in the EMU, the TARGET2 system cannot replace necessary reforms.
However, it might provide time and money, which in turn have to be used by policy-
makers to reduce intra-EMU imbalances.
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5.5 Appendix
To illustrate the dynamics of the TARGET2 mechanism we use a small open economy
approach within a monetary union in the spirit of Galí and Monacelli (2005, 2008).
The specific model is based on Herz and Hohberger (2013) who analyze the potential
of fiscal policy to stabilize current account imbalances. Figure 5.9 summarizes the
structure of the model.
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Figure 5.9: Small open economy model structure.
Given the focus on TARGET2 mechanism, the modeling of the external sector
deserves more detail. The following model equations are log-linearized around a
deterministic steady state, so that variables are expressed in percent deviations from
their respected steady state value. The change in the real exchange rate is defined as
change of CPI ratios in a common currency:
∆t = ∆Et + pi
∗
t − pit, (5.13)
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Due to the same currency, we can set ∆Et = 0. Hence, an increase in foreign inflation
relative to domestic inflation yields to a real exchange rate depreciation (an increase
in t). The uncovered interest rate parity condition (15) is:
it = i
∗
t + riskt (5.14)
where riskt = −χnfat captures a time-varying country risk premium according to
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005) and ensures stationarity of the foreign debt level.
The real net foreign asset position evolves over time according to:
nfat = (1 + it−1 − pit)nfat−1 + nxt (5.15)
where nxt = yt − ct − α∆t are the net exports in each period. Given the evolution
of assets determined by the model, we express the current account as the change in
net foreign assets:
cat = nfat − nfat−1 (5.16)
In the current small open economy trade is financed through private capital flows
(nfat). As we assume that private capital flows are totally substituted by TARGET2
since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007 (see, e. g. Cecchetti et al., 2012;
Sinn and Wollmershäuser, 2012b), we replace nfat by targett so that a trade balance
surplus corresponds with a TARGET2 claim vis-à-vis the deficit country. To illustrate
TARGET2 in figure 5.9, the financial flows between households and RoEA (∆B∗ and
i∗B∗t ) can be replaced by TARGET2 balances and, hence, equation (5.15) and (5.16)
can be rewritten to:
targett = (1 + it−1 − pit)targett−1 + nxt (5.17)
cat = targett − targett−1 (5.18)
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The aim of this thesis was to analyze the role of central banks in the context of
financial crises. In particular, the thesis has examined (i) the potential monetary
policy’s role in causing a financial crisis and (ii) the central bank’s management in
times of crises.
Chapter 2 has focused on US monetary policy as a cause of asset price booms. The
analysis was based on an extended GMM Taylor-type monetary reaction function,
which captures asset price booms in the US real estate market. The estimation re-
sults give reason to suppose that US monetary policy responds pro-cyclicly to boom
phases in the real estate market. According to the analysis the Fed did not increase
interest rates in response to increasing real estate prices. This interest rate setting
behavior therefore seems to create an implicit expansionary monetary impulse – or,
put differently, the absence of a tighter monetary policy could be a driving force for
further increases in asset prices (see Meltzer, 2002). This finding indicates that the
interest rate setting behavior of the US monetary policy might has contributed to the
formation of an asset price bubble, and hence to the outbreak of the financial crisis
in 2007.
Chapter 3 has analyzed central bank actions in the course of financial crises. In
particular, this chapter has evaluated the economic costs associated with the cen-
tral banks’ decisions to intervene or not to intervene in case of speculative attacks.
Contrary to the typical public and academic perception, currency crises can be very
heterogeneous events with quite different real effects. The monetary authorities with
their decisions to intervene or not to intervene seem to play an important role for
the economic costs of such financial crises. In case of a speculative attack, a central
bank can in principle either intervene in the foreign exchange market to defend the
exchange rate or she can remain passive, i. e. abstain from an intervention. If the
central bank decides to intervene she can then either succeed or fail so that the cur-
rency depreciates. This gives rise to three distinct crisis events, namely immediate
depreciations, successful defenses and unsuccessful defenses.
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The empirical analysis of chapter 3 indicates that a successful defense, i. e. the
central bank is able to stabilize the exchange rate with her interventions, yields the
best result in terms of output growth. In this case the central bank can basically
counteract the speculative attack, apparently without facing any economic costs,
e. g. a recession due to a restrictive monetary policy. If the central bank starts to
intervene in the currency market she faces the possibility of an unsuccessful defense
either because she suspends her intervention voluntarily, e. g. the benefits of a stable
exchange rate no longer exceed the costs of stabilizing, or involuntarily, e. g. as the
reserves are depleted. Such an unsuccessful defense seems to be associated with the
worst possible outcome with an average loss of around 5 per cent of GDP. If the
central bank decides not to intervene, i. e. if she lets the domestic currency depreciate
right away, she can expect an “intermediate” loss, with the economy passing through a
mild recession. The decision to defend therefore is evidently quite risky. Abstaining
from an intervention policy could be an interesting alternative for a conservative,
risk-aware central bank.
Chapter 4 has extended the analysis of the previous chapter and has focused on a
number of important macroeconomic variables, such as private consumption, invest-
ment, exports, imports, debt-to-GDP ratio, and unemployment rate. The analysis
has applied a panel VAR framework to explicitly examine the macroeconomic dy-
namics following the three types of currency crises. The findings from the impulse
response functions indicate that central banks can heavily influence the economic
course of a currency crisis. The impulse response functions highlight the different
policy approaches taken by central banks as response to a speculative attack. In the
case of successful defenses the central bank follows a policy that is consistent with
a stable exchange rate and is thereby able to neutralize the effect of the speculative
attack. In the case of an immediate depreciation the central bank voluntarily aban-
dons the exchange rate regime without intervening, and at the same time she tends
to implement an expansionary monetary policy – possibly to support real growth. As
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this strategy is associated with little economic costs in terms of output growth, it may
be considered as a distinct alternative monetary policy compared to defending the
domestic currency. In contrast, the impulse response functions suggest a somewhat
inconsistent monetary policy in case of an unsuccessful defense. On the one hand,
the intervention policies are not expansionary enough to prevent a recession. And on
the other hand, they are not restrictive enough to stabilize the exchange rate. As a
consequence, this inconsistency might increase uncertainty, which in turn lead to an
unsuccessful defense of the exchange rate and to high economic costs.
The results also imply that to not differentiate between the different types of crises
is likely to bias policy recommendations in favor of exchange rate interventions. Anal-
yses which intermingle the different types of currency crises typically overestimate the
costs of immediate depreciations as the high costs of unsuccessful defenses dominate
the relatively low costs of immediate depreciations and successful defenses. Subse-
quently, monetary authorities are inclined to intervene “too often” rather than to
immediately give in to a speculative attack.
To adequately analyze the role of the TARGET2 system within the euro area,
chapter 5 has examined the dynamics of TARGET2 balances. Against the background
of the European debt and banking crisis, the TARGET2 system currently acts as an
implicit stabilization mechanism, as it substitutes for missing private capital flows.
Economists argue that if real economic imbalances will be removed, private capital
flows would recover and, thus, TARGET2 balances would disappear – without causing
any economic costs. The existing literature focuses on potential costs and risks, which
are associated with the TARGET2 system, e. g. the costs in case of a euro area collapse
or a member country exit. These studies, however, seem to neglect the aspect that
even in “normal” times the current TARGET2 system might be associated with high
economic costs. Given price differentials between EMU member countries, holding
TARGET2 claims can incur losses in real terms – even without a collapse of the euro
area.
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The analysis finds that by the end of 2013 Germany has incurred losses from hold-
ing TARGET2 claims of around 13 bn. euros in real terms (in constant 1999 prices).
The calculation of real gains and losses for each EMU member country suggests that
the TARGET2 system can be considered a redistribution mechanism, which might
help to finance necessary (real) economic adjustments. While the TARGET2 system
cannot replace necessary adjustment processes, it might provide time and money that
have to be used to implement reforms and adequate policies.
In summary, this thesis highlights that central banks play an important role with
respect to financial crises. Of course, the relationship between monetary policy and
financial crises has many different dimensions and this thesis cannot provide a com-
prehensive overview of all possible transmission channels through which monetary
policy may determine the economic course before and after financial crises. Never-
theless, the results of this thesis indicate that central banks’ decisions may affect the
economic development in fundamental ways. They can help to mitigate the negative
economic consequences of financial crises, but they can also sow the seeds for finan-
cial distortions. For this very reason, the economic effects of central banks’ actions
inevitably needed to be thoroughly examined to subsequently support tighter control
of economic consequences.
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